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Abstract
This thesis defends the notion of grounding—an explanatory connection of non-causal
determination. I present four challenges to developing a systematic theory of grounding,
and show that they can be met satisfactorily.
The first challenge is that grounding is unintelligible or uninformative—or at any
rate, that its work can be done by more familiar notions. If so, the notion of grounding
is not even prima facie justified. I argue that grounding is at least as informative as—
and, in some respects, more informative than—the more familiar notions it is supposed
to supplant. It is necessary because we can express with it certain explanatory relation-
ships which are just inexpressible with weaker notions of determination. My defence
of grounding is preferable to extant defences since it is less concessive, requiring fewer
assumptions about the nature of grounding.
A key motivation for grounding is that it is an explanatory connection. The second
challenge is that the sense in which grounding is a (distinctly) explanatory relation is
unclear, wherefore the case for grounding is severely weakened. I motivate a theory
of explanation and argue that it comports nicely with the sense in which grounding is
explanatory. Moreover, I characterise a new explanatory notion I call philosophical ex-
planation with grounding at its core. This notion illustrates the importance of grounding
for philosophical methodology generally.
The third challenge is to the internal coherence of grounding theory. A dilemma
apparently show that grounding connections can be neither grounded nor ungrounded.
Several treatments of this problem already exist, but none is satisfactory. Some imply
4
5implausible explanations. Others require new—dubious—posits. I present a new solu-
tion, which offers satisfying explanations but requires no dubious posits. It explains,
moreover, why some grounding connections appear to admit of explanation but others
do not.
The last challenge is to the usefulness of grounding. While it is an interesting meta-
metaphysical posit, it offers little to the metaphysician working on first-order problems.
I show how grounding can be fruitfully applied to breaking the deadlock in the debate
about laws of nature.
for Amy,
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The overarching aim of this thesis is to vindicate the notion of grounding.1 By this I
mean that the notion is useful, and that investigation into its nature is worthwhile. It has
already become clichéd to say: the notion has caused something of a stir in metaphysics
recently. Whether that is because the notion was initially championed by the likes of Kit
Fine, or because philosophers sense something genuinely exciting afoot, is hard to say. I
happen to think that grounding marks the most significant development in metaphysics
since the rehabilitation of necessity. Naturally, as a philosophical notion becomes popu-
lar, others tend to push back. We are now seeing some serious criticism from naysayers,
led by Jessica Wilson. But the research programme surrounding grounding has barely
got off the ground, as it were. If grounding theory is to survive to adolescence, there are
some foundational issues we need to address. The subsidiary aims of this thesis are to
address those issues.
The purpose of this chapter is first, to get a preliminary handle on the notion of
grounding, and second, to say how I plan to address those foundational issues in subse-
quent chapters.
1Or ‘ground’. I will use the two terms interchangeably in this thesis. It is interesting to note, but
holds no substantive interest, that ‘ground’ is overwhelmingly favoured by operator theorists, while
‘grounding’ is favoured by predicate theorists (see Chapter 3).
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1.1 What is Grounding?
1.1.1 Explanation
Some facts hold in virtue of others. Or so philosophers often say. That Xanthippe is a
widow holds in virtue of Socrates’ having died (Kim 1974). My jumper is red in virtue of
being maroon. An act is good in virtue of its bringing about a net gain in utility. The in-
virtue-of locution is ubiquitous throughout philosophy, and yet is rarely given a second
thought. As a systematic account of it, grounding theorists offer grounding—a connec-
tion of directed, explanatory, non-causal determination. (Cognate phrases—‘makes it
the case that’, ‘determines’, ‘depends on’, ‘fixes’, ‘because’—are similarly thought to
denote grounding.) Questions of what grounds what, it is further claimed, are central
to metaphysics, and philosophy more broadly. Insofar as philosophy has an explanatory
task, it is to seek the grounds of the phenomena which interest us.
Its close relationship with explanation is characteristic of grounding. Grounds ex-
plain what they ground. A philosopher might ask: why, or in virtue of what, does
‘Kripke’ refer to Kripke? And we might reply that ‘Kripke’ is shorthand for a definite
description which uniquely denotes Kripke; that it does so by convention; or that our
use of ‘Kripke’ is a part of a causal chain of references tracing back to an initial bap-
tism of Kripke. These explanations are highly non-trivial, of course. Philosophers are
not typically interested in trivial grounding claims. But if true, they are explanations
nonetheless.
There are homely and obvious examples. That Socrates died explains why Xanthippe
became a widow. My promising to ϕ explains why I am obliged to ϕ. My jumper’s being
maroon explains its being red. To be sure, in philosophy we might argue about how the
determinate-determinable relation works, or what its nature is. Those are non-trivial
issues. But it is trivial that my jumper is red because it is maroon.
Nor are such explanations confined to layman and philosopher. A physicist might
ask in virtue of what the temperature of a gas is t, and it may be replied that this is
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because its mean molecular kinetic energy is k. Or she might say that the curvature
of spacetime explains gravitational phenomena. Or that graphene is highly conductive
because of its flat hexagonal lattice structure.
The explanatoriness of grounding, moreover, is what makes it indispensable. In
recent years, philosophers have attempted to capture a general notion of dependence
is modal terms, such as supervenience (see Fine 2001; Schaffer 2009; Rosen 2010, cf.
Wilson 2014). The dependence of the mental on the physical, for instance, was thought
to be captured by a supervenience relation: M depends on P iff necessarily, there can be
no change in M without a change in P. The trouble is, what we want to capture is that P
explains M—but supervenience is not an explanatory relation. To see this, consider that
supervenience can hold symmetrically. As Fine (1994) taught us, Socrates exists exactly
when {Socrates} does, and thus each supervenes on the other. And yet, we are strongly
inclined to say that Socrates explains, or accounts for, the existence of his singleton, and
not the other way about. Explanation has a strict directionality which supervenience
lacks, and thus requires requires a directed relation to back it up. But this isn’t even
the worst problem with supervenience. As Kim (1993) taught us, supervenience is not
even of the right character in the first place to be explanatory.
Supervenience itself is not an explanatory relation. It is not a ‘deep’ metaphysical
relation; rather, it is a ‘surface’ relation that reports a pattern of property covari-
ation, suggesting the presence of an interesting dependency relation that might
explain it. (p. 167)
That is, supervenience is a superficial relation. From the fact that one set of properties
invariably accompanies another set of properties, it hardly follows that the latter explain
the former in any interesting sense—anymore than the fact that night always follows




The main lesson of Fine (2001), as I understand it, is that we need to give up the obses-
sion with replacing substantive notions of dependence with more hygienic, empiricist-
friendly, or simply better-understood notions. For instance, logical, semantic, and modal
characterisations of reduction repeatedly fail, and fail in trivial ways. This does not mean
that we need to give up notions of dependence. If anything, it indicates that our handle
on dependence is more nuanced and fine-grained than these notions allow for. As Fine
(ibid., p. 10) says, we need to restore ourselves to a state of ‘metaphysical innocence’
about these notions, in which they are ‘seen to concern the subject matter itself and not
the means by which it might be represented or cognized’.
Noting similar failures to capture the idioms of dependence, Rosen (2010) makes an
explicit plea for ideological tolerance. He says
We should grant immediately that there is no prospect of a reductive account or
definition of the grounding idiom: we do not know how to say in more basic terms
what it is for one fact to obtain in virtue of another. So if we take the notion on
board, we will be accepting it as primitive, at least for now. . . . I begin with the
working hypothesis that there is a single salient form of metaphysical dependence
to which the idioms we have been invoking all refer. (pp. 113–114)
Rosen’s central point is that we should grant the notion of grounding—even though we
may be unable to define it—and see what we can do with it. If it turns out to be useful,
that is vindication enough. If not, we’re no worse off.
Most grounding theorists take on such a working hypothesis.2 Part of the grounding
theorist’s challenge is to show that ‘ground’ is meaningful. This can be done in several
ways (see especially Chapter 2.3). We can specify its logical properties. We can trace its
analytic connections with other terms. And we can ostend examples. We have already
seen some examples. Let’s look at grounding’s formal properties.
2Though Correia and Skiles (forthcoming) are a notable exception. They define grounding in terms
of a generalised notion of identity.
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1.1.3 Formal Properties
For the purposes of this section, I’m going to assume that grounding is a relation between
worldly facts (see Audi 2012b, cf. Rosen 2010).3 A worldly fact is an obtaining state
of affairs. An atomic state of affairs is an individual entity together with one of its
properties. If a is F , then a’s being F is a fact. (Sometimes this is denoted [Fa], but
it will usually not be necessary to avail ourselves of this notation.) We can view this
as a ‘chunk of the world’, so to speak, or as something like an abstraction from a. The
exact nature of facts will not be at issue in this thesis, but at the very least, the worldly
conception of facts entails that facts are not sensitive to difference in sense. If a = b
and F denotes the same property as G, then [Fa] and [Gb] denote the same fact. More
complex states of affairs, and thus more complex facts, may be built from the atomic
states of affairs.
Now, the grounding relation is commonly (but by no means unanimously) thought
to have the following properties:
1. Irreflexivity. Just as no fact explains itself, so no fact grounds itself.
2. Asymmetry. Just as circular explanations are prohibited, so are circles of ground.
3. Transitivity. Just as explanations chain, so do relations of ground.
4. Factivity. That A explains B entails that A and B are true. Likewise, that A
grounds B entails that A and B obtain.
5. Necessitation. If A grounds B, then necessarily, if A then B.
6. Non-Monotonicity. If A explains B, it does not follow that A and A′ explain
B. We can’t add arbitrary ‘premises’ to the explanans—they must all be relevant.
For instance, that snow is white explains why ‘snow is white’ is true. But it is not
the case that snow’s being white and grass’s being green explains why ‘snow is
3The consequences of this assumption are minimal at this point. Those who take grounding to be
an operator can encode its formal properties as inference rules in their logic. See Chapter 3.
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white’ is true. The colour of grass is irrelevant. Grounding is not invariant under
the addition of arbitrary grounds.
7. Hyper-intensionality Grounding is more fine grained than purely modal notions,
such as supervenience. An intensional context is one in which co-referring terms
cannot be substituted salva veritate. Modal contexts are such contexts. It is
necessary that 8 = 8, but it is not necessary that the number of planets = 8.
Belief reports induce hyper-intensional contexts. Lois believes that Clark is Clark,
but she does not believe that Clark is Superman. Grounding is hyper-intensional
in the sense that we can’t substitute necessarily co-obtaining facts in grounding
claims. That Socrates exists and that {Socrates} exists necessarily co-obtain. But
the former grounds the latter, and not the other way about.
These formal properties make grounding particularly well-suited to defining and
illuminating a host of related notions.
1.1.4 Structure, Fundamentality, and the Hierarchy
Grounding is sometimes described as ‘something like metaphysical causation’ (Schaffer
2012, p. 122). Just as causation drives the world forwards through time, so grounding
drives the world ‘up through levels’ (Schaffer 2016b, p. 59). These levels are levels of
fundamentality. The idea is that the ‘low-level’ facts—concerning the microphysical,
fundamental particles and their properties—occupy the lower levels. Higher up we find
the biological—organisms and their properties. (Even higher up we might find social
facts.) And these sets of facts may be bridged by facts concerning the chemical—
molecules and their properties. We can sum this up with the convenient simplification
that biology depends on chemistry, and chemistry depends on physics, and. . . . The
idea is that the higher-level facts are real—they really obtain. But they are fully fixed
by the fundamental facts. This is similar to the working hypothesis of non-reductive
physicalism: there are mental facts—they are distinct from physical facts. Nevertheless,
each mental fact is fully explained by some constellation of microphysical facts.
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Grounding thus induces structure. Specifically, as a transitive asymmetric (but not
connected) relation, grounding induces a strict partial ordering on the domain of facts.
A neat example of such an ordering is given by the proper subset relation:
{0, 1, 2}
{1, 0} {0, 2} {1, 2}
{0} {1} {2}
{}
Figure 1.1: A partial ordering
Of course, a grounding structure won’t be anything like as well-behaved as this, but
the diagram gives a picture of the kind of structure to which grounding gives rise.
The structure induced by grounding is sometimes referred to as the hierarchy. Lower
down the hierarchy we find the more fundamental facts, and higher up the less funda-
mental facts. I’m not overly fond of the hierarchical picture. It suggests that the facts
are neatly stratified into levels according to their degree of fundamentality. That pic-
ture is too idealised. Some theorists (e.g. Cameron 2016; Rettler 2017) like to separate
the notions of grounding and relative fundamentality. For instance, Rettler says that
an electron in his hand is more fundamental than the Eiffel Tower, but plausibly, no
grounding relation holds between them. Now, I’d certainly agree that there is a sense, in-
tuitively, in which electrons are generally more fundamental than towers. But in general,
when we separate relative fundamentality from grounding, the notion becomes slippery.
Let us say that a pure notion of relative fundamentality induces a weak total order on
reality—that is, for any two things x, y: either x is more fundamental than y; y is more
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fundamental than x; or x, y are equally fundamental. Now consider the window and the
table. Which is more fundamental? Who knows. It’s not even clear there should be a
determinate answer. The best we can do is to say that x is more fundamental than y iff
x grounds y (see Schaffer 2009).4
Finally, note that the least members of the ordering occupy a privileged position.
Nothing grounds them. They are the most fundamental facts in the hierarchy. They
are the absolutely fundamental facts. That is, x is (absolutely) fundamental iff nothing
grounds x. We will defend this understanding of fundamentality in the next chapter.
So there you have it. Grounding is a relation of non-causal determination be-
tween facts (or fact-like entities). Grounding is explanatory; grounds explain what they
ground. The notion is more useful than supervenience for characterising dependence. It
is primitive—we can’t define it—but it is useful. And the formal properties of grounding
make it well-suited to explicating structure and fundamentality. We will now consider
some obstacles to formulating a systematic theory of grounding.
1.2 Foundational Issues
The first issue is how to tackle outright skepticism about the grounding theorist’s
posit. While others have addressed skeptical worries (Raven 2012, 2017; Schaffer 2016a;
Cameron 2016; Berker 2015), my defence of ground is less concessive, and consequently
leaves a broader space of possible grounding theories. If I could sum up the skeptic’s
position, it is that grounding is unexplanatory because it is uninformative. My rejoinder
is that the skeptic has mischaracterised the grounding theorist’s position. In the course
of dispelling the mischaracterisations I show how grounding claims can be informative,
and consequently, how grounding gets to be explanatory.
The second issue is the relationship between grounding and explanation. Grounding
theorists generally agree that a characteristic feature of grounding is that it is explana-
4Note that I could have replaced this definition with the weaker definition that grounding is sufficient
for relative fundamentality. This would have allowed for the possibility of relative fundamentality
between grounding-disconnected facts, without tying the notion to a dubious definition. This would
have created a problem for my next definition, however.
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tory. But the exact nature of the relationship is rarely spelled out (though Audi 2012b;
Schaffer 2016b are exceptions). I relate this problem to the question of how we ought
to represent grounding claims—with an operator or a relational predicate? As it turns
out, the problems are intimately related. How we choose to represent grounding claims
has consequences for the plausibility of certain positions on the relationship between
grounding and explanation. I will argue that grounding is irreducibly relational, and
so best represented by a relational predicate. While other grounding theorists hold this
position, my argument for it is unique. I argue that an operational grounding claim
is true, if at all, because it has a relation of ground as a truthmaker. I then use this
position to motivate a view on which explanation is an epistemic notion, distinct from
the metaphysical dependence relations which ground it. Finally, I characterise a notion
I call philosophical explanation—explanation by philosophical theory—and show how it
relates to metaphysical explanation. The nature of this relationship illustrates the cen-
trality of grounding not just to metaphysics, but to philosophy more broadly. Indeed,
on this view the rest of philosophy turns out to be a kind of applied metaphysics.
The third issue is the problem of iterated or meta-grounding: what grounds the
grounding facts? There are compelling reasons to doubt that grounding facts are
grounded, and compelling reasons to doubt that they are ungrounded. But if neither
option is plausible, then the posit of grounding must be misguided. The problem is well
known to grounding theorists (Bennett 2011; deRosset 2013; Dasgupta 2015; Litland,
forthcoming), but I don’t think any treatment is adequate. Bennett and deRosset’s
accounts imply implausible explanations. Litland’s account pushes the problem into
his logic, and Dasgupta relies on an extra—controversial—posit. After dismissing some
prima facie routes to dismissing the problem, and arguing that it is a problem facing
all accounts of dependence, I present my own solution. The solution is most similar
to Dasgupta’s, but it does not rely on any extra posit. I take grounding facts to be
grounded in the essence of grounding itself. This has some surprising and welcome con-
sequences, given the primitivity of grounding. On this account, there is, in principle, a
ground for every grounding fact, but because the essence of grounding remains partially
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unknown to us, we can’t always find the required ground—as would be expected, given
primitivity.
Now, all this work would be largely beside the point if grounding were not a useful
notion. But most work on grounding has hitherto focused on theoretical questions
about the notion itself. Applications are thin on the ground. It is a fair criticism of
the grounding literature that it does not illuminate how we can actually use the notion.
The fourth issue, then, is whether, and how, grounding may be deployed in philosophical
theorising. The fifth chapter aims to rectify this. I show how the notion of grounding can
be used to break the deadlock in the debate between Humeans and non-Humeans about
laws. Specifically, I argue that the anti-Humean’s central complaint is best articulated
as a complaint of grounding gaps—that a Humean ontology is unable to ground what
Humeans claim it grounds. If the Humean attempts to close the grounding gap, another
one springs up elsewhere. Even if this articulation fails to convince any Humeans, at
the very least it sets up the non-Humean’s misgivings in a way which is clearly non-




One can challenge the notion of grounding in at least two ways. On the one hand, one
might challenge the very intelligibility of the notion. Skeptics of this type include Thomas
Hofweber (2009) and Chris Daly (2012). Hofweber accepts that there are contexts in
which the use of ‘ground’ is reasonably well clear, but denies that in such cases the
notion is necessary; its work can be done by better understood notions, such as logical
entailment, conceptual priority, or counterfactual dependence. In contexts where its
use is unclear, the notion of ground becomes ‘esoteric’. Hofweber’s attack overlaps
somewhat with Daly’s, but whereas Hofweber considers the notion ‘esoteric’, Daly thinks
it is outright unintelligible. With any primitive term, unless it is clearly deployed in
everyday thought, it is difficult to establish definitively that it is intelligible. But here,
I think, it is easy enough to shift the dialectical burden. For the grounding theorist
has met all mutually agreed criteria for furnishing her primitive with content. Absent
a principled reason as to why ground should be considered unintelligible, any attack on
its intelligibility just betrays a prejudice against it (which comes across very clearly in
Daly’s attack). Thus, my response is not to attempt to convey the content of ‘ground’
(many such attempts already exist), but rather to show that Hofweber and Daly have
22
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given no good reason to think the notion unintelligible.
On the other hand, though one may think questions of metaphysical dependence are
intelligible and important, one may yet doubt that ground, conceived as a generic notion
of dependence, is in any way useful. Skeptics of this type include Kathrin Koslicki (2015)
and Jessica Wilson (2014). Koslicki argues that, by obscuring salient and important dif-
ferences between different types of metaphysical dependence, a generic notion of ground
confuses questions of dependence. Wilson holds a similar view, but her argument aims to
show that a generic notion of ground is uninformative, leaving open important questions
which must be answered in order to get a handle on the nature of the dependence at
issue. The upshot of the argument is that ground is not such an admirably explanatory
notion—one of its key motivations.
My response to Koslicki is rather swift. I argue that the notion of ground, as a
relation of dependence, does not obscure putative differences between various forms of
dependence, since these differences ought to be attributed to differences in the nature of
the relata. Wilson’s attack presents the strongest challenge to the grounding theorist to
date. As such, the bulk of the chapter will be devoted to rebutting her arguments. Get-
ting bogged down in the details of these arguments will take some time, and may obscure
the overall picture. So, to summarise: I argue that grounding claims are appropriately
informative, and they allow for follow-up questions which illuminate the nature of the
dependence at issue. The logical interaction of specific relations of metaphysical depen-
dence provides reason to think a common relation is at work. Bare grounding claims
taken out of context may indeed be unexplanatory, but when embedded within a larger
theory, their explanatory role becomes clear. Moreover, it is doubtful that Wilson’s spe-
cific relations are able to convey what a grounding claim conveys, particularly regarding
the directedness of dependence. Lastly, I compare the grounding framework with Wil-
son’s primitive fundamentality framework, and argue that the grounding framework is
both more expressive, and better characterises fundamentality.
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2.2 Grounding is Esoteric
Hofweber (2009) attacks what he takes to be an illegitimate way of doing metaphysics—
esoteric metaphysics—which he takes grounding to exemplify:
Esoteric metaphysics holds that the questions metaphysics aims to answer involve
distinctly metaphysical terms. It is properly called ‘esoteric’, since one needs to
understand distinctly metaphysical terms in order for one to understand what the
questions are that metaphysics tries to answer. You have to be an insider to get in
the door. (ibid. p.267)
The most common way to be an esoteric metaphysician in practice is. . . [to] rely
on a notion of metaphysical priority: some notion that claims that certain facts or
things are metaphysically more basic than other facts or things. (ibid. p.268)
This is to be contrasted with egalitarian metaphysics:
One conception [of metaphysics] holds that the questions in the domain of meta-
physics are expressed in ordinary, everyday terms, accessible to all. We shall call
metaphysics so understood egalitarian metaphysics. One does not need to under-
stand special metaphysical terms to understand the questions that we are trying to
ask in egalitarian metaphysics. The questions are accessible to all, even though not
everyone cares equally about finding an answer to them. (ibid. p. 266, emphasis
original)
Hofweber is not explicit on what precisely he thinks is wrong with esoteric metaphysics,
but we can surmise from the rhetoric1 what he has in mind. Esoteric metaphysics is the
paradigm of ivory tower philosophy, concerned with irrelevant questions and problems
philosophers themselves have invented. It is exclusive because only the initiated may
participate. And it is arrogant because it considers itself independent from the rest of
inquiry.
Hofweber targets his attacks on special primitive metaphysical terminology. Defined
terminology, so long as it bottoms out in terms accessible to all, I take it, is fine.2
1‘Esoteric metaphysics appeals to those, I conjecture, who deep down hold that philosophy is the
queen of the sciences after all, since it investigates what the world is REALLY like.’ (p.273). The
capitals are supposed to indicate that ‘really’ is being used in a non-standard, special metaphysical
sense.
2I base this claim on Hofweber’s contention that, despite appearances, mathematics is a paradigm
of an egalitarian discipline, since its terms are explicitly defined by prior terms, going back to terms
which are accessible to all.
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Moreover, it is only metaphysics which concerns itself with questions couched in dis-
tinctly metaphysical terminology that is deemed esoteric. Metaphysical theories which
‘implicitly define’ special terminology are fine, so long as those theories attempt to an-
swer egalitarian questions. Hofweber offers no reasons for this claim, but it seems the
idea goes something like this: introducing special metaphysical terms in an attempt to
answer a metaphysical question is akin to introducing theoretical entities in science to
attempt to explain some phenomenon. A metaphysical theory which makes use of spe-
cial metaphysical terminology is fine, it seems, so long as it is justified by an inference
to the best explanation.
Now, Hofweber concedes that proponents of grounding, despite taking the notion as
primitive (usually), attempt to elucidate it by way of example. But, he claims, grounding
theorists pull a ‘bait-and-switch’ here, pointing to an example of some ordinary kind of
priority, and claiming it exhibits a grounding connection. Fine (2001)’s contention that
a true disjunction is grounded in its true disjunct(s) is really an example of logical
priority—in the sense of asymmetric entailment. Other putative grounding connections
are similarly dismissed. Where no suitable ‘ordinary’ notion of priority seems to be at
work, the example is dismissed as not requiring us to recognise any priority at all, since
the same facts hold in any case.
2.2.1 Response to Hofweber
There are two prongs to Hofweber’s attack. The first is that there is no need for ground,
since our stock of ordinary notions of priority is sufficient to understand questions of
dependence. The second is that ground is esoteric. Even if there were a need for some
finer-grained notion of priority, it is not clear this would be ground. Michael Raven
(2012) notes that much of the recent work on grounding can be seen as attempting to
clarify the notion. Thus, answering the first attack provides vindication for the attempt
to clarify the notion of ground, and the clarification of ground can be seen as a response
to the second attack. But I think we can do better than this. We can show that Hofweber
has given no good reason to dismiss ground out of hand, since his esoteric/egalitarian
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distinction rules out many important and perfectly intelligible questions.
The need for grounding
Grounding is usually introduced via intuitive examples of dependence which are appar-
ently not captured by better understood notions. Hofweber’s contention is that: either
the example exhibits some ordinary kind of priority, or there is no need to recognise
any kind of priority in the example. The second horn of this dilemma can be dismissed
off the bat as clearly question begging. If there is strong intuitive evidence that some
form of dependence is at work, then summary dismissal of the example merely indicates
a prejudice against ground (cf. Audi 2012a). Thus, we will restrict ourselves to the
examples where Hofweber considers some ‘ordinary’ form of priority to be at work.
Example 1. A true disjunction p ∨ q is grounded in its true disjunct p. This, claims
Hofweber, is merely an example of logical priority, in the sense of asymmetric entailment.
Now, as Raven (2012) points out, non-asymmetric relations cannot serve as grounding
relations. Grounding has a strict directionality. In the case of non-asymmetric relations,
directionality has to be enforced by something else. Thus, either this example involves
a tacit appeal to ground, or else Hofweber must accept that there is no real dependency
here. Audi (2012a) joins Hofweber in dismissing the example, but for different reasons.
On his conception of grounding, the relata are facts, and there is no such thing as a
disjunctive fact, nor can facts stand in entailment relations. But it is easy to recast the
example in non-factual terms, and, dialectically, it would be better to respond without
adverting to a particular conception of grounding.
Thus, consider the following example: a conjunction p∧q is grounded in its conjuncts
p, q. Here we have a case of symmetric entailment: the conjunction entails the conjuncts
and the conjuncts entail the conjunction. Yet, we are strongly inclined to say that the
conjunction is true because its conjuncts are, and not the other way about. It does
not help to appeal to the truth definition, for the truth definition is expressed as a
biconditional: p ∧ q = T iff p = T and q = T.3 It is true that in the logic classroom we
3If one thinks it is relevant that the grounded is singular while the grounds are plural, change the
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compute a formula’s truth definition ‘top-down’, by computing the possible truth values
of its constituents, but we could in principle (though with more difficulty) do it ‘bottom
up’. Nothing in the truth definition prevents it. Thus, no kind of logical dependence
(syntactic or semantic) adequately captures the kind of dependency we have in mind.
Example 2. Consider any set of mutually definable physical quantities, such as mass,
volume, and density. Hofweber says:
Any two of them determine the third, but intuitively one pair, mass and volume, is
more basic than density. And this seems right, but this is priority in a conceptual
sense, not a metaphysical one. Our concept of density is derivative on our concepts
of mass and volume. (pp. 269–70)
Here is what Raven (p. 690) has to say about conceptual priority:
[Ground does not] assimilate to conceptual priority. What is conceptually prior
needn’t be metaphysically prior. For example, whether the set-theoretic facts
ground the arithmetic facts is orthogonal to whether our set-theoretic concepts
are, in some relevant sense, prior to our arithmetic concepts.
That seems true. However, the issue is whether there is any kind of metaphysical priority
here at all, not whether it should be assimilated to conceptual priority. Hofweber’s point
is that conceptual priority may give the appearance of a more substantive kind of priority,
even where there is none.
There are several things to say about this. First, I quote Hofweber in full here to
illustrate the baldness of the claim. It may, after all, turn out that the priority here is
merely conceptual priority, but that is far from obvious and Hofweber gives zero argu-
ment; it is merely proclaimed. Second, even if there is a relevant sense of conceptual
priority, it is doesn’t seem to be any more egalitarian than the notion of ground. Third,
in a footnote Hofweber mentions that Newton might have regarded volume and density
as more basic than mass. ‘If that is right then conceptual priority and physical pri-
ority, according to Newton, come apart’ (ibid. footnote 6, my emphasis). What does
Hofweber mean here by ‘physical priority’? It is not causal priority. The mass and
volume of a gas do not cause it to have the density it has. It’s true that if we alter, say,
example. p symmetrically entails ¬¬p, but the latter is grounded in the former.
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the volume of the gas, the density will change too. But whatever causes the change in
volume also thereby directly causes the change in density. The change in volume is not
some intermediary effect between the change in volume and the change in density. Thus,
this ‘physical priority’ is a more constitutive kind of determination. Many grounding
theorists would call it a grounding relation—the kind of grounding relation which is dis-
covered a posteriori (other examples might include categorical/dispositional features or
physical/mental states). Such cases are important, because they undermine Hofweber’s
attempts to reclassify putative grounding cases as cases of conceptual priority. Pretty
much any putative case of grounding, if it is determined a priori, is vulnerable to this
kind of charge. (If we know a priori that A grounds B, how can we assure ourselves that
it is not merely that the concepts in A entail, or are otherwise prior to, the concepts in
B?)
Moreover, such cases undermine another claim Hofweber makes: that grounding
relations are ‘immune from the facts’. Aside from the trivial point that grounding
facts are supposed to be among the facts, this is an example of a grounding fact which
is constrained by a posteriori knowable facts.4 Now, it may be that all three of our
quantities are equally fundamental (in which case, no grounding relations hold), or it
may be the case that they mutually ground each other (in which case, we have to
revise our views on grounding’s formal properties). But perhaps, just maybe, two of the
quantities are more fundamental than the third (in which case, grounding behaves as
expected). What has not been established, pace Hofweber, is that the example exhibits
mere conceptual priority.
Example 3. ‘Its being the case that the couple Jack and Jill is married consists in
nothing more than its being the case that Jack is married to Jill.’ (Fine 2001, p. 15, as
quoted by Hofweber ibid., p. 270).
Hofweber claims not to follow this example, since it is a conceptual truth that
4As Audi (2012a) notes, as is the case in most of philosophy, grounding facts are to be determined
by a mixture of both a priori and a posteriori considerations. (Moreover, Hofweber himself dismisses
epistemological concerns regarding metaphysics as ‘not as serious as they have sometimes (historically)
been taken to be’, p. 260).
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(1) A and B are a married couple iff A and B are married to each other.
No doubt that is true. But, as Audi (2012a, p. 113) points out, Hofweber has misun-
derstood the example. The example should be understood as the existence of a certain
complex (a couple) being grounded in a relation between its constituents. One may
doubt that couples exist, as Audi does. Or one may hold that the fact that A-and-B are
married is just the fact A is married to B. But if we take seriously the idea that couples
exist, we are surely not going to hold that their existence is just brute. Couples owe their
existence to something. It is natural to think that the relation of marriage between Jack
and Jill has something to do with the existence of Jack-and-Jill as a married couple.
Such a view is not esoteric. Couples certainly feature in folk ontology. (Indeed, it may
be trivial that couples exist on Hofweber’s view.) But it is not trivial how couples exist,
if they do.
Questions egalitarian and questions esoteric
There are a number of strategies for responding to Hofweber’s second charge—that
grounding represents metaphysics at its worst: esoteric metaphysics. First, we could
argue that grounding is a folk concept after all, and thus egalitarian. Second, we could
undermine the distinction between folk and philosopher’s concepts, and thus the distinc-
tion between esoteric and egalitarian metaphysics. Third, we could argue that, despite
being esoteric in Hofweber’s sense, there are legitimate uses of ‘ground’. Audi (2012a) is
skeptical about the distinction between folk and philosopher’s concepts. But officially,
he takes the first kind of approach, showing how grounding features in folk discussions,
particularly regarding questions of morality (cruelness grounding wrongness), and by
tying ground to the folk concept of explanation. However, I think ethical examples are
all-too-easily dismissed as exhibiting some kind of conceptual priority (thick and thin
moral concepts). And while explanation is certainly a folk notion, Audi’s preferred the-
ory of it is not, and the theory practically implies that there is a grounding relation.5 I
5Audi subscribes to explanatory realism (Kim 1994; Ruben 1990), the view that explanations are
made correct by the determination relations which ‘underwrite’ them—causation in the case of causal
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am sympathetic to Audi’s view of explanation, but it is dialectically unwise to hang our
response on a view so highly theoretical. I also doubt there is an important distinction
to be drawn between the folk and the philosopher, but I’m not sure how to go about
persuasively dismissing the distinction. Thus, I will argue that there are intelligible and
important questions to be asked in metaphysics, despite being ‘esoteric’ in Hofweber’s
sense.
Consider Hofweber’s criteria regarding the esoteric/egalitarian distinction:
(2) A question is esoteric if it involves undefined, distinctly metaphysical, terms.
(3) An answer to a metaphysical question which implicitly defines a metaphysical
term is egalitarian, so long as it is an answer to an egalitarian question.
Now, there is a question here about what amounts to ‘implicit definition’. A term might
be implicitly defined by a theory if the theory (logically) implies a definition of the term.
Or it could be that a term derives its content from its place in the context of the theory.
The cases are importantly different. In the former we have a term which is, in principle,
explicitly definable. In the second, we have a term which is irreducibly primitive, but
which nonetheless has discernible content. For example, the set-membership relation
seems to be implicitly defined by set theory in this sense.6 A term explicitly definable
in egalitarian terms is clearly egalitarian, so we can assume Hofweber has in mind the
latter sense of ‘implicit definition’. But in that case, it seems that by Hofweber’s lights,
there is a perfectly egalitarian way of introducing the term ‘grounds’. Witness:
(4) There appear to be forms of dependence not captured by notions modal, seman-
tic, or otherwise more familiar to the philosopher.
(5) How should we understand such forms of dependence?
(6) We should posit a hyperintensional form of dependence, which we will call ground.
explanation, grounding in the case of metaphysical explanation.
6There is an interesting question as to whether this notion of set-membership corresponds to our
‘ordinary’ notion of set-membership. In naïve set theory, a set can be a member of itself, but in modern
axiomatic set theory, it cannot. The notions thus come apart. Do they come apart enough for us to call
them different concepts? However the answer to that goes, it’s clear that ‘is a member of’ is perfectly
intelligible within axiomatic set theory.
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Hofweber takes issue with (4). We saw in the last section why his reasons for this were
unfounded. (5), I take it, is a perfectly egalitarian question. Dependence is a perfectly
folk concept. Of course, the philosopher often wishes to go further and discern exactly
what kind of dependence is at issue. But the folk have no problem understanding talk
about dependence without adverting to its specific species. (6) here is supposed to be
a placeholder for a theory of ground, which is an answer to the egalitarian question
posed by (5). Given (4), that is a perfectly natural question to ask. But why, having
introduced the term in an egalitarian fashion, is it not legitimate to ask further questions
involving it? Hofweber considers a similar strategy concerning the term ‘natural’. He
says:
[O]ne might hold that first there is the question which counterfactuals are true,
and the answer to that question introduces the term ‘natural’. Then there is the
next question: which things are natural in this sense? But the followup question is
then derivative on the theory of counterfactuals. This seems to give counterfactuals
too big of a role in metaphysics, and doesn’t seem to be a proper way to start the
project of ontology. (p. 272)
Granted, it would probably be unwise to hang the whole of metaphysics on the theory
of counterfactuals. But it is not clear that the question is ‘derivative on the theory of
counterfactuals’. The theory of counterfactuals has merely given us a handle on the
notion of naturalness; it has provided us with an implicit definition of ‘natural’. It could
easily be viewed as a ladder which we kick away. On the other hand, if it were found
that the same notion of naturalness could be fruitfully applied to other egalitarian, or
‘first-order’, metaphysical questions, that would indirectly confirm the theory of coun-
terfactuals. Or suppose we have a second theory of counterfactuals, which implicitly
defines the term ‘joint-carving’. It is then natural to ask: which theory is better? The-
ory comparison is a necessary part of metaphysics, as with any academic pursuit. But
it is unclear whether we can ask such questions without becoming esoteric. To assess
a theory holistically involves assessing (perhaps indirectly) any of its primitive terms.
If each theory performs equally well as regards other theoretical virtues, the question
has to turn on which notion gives us a better handle on counterfactuals: naturalness or
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joint-carving? By Hofweber’s lights, these should be esoteric questions. Not only are
they clearly not esoteric, good methodology demands that we ask them. As Daly (2012,
p. 97) remarks, it is good methodology to limit our stock of primitives. Wouldn’t it then
be good methodology to put our limited stock of primitives to as much work as possible?
That is precisely what the grounding theorist is doing. She starts with the observation
that questions of dependence are not only rife, but central, to many first-order questions
of metaphysics. The second observation is that dependence can’t be captured by our
current stock of uncontroversial primitives. She then makes a single posit in an attempt
to answer these diverse questions of dependence.
All of that said, I think there is something right in Hofweber’s criticism, which we
might understand as a kind of methodological rule: when asking questions about or
involving metaphysical terms, this must ultimately be in the service of some first-order
metaphysical question. This seems uncontroversial, but we could probably all do with
reminding ourselves of it from time to time. It can be too easy to get caught up in the
finer nuances of theory; we shouldn’t lose sight of the bigger picture.
2.3 Grounding is Unintelligible
Daly (2012) claims not to understand grounding talk, but it is unclear what the dialecti-
cal force of this criticism is supposed to be. For lack of a general theory of significance—a
theory of which terms are meaningful and which are not—he rejects grounding on the
basis of his ‘philosophical conscience’ (cf. Goodman 1955). That is, I gather, that he
rejects grounding simply because it does not make sense to him. Daly recognises that
a parallel move is available to the grounding theorist, but says the best that can come
of such an exchange is a stalemate. I’m not sure such a result would worry too many
grounding theorists. Dialectically, the criticism cannot force the grounding theorist to
reassess her overall position. Thus, she is free to continue her work on elucidating the
notion. And such work may help the skeptic to understand grounding talk after all.
Daly outlines three ways to furnish content on a primitive term. First, we can specify
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its logical properties; second, we can trace its analytic connections with other terms, and
third, we can give examples.7
Daly is quite right that specifying a term’s logical properties constrains, but does not
determine, its content. That is easily conceded. No one claims that logical properties
alone determine a term’s content. They do, however, allow us to distinguish terms which
might otherwise be confused. For instance, anecdotally, it seems that some philosophers
consider grounding the latest incarnation of the ‘truthmaking fad’. But truthmaking
and grounding plausibly have different logical properties. Grounding is irreflexive, but
truthmaking is probably not.8
Regarding grounding’s connection with other terms, Daly makes some rather dubious
claims. He considers Schaffer (2009)’s definition of ‘fundamental’ in terms of grounding:
x is fundamental =df nothing grounds x
and writes:
Since the above definition defines ‘fundamental’ in terms of ‘grounding’, any un-
derstanding we have of ‘fundamental’ has to be given to us through understanding
‘grounding’. What we wanted, however, was to gain an understanding of ‘ground-
ing’. (p. 92)
But that’s just false. We have some antecedent understanding of ‘fundamental’, and
we use that understanding when assessing whether the proffered definition is adequate.
Such practice is quite common throughout philosophy. We seek to define terms which we
already understand reasonably well, and (as is usually the case) use that understanding
to construct counterexamples to the definition. Though definition is not symmetric,
definiendum and definiens are, in many contexts, substitutable. Thus, if we have a
handle on how to use the one, we have some handle on how to use the other. Of course,
7Kit Fine (pers. comm.) thinks that pictures and models can also furnish a term with content, and
often aid understanding better than these other methods. If true, that’s just more grist to our mill. But
I wonder if providing a model is not just a way of specifying a term’s logical properties. The problem,
well worn in philosophy of science, is whether ‘syntactic’ and ‘semantic’ descriptions of a theory amount
to the same thing. An interesting problem, but outside our purview.
8Take the proposition, 〈there is a proposition〉. See Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015) and Tahko (2013) for
discussion.
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‘grounds’ is only part of the definiens. Thus the definition does not determine its content.
But that was not what was being claimed. All that was claimed is that we may gain
further understanding of a notion by tracing its analytic connections with other notions.
Lastly, Daly claims that the best card the grounding theorist has to play is to give
examples, but that this is ‘indecisive’. Daly concedes that some terms can only be
learned by ostending exemplars and foils, but denies that ‘grounding’ is such a term:
Some terms can be learned (and perhaps can only be learned) by means of ostending
exemplars and foils. Be that as it may, the sceptic denies that ‘grounding’ can be
learnt in such a way. As noted, the sceptic is familiar with the (alleged) examples
of grounding and he can follow a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy. Either he finds that
he does not understand the claims being made, and so the examples offered are as
baﬄing as the general claim that some facts ground others. Or he finds that the
examples are best construed as examples of relations of supervenience or identity,
relations that are supposedly distinct from the relation of grounding.
This charge similarly lacks any dialectical force. We have already seen how Hofweber’s
attempts at assimilating ground to other notions have failed. In the absence of any
principled reason as to why some primitive terms (such as modal terms) are meaningful,
and others are not, such a charge is just question-begging. The onus here is not on the
grounding theorist to say more as to why ‘ground’ is meaningful. There are three agreed
strategies for furnishing a primitive term with meaning. The grounding theorist has
implemented them, and thinks she understands ‘grounding’ (and has persuaded others
they understand it too). Schaffer (2016b) sets out to elucidate ‘grounding’ in precisely
these three ways. He writes:
The reader who thinks that more is needed should take this as an invitation to say
what more is needed generally, for a concept to be communicated at all. (p. 51)
And if the skeptic thinks the dialectical burden is on grounding theorist, she should
similarly say why that is so.
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2.4 Grounding is too Coarse-Grained
We now turn to a different kind of challenge to grounding. Wilson (2014) and Koslicki
(2015) take no issue with the intelligibility of ‘ground’ or its cognates. They appear
to think that it is meaningful at least in a minimal sense in that it has a relatively
clear denotation. And they think that there are distinctive kinds of metaphysical de-
pendence which are not adequately captured by modal or semantic notions. However,
they think the denotation of ‘ground’ is heterogeneous, grouping together several—
importantly different—kinds of dependence relation under a single rubric. Among such
relations (which she calls ‘small-g’ grounding relations) Wilson includes ‘type identity,
token-but-not-type identity, functional realization, the classical mereological part-whole
relation, the causal composition relation, the set membership relation, the proper sub-
set relation, and the determinable-determinate relation.’9 Here Koslicki differs. She
does not consider these relations themselves to be dependence relations, but thinks that
they ‘induce different varieties of metaphysical dependence in different circumstances
and in different respects’ (2015, footnote 2, my emphasis). Though Wilson and Koslicki
arrive at the same conclusion—that grounding is too coarse-grained to do any useful
work—they arrive at the conclusion via quite different arguments. Wilson’s argument
focuses on the supposed informational paucity of grounding claims, whereas Koslicki’s
argument focuses on the supposed pertinent differences between the kinds of examples
the groundng theorist considers to exhibit grounding connections. I will thus consider
their positions separately, starting with Koslicki.
2.4.1 The Heterogeneity of Grounding
Koslicki (2015) distinguishes three ways in which putative cases of ground might present
us with a unified phenomenon. What she calls the ‘Unity Hypothesis’ admits of three
9Grounding theorists are likely to take issue with this list. Certainly no grounding theorist would
countenance type- or token-identity as grounding relations. Why does Wilson think of these as ‘small-g’
grounding relations? It appears that she thinks they play the same kind of explanatory methodological
role the (‘big-G’) Grounding relation is supposed to play. That token mental states are identical with
token brain states would explain how the mental depends on the physical.
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interpretations of varying strength:
(7) The single relation interpretation:
There is a single relation of grounding at work in the putative examples.
(8) The single genus interpretation:
There is a generic relation of grounding with several species.
(9) The mere resemblance interpretation:
There are distinct relations of metaphysical dependence which exhibit some ob-
jective similarities.
Koslicki then argues, by pointing to some salient differences between cases, that the
grounding theorist can at best support only the ‘mere resemblance’ interpretation.10
And she says, ‘by treating a collection of phenomena which is in fact heterogeneous as
though it were homogeneous, we have, if anything, taken a dialectical step backward’
(p. 307).
In what way, then, are the alleged grounding relations supposed to differ? Rosen
(2010) offers the following example: the fact that something is a square is grounded in
the fact that it is an equilateral rectangle. This is supposed to be an instance of a species
(square) being (partially) grounded in its genus (rectangle). Here the grounding relation
is directed from the less specific to the more specific. Compare: the fact that something
is red is grounded in its being maroon. Here the grounding relation goes from the
more specific (a determinate colour property) to the less specific (a determinable colour
property). But in general it seems as though ground should travel from the more to the
less fundamental. Which is more fundamental, the more specific or the less specific?
There are a number of ways we can respond to this. We could concede the point. Not
much hangs on whether a species is grounded in its genus. The only consequence of that
is that the direction of grounding runs opposite to what we thought it was. We could
10Koslicki starts out by arguing that appeals to grounding’s formal structure do nothing to distinguish
it from it from other well-founded strict partial orderings (such as the substring relation). But as I
pointed out when discussing Daly’s articulation of this point, no grounding theorist thinks that appeals
to formal structure alone are enough to convey the content of ‘grounds’. We also need the examples.
Grounding Skepticism 37
deny that any grounding relation is in the offing. For instance, Audi (2012b) thinks
that a species just is a genus + differentia. That is, he considers the relation between
square and equilateral rectangle just to be identity. Or we could simply challenge the
assumption that grounding must run from the specific to the general. No one has
explicitly advocated anything like this kind of principle.11 What reason is there to
believe it? It might be natural to think of the general as somehow ‘built up from’ the
specific—in the way that a generalisation, ‘all F s are G’, is built up from its instances
‘Fa and Ga’, ‘Fb and Gb’, . . . . But suppose that the connection is lawlike. Then it
might be natural to think that the instance is grounded in the generalisation (cf. Rosen
2010). There are two take-aways here. First, the case is controversial. Even if Koslicki’s
point has force against a particular conception of grounding, it has no force against
grounding generally. And second, we shouldn’t suppose that every interesting feature
of a particular grounding case should generalise (and thus it is doubtful that the point
has force against any grounding view.)
The second case Koslicki considers concerns overdetermination. The fact p ∨ q has
three possible grounds: p, q and both p and q. In the latter case, the ground overdeter-
mines what it grounds. Such a situation is in general permissible in logical cases. But
compare again the determinate/determinable relation. The fact that something is red
cannot be overdetermined. A jumper cannot be both maroon and scarlet. So we have
a systematic difference between logical grounding and the determinate/determinable
relation.
The third case involves truthmaking (though again we should note that such cases
are controversial among grounding theorists). In such a case we have a worldly item (a
fact or state of affairs) making true a representational item (some kind of truthbearing
entity). Other cases of grounding strictly relate worldly items. That is a systematic
difference between truthmaking and all other grounding relations.
The appropriate response to these cases, I think, is contained within a passage from
Audi (2012b, p. 689), which Koslicki herself quotes:
11Raven (2017, p. 634) makes a similar point.
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Even the view that there is only a generic similarity, that there is a different species
of noncausal determination at work in each case, strikes me as under-motivated.
What differentiates the species? If it is only that one concerns normative properties,
another determinables, still another dispositions, this does not yet give us a reason
to think that how the determination works differs in each case, simply because it
relates different kinds of fact. (Emphasis original)
It seems to me that the differences in these cases, which Koslicki attributes to the nature
of the kind of determination at work, can just as easily (and perhaps more naturally) be
attributed to the nature of the relata. Determinable colour properties just aren’t the kind
of thing which can be multiply realised. Hence it is that the determinate/determinable
relation doesn’t admit of overdetermination. The point applies even more clearly to
the truthmaking case, in which the worry is that one of the relata of the truthmaking
relation is different in kind to the relata of other grounding relations. ‘So what?’, one
wants to reply.
The last case Koslicki considers case involves natural/moral properties. The fact that
some act is wrong is grounded in its being a lie. But the wrongness of a lie is defeasible—
it is defeated, for example, if the lie is to save someone’s life. Thus, wrongmaking features
do not with any kind of necessity determine wrongness. The determinate/determinable
relation, on the other hand, does carry such modal force. It is metaphysically necessary
that, if something is maroon, then it is red—another systematic difference.
Here, it could easily be argued that being a lie is never a full ground on its own for
wrongness.12 Such cases present the classic problem for the deontologist. Why is that
some acts seem right or permissible, despite their possessing wrongmaking features?
Either we say that being a lie is insufficient, on its own, for wrongness, or if we are
staunch Kantians, we might bite the bullet and insist that all lies are wrong. Either
way, the counterexample to necessitation is unconvincing.
Koslicki takes her arguments to seriously undermine both the single relation and
the single genus interpretations of the Unity Hypothesis. Even if we grant that the
differences in the cases should be attributed to the kinds of determination at work,
12Audi recognises the potential problem here and makes essentially the same response, arguing that
being a lie is at best a ground for prima facie wrongness.
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Koslicki has said nothing to undermine the general features ground is usually assumed
to have (such as asymmetry, transitivity, non-monotonicity, hyper-intensionality). If
her arguments are successful, at best they undermine the single relation interpretation.
That the different species exhibit systematic differences does not preclude their being of
a common genus. Indeed, if the species did not exhibit differences, there would be no
reason to consider them different species.
2.5 Grounding is Uninformative
Probably the most influential (and sophisticated) critique of grounding to date is due
to Jessica Wilson. In an influential paper (Wilson 2014)13 she challenges the aptness of
a single, generic notion of ground to capture what is meant by ‘in virtue of’ and similar
phrases. For Wilson, this generic notion of dependence is uninformative, and therefore,
unexplanatory. What we need (and already have) is a stock of specific ‘small-g’ ground-
ing relations—the parthood relation; the determinate/determinable relation; the subset
relation; the causal composition relation; the set-membership relation; and type/token
identity. Genuine illumination requires that we advert to these specific relations, and
having done so, there is no work left for a generic notion of (big-G) Grounding—this can
be done by the small-g relations together with the right methodological assumptions.
In the remainder of the chapter I wish to engage Wilson’s criticisms head-on. My
aim is to defend grounding theory as a research programme, rather than any particular
conception of ground. Sometimes criticism requires that we revise a notion so as to
avoid it, but ultimately, I don’t think Wilson’s arguments really tell against any serious
contender for a theory of ground. I will thus consider the arguments as Wilson presents
them; I will not translate them into my preferred ideology. This will entail entertaining
some assumptions many grounding theorists (including the author) reject—that ground
can relate entities of arbitrary category, for instance. But not much of substance hangs
on this—the examples can be recast in terms of facts.14
13Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to this paper.
14This chapter was largely finished shortly before the publication of Mike Raven’s (2017), which
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2.6 The Underdetermination Argument
Wilson’s main argument is meant to show just how uninformative or ‘underdetermined’,
and hence, unilluminating, grounding claims are. By ‘underdetermination’ Wilson means
that the holding of a grounding relation leaves open several crucial questions regarding
the metaphysical status of the grounded—questions which ‘must be answered to gain
even basic illumination’ about the metaphysical dependence at issue (p. 545, emphasis
original). Consider the bare grounding claim that the mental is grounded in the physical.
This leaves open several basic questions regarding the status of the mental:
The ontological question Are mental states real?15
The reduction question Are mental states reducible to physical
states?
The emergence question Are mental states over and above
their physical grounds?
The efficacy question Are mental states causally efficacious?
Wilson says (p. 549)
Now, suppose someone claims that the mental is Grounded in the physical. Am
I in position to know whether I should agree with them? Not at all . . . [T]he
bare assertion of Grounding is compatible with both reductive and non-reductive
versions of physicalism—indeed, perhaps even with anti-realist eliminativism about
the mental. . . Absent further information about the specific grounding relation(s)
supposed to be at issue, I am stuck: I am not in a position to assess, much less
endorse, the claim that the mental is Grounded in—is metaphysically dependent
on, nothing over and above—the physical.
These charges could not be levelled at a general notion of causation, claims Wilson, for
even a bare causal claim—‘fire causes smoke’—puts us in a position to infer a great deal
about the effect: smoke is real; smoke is distinct from fire; smoke is not reducible to fire;
and smoke is efficacious.
makes a number of similar points regarding Wilson’s critique of grounding.
15Wilson appears to be using ‘real’ in the sense of ‘existent’. I have never been convinced myself of
the need to distinguish the two notions (pace Fine 2001). I will thus follow Wilson’s usage.
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It is important to note that Wilson’s target is a synthesis of the views of Fine (2001),
Schaffer (2009), and Rosen (2010). These views differ in important respects, however.
Indeed, the authors don’t even agree on the proper relata of the grounding relation,
and each view bears on these questions differently. Wilson does not clarify what this
synthesis might look like, or whether any particular author would endorse it, and her
charges don’t have much traction against any of these particular views. Although these
authors are not unanimous on any of the basic questions, taking each view separately, one
finds that many of these questions are indeed answered. (Hence, Schaffer (2016a) replies
that bare grounding claims and bare causal claims are informationally comparable.) In
response, a grounding theorist can just clarify how her conception of ground would bear
on these questions, or else deny that ground should bear on them. (Fine, for instance,
thinks that questions of reality are to be settled on considerations of ground.)
Wilson is not just attacking a straw man, however. She considers what she calls the
‘general presumption gambit’. We can employ, for instance, a general presumption in
favour of the grounded’s being real. But in that case, it is the general presumption,
not the grounding relation, which is doing the ‘heavy lifting’. A similar strategy can be
employed to bolster supervenience: to ensure a strict direction of dependence we can
couple a supervenience claim with a claim of conceptual entailment—though similarly,
it is the claim of conceptual entailment, not of supervenience, which is doing the heavy
lifting.
Furthermore, suppose we employ general presumptions regarding each of our four
questions. Then, argues Wilson, ground will be too fine-grained to be of general use.
Sometimes we want the grounded to be real, efficacious or what have you. Sometimes
not. Take the following pair of grounding claims:
(10) That the jumper is red is grounded in its being maroon.
(11) That S is in pain is grounded in S’s being in physical state p.
One may want to assent to both of these grounding claims, but deny the existence
of determinable colour properties (one may think that ‘red’ fails to pick out a real
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property but rather has a disjunctive, vague, or ‘scattered’ reference), while accepting
the existence of mental properties. But part of the appeal of ground was its supposed
wide applicability to diverse metaphysical problems. The advantage of positing multiple
different, more fine-grained, relations of dependence is that one obtains different answers
to these questions. Once these relations are admitted, what further need is there for a
general notion of ground? If metaphysics must always proceed by reference to the more
specific metaphysical relations, it is doing no metaphysical work. If it is conceptual
unification we are after, a distinct metaphysical posit is not what is required.
The above remarks in mind, I prefer to think of Wilson’s challenge as a dilemma:
either a general notion of ground is too coarse-grained to be of any use, or it is too
fine-grained to be of general use. It is here that Wilson lands her crucial blow:
That grounding is so useless undermines another motivation for such a posit, ac-
cording to which this relation is admirably explanatory. . . [but] from the bare fact
that some goings-on are Grounded in some others, it hardly follows that the latter
metaphysically explain the former in any interesting sense; nor does a bare Ground-
ing claim itself constitute an explanation in either a metaphysical or epistemic sense.
(p. 553)
Though she addresses it only cursorily, this is, I think, Wilson’s crucial point. Bare
grounding claims are not as ‘admirably explanatory’ as grounding theorists hold them
to be. Only the specific dependence relations can explain, because they tell us how the
determination really works. And it is only by knowing how the determination really
works that we can answer her four questions.
2.7 Underdetermination Undermined
My response to Wilson proceeds on several levels. First, I argue that grounding does
not admit of as much ‘underdetermination’ as she supposes. Some of Wilson’s questions
are indeed answered (depending on what we mean), while others are appropriately left
open. Wilson thinks such questions must be answered and that the grounding theorist
is unable to answer them. But this caricatures the grounding theorist’s position. The
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grounding theorist can answer such questions in a number of ways: she can invoke other
notions (such as translatability and identity); she can invoke background or method-
ological assumptions; or she can merely pose her questions of ground more pertinently.
What’s more, though Wilson contends that these questions are answered by the small-g
relations, I argue this is doubtful. When invoking the determinate/determinable relation
or the proper subset relation, we still have to invoke background assumptions in order to
establish the efficacy of the mental. Thus, with regards to her four questions, a relation
of ground is at least as informative as many small-g relations. Second, regarding how the
determination works, there are two ways to follow up such questions, as Schaffer (2016a)
notes. First, we can point to the species of grounding relation at play. And second, we
can specify the rule which maps ground to grounded. I am skeptical that the small-g
relations are able to act themselves as grounding relations. At best, I think, like Koslicki
(2015), that the small-g relations induce, underwrite, or ground, dependence relations
(and may just be indicative of dependence relations). That such ‘induced’ dependence
exhibits unity is evidenced by its logical behaviour (cf. Koslicki ibid.). Finally, I offer a
third way in which we can show how the determination works: by embedding a ground-
ing claim within a larger background theory—which also shows how grounding claims
play their explanatory role.
2.7.1 Bare grounding claims leave some questions open
There are two ways in which bare grounding claims are uninformative. The first per-
tains to how many questions regarding the metaphysical status of the grounded are left
unanswered. The second pertains to how the grounding connection works. Let’s first
take Wilson’s four questions. Is the grounded real? Does the grounded reduce to its
ground? Is the grounded over and above its ground? Is the grounded efficacious? As
they stand, some of these questions are in need of clarification. Ground bears differently
on the reduction and emergence questions, depending on how they are precisified, and
it leaves open the efficacy question. But if any question is left open, I will say why it is
appropriately left open.
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The ontological question, I think, is a bit of a red herring. First, the reality of the
grounded follows directly from ground’s being a factive notion. But second, suppose we
wish to take a deflationary position on determinable colour properties. The deflationist
will not give a story about how redness depends on maroonness. Rather, she will give
a story which ‘explains away’ the appearance of redness (perhaps invoking similarity or
naturalness). On such a view, there is no determinate/determinable relation—at least
not understood as relating colour properties—for there are no colour properties (at least
on one side) to be related. At best, the relation will relate colour predicates (and perhaps
make intelligible how we can speak truthfully about red things, though no such property
exists). So my response to Wilson here is: ground does entail reality, but to deny the
existence of a dependent entity is to deny the existence of (a token of) the dependence
relation. And the grounding theorist can accommodate such a view—by talking about
existence (and similarity, or what have you).
Suppose heat is grounded in mean molecular kinetic energy (MMK). Is this to say
that heat just is MMK (in some reductive sense of ‘just is’)? Or could there be facts
about heat further to facts about MMK, despite being grounded in them? It seems that
depends on what you think deserves the name ‘reduction’. A popular view of reduction
is that it indicates identity (Audi 2012a). There is broad agreement among grounding
theorists that ground is irreflexive. From this it follows that reduction is not a kind
of ground. However, one may legitimately ask whether reduction must be understood
in this way. Perhaps some instances of what we consider reduction will turn out to be
ground, others identity. It is ironic that Wilson helps herself to the term ‘reduction’,
given that there is little consistency in how it is applied in the literature. In philosophy of
science it is used in at least the following three ways: as indicating translatability between
theories; as indicating a supervenience relation; and as indicating a relation between two
ways of representing the same phenomenon. Does all this show that reduction is after
all a useless concept? No. It merely suggests that we should be clearer about what
we mean, and perhaps regiment the notion accordingly. Once we have a clearer idea
of what we mean by ‘reduction’, it may turn out that ground entails it (trivially, if it
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just is ground), is compatible with it (if it indicates translatability or supervenience),
or is incompatible with it (if it indicates identity). There is nothing here on which the
grounding theorist must remain silent.
Are mental states over and above the physical—by which Wilson means, does the
grounded emerge from its ground? There are two senses of emergence—weak and strong.
A phenomenon is weakly emergent if it is in some way surprising, though in principle,
perfectly explainable by its physical base. To offer a causal analogy: a chaotic system is
perfectly deterministic, but may give outputs which are surprising given the inputs (just
because of the system’s sheer complexity). But given a maximally specific description of
the system at a prior time (and significant computing power) we could explain the state of
the system at a later date. Ground is clearly compatible with this ‘surprising’ emergence.
Strong emergence, on the other hand, is more metaphysically robust. A phenomenon is
strongly emergent if we can’t even explain it in principle in terms of its physical base. If
A strongly emerges from B, then part of what it is to be A isn’t contained in what is to
be B (in some relevant sense). It may be that such emergence is compatible with partial
grounding, if a strongly emergent phenomenon is partly explained by its physical base.
Or such emergence might be incompatible with grounding, if one is suspicious, as I am,
of the notion of an in-principle in-completable explanation. Now, Wilson thinks that a
general notion of dependence is inadequate if it is unable to capture strong emergence.
But I don’t see why this should be so. Ground is held, above all things, to indicate an
explanatory determination between its relata, whereas strongly emergent phenomena are
in-principle unexplainable (or not fully explainable). It is therefore unsurprising (and I’d
say, desirable) that ground isn’t able to capture this very different kind of dependence.
I say that ground appropriately leaves open questions of weak emergence, because this
relation seems more of an epistemic kind than a metaphysical one.
Are mental states efficacious? The sense of ‘efficacious’ here is reasonably clear, and I
think the question is appropriately left open by a grounding claim. For we want ground-
ing claims to cover the abstract realm as well (and indeed, ground may have important
work to do in distinguishing explanatory from unexplanatory proofs in mathematics).
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Does this mean the grounding theorist is unable to answer the question of whether the
mental is efficacious? Of course not. Wilson writes as though the grounding theorist
holds that questions of ground are the be-all-end-all of metaphysics. No one claims that.
What is claimed is that questions of ground are central to metaphysics, not that they
comprise it. The grounding theorist has at her disposal many other tools to answer this
question. Moreover, as Berker (2015) notes, whether the mental is efficacious does not
itself appear to be a question about dependence:
Perhaps it is true that, when it comes to the mental, the [four] questions Wilson
is asking are more interesting than the question of what, if anything, the mental
depends on. But that doesn’t show that one hasn’t answered the question of de-
pendence until one has answered these other questions, and it also doesn’t show
that in all areas of philosophy questions of dependence are uninteresting. (p. 39)
That said, I think it may be possible to answer the question in terms of ground—it
is just that the question of whether the mental is grounded in the physical is the wrong
question (since it is too broad). The question is rather: is the efficacy of the mental
grounded in the efficacy of the physical, and if so, how? Moreover, the grounding theorist
can advance her own tu quoque here, for merely adverting to the small-g relations is
not sufficient to answer this question. The determinate/determinable relation does not
entail the efficacy of determinables. Abstract geometric shapes (squares and rectangles)
can stand in the determinate/determinable relation, yet they are not efficacious. Take
Yablo’s (1992) view:
What if mental phenomena are determinables of physical phenomena in something
like the traditional sense. . . ? Then since a determinate cannot preempt its own
determinable, mental events and properties lose nothing in causal relevance to their
physical bases. . . . (p. 250)
Here Yablo does not build into his proposal the causal efficacy of the mental. Rather, he
proposes a story on which the causal efficacy of the mental does not compete with causal
efficacy of the physical. The causal efficacy of the mental follows from the background
assumption that mental properties do indeed have causal powers. Likewise for various
characterisations of realisation.16
16For a recent characterisation of realisation, take Gillett (2003):
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The upshot of all this is that, even if grounding claims are relatively uninformative,
it is doubtful that the small-g relations are able to pick up the slack. Answering these
questions is rather messy and often involves making methodological assumptions. But
Wilson is just wrong if she thinks that the grounding theorist can’t appeal to such
assumptions in the course of her inquiries. For ground is just one tool, among many, at
her disposal. The positive case for ground proceeds not by showing that ground can do
all the work that other notions can do, but by showing that there is work only ground
can do.
2.7.2 Bare grounding claims leave open how the grounding connection
works
Schaffer (2016a) offers an analogy with bare causal claims. Take a claim such as ‘smoking
causes cancer’. This claim leaves open exactly how the causal connection works. There
are at least two further ‘how’ questions we can ask. The first is which ‘small-c’ causal
relation is at work (waking, baking, making). Second, which specific rule maps the input
to output (for example, which function maps number of cigarettes smoked per day to
the appropriate risk of cancer?). Now, although such a bare causal claim leaves these
questions unanswered, it is nevertheless informative. It rules out smoking and cancer
being effects of a common cause. Likewise, the claim that the mental is grounded in the
physical rules out certain forms of dualism. Despite its non-specificity, one can assess
a bare causal claim—through sophisticated statistical methods (exactly how the link
between smoking and cancer was established). Likewise, one can, pace Wilson, assess
bare grounding claims. However the exact story goes, we can be quite sure that the
Property/relation instance(s) Fi-Fn, realize an instance of a property G, in an
individual s, if and only if s has powers that are individuative of an instance of G
in virtue of the powers contributed by Fi-Fn, to s or s’s constituent(s), but not
vice versa. (p. 594, my emphasis)
Here, causal efficacy is built right into the definition of realisation. However, there is at work another
dependency relation, indicated by ‘in virtue of’.
On Wilson’s preferred treatment of realisation, subset realisation, a mental property M is realised
(roughly speaking) by a physical property P iff onlyM ’s causal powers are a proper subset of P ’s causal
powers. It is clearly not the subset relation doing the ‘heavy lifting’ here, but the presupposition that
mental properties exist and have causal powers.
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fragility of glass has something to do with its molecular structure. I’m certain, as a
matter of conceptual entailment, that my jumper is red in virtue its being maroon.
There is, however, an important insight in Wilson’s critique. Schaffer draws from it
the following lesson (2016a):
Wilson’s first lesson. An account of grounding must give one more than just the
bare ideology of ‘this grounds that,’ and in particular must allow one to make sense
of follow-up inquiry into how exactly the grounding connection works.
As with bare causal claims, Schaffer thinks there are two ways of pursuing such inquiry.
First, we can point to the species of grounding relation at work (the specific small-
g relation), and second, we can point to the rule which maps input to output. To
illustrate: suppose we say that sets are grounded in their members. We can follow
this up by saying that it is the set-membership relation which serves as the grounding
relation, and it is the extensionality axiom which maps input to output.
Schaffer thus holds that the small-g relations are species of a common grounding
genus. There are at least two advantages to the posit of a unifying relation, he claims.
First, it allows us to wrap up the specific relations in an appropriate formalism17 which
outfits them unified rules. This allows us to uncover generalisations we might otherwise
miss. Second, a generic notion allows us to enumerate its species. Schaffer doesn’t really
clarify what we means by this, but I take it the advantage is that we can only recognise
some specific relation as a (small-g) grounding relation if we also have the generic notion.
Schaffer thinks that, in general, if we can provide an appropriate formalism for some no-
tion, this provides defeasible evidence of unity, since (I assume) the presence of a single
relation provides the best explanation for the satisfaction of unified principles. Wilson
argues that the small-g relations should not be regarded as unified by the presence a
common generic relation, since, even if they exhibit the commonalities Schaffer and oth-
ers assume them to have, this does not show that a distinctive metaphysical posit unites
17Schaffer’s preferred formalism is that of structural equation models (see especially Schaffer 2016b).
The formalism effectively outfits the notion with a contrastive structure: this rather than that grounds
this* rather than that*. I take issue with Schaffer’s contrastive approach to ground, primarily because I
just don’t see how a supposedly worldly relation could be contrastive (cf. Schaffer 2012). But the point
applies to any rigorous formalism, including Fine’s Pure Logic of Ground (Fine 2012a, 2012b).
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them, rather than their being merely conceptually unified. Moreover, it is doubtful that
the relations exhibit even formal unity, since some small-g relations (set-membership,
for instance) are not even transitive.
2.7.3 The Transitivity and Asymmetry Arguments for Unity
Recall that Koslicki (2015), whose critique of grounding is similar to Wilson’s, proposes
an importantly different positive alternative: the small-g relations are not themselves
dependence relations, but induce dependence relations. This position makes better sense
of how sets depend on their members. For clearly {Socrates} depends on Socrates and
{{Socrates}} depends on {Socrates}. But we are also strongly inclined to think that
{{Socrates}} depends on Socrates. However, since set-membership is not transitive,
Wilson must either posit some other (small-g) dependence relation between these sets,
or else deny that there is any dependence between them. Neither option seems plausible,
however.18 On the other hand, if we say that the set-membership relation induces
dependence between a set and its members, there’s nothing to prevent us from saying
that {{Socrates}} depends on Socrates, since the induced dependence may be transitive,
even though the dependence-inducing relation is not.
Whereas Koslicki thinks that induced dependence relations are distinct, their logical
interaction provides reason to think that there is only one. Berker (2015) offers two kinds
of argument for the unity of the small-g relations—one from transitivity, and one from
asymmetry. We have already given an argument from transitivity—in which the (non-
transitive) set membership relation induces a kind of transitive dependence. We will
now consider mixed cases. The transitivity argument proceeds by taking two grounding
claims involving distinct (small-g) grounding relations: A grounds* B and B grounds**
C, and considering whether A grounds C in some ‘non-rigged-up’ sense.
(12) Socrates’ physical brain states causally compose Socrates’ neural states.
18The transitive closure of the set-membership relation does not seem a good candidate, for the
relations being a direct member and being a member of member seem importantly different, especially
from a set-theoretic perspective.
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(13) Socrates’ neural states subset-realise Socrates’ desire to seek truth.
Given these two claims, we are strongly inclined to hold that Socrates’ desire to seek
truth is dependent on his physical brain states. But Socrates’ desire to seek truth bears
no (obvious) small-g relation to his physical brain states. For Wilson to accommodate
this dependence claim, she’s going to have to posit some kind of rigged-up ‘meshing’
between causal composition and subset realisation.
Perhaps this example is unconvincing, but in fairness to Berker, he was picking
from Wilson’s somewhat restrictive list of approved grounding relations. If we go off-
list, we can come up with more convincing examples. For instance, certain semantic and
pragmatic factors ground the fact that I have promised to ϕ. My promising to ϕ grounds
a moral obligation to ϕ. So my obligation to ϕ is grounded in certain semantic and
pragmatic factors. Here we have ‘semantic grounding’ meshing with ‘moral grounding’.
As Berker notes, we don’t even need a general transitivity principle for this argument
to work. Even if there are only instances in which transitivity plausibly holds, we will
still be forced to posit some kind of rigged-up meshing of small-g relations. This makes
the grounding theorist’s position particularly strong. She does not need to argue for a
universal claim, only an existential one: there’s at least one case of ‘mixed transitivity’.
Wilson, on the other hand, needs to establish a universal claim: there are no cases of
mixed transitivity.19
On the other hand, the asymmetry argument requires that the following schema hold
with full generality:
(14) If A grounds* B, then there is no grounding** relation, such that B grounds**
A.
Certainly, we can find instances of this schema (and I know of no counterexamples).
But the argument goes: if the small-g relations are indeed distinct, then we shouldn’t
expect any such principle to hold. There would be no explanation of why the relations
19In her (forthcoming) Wilson notes that Schaffer’s (2012) counterexamples to the transitivity of
grounding all involve distinct small-g relations. Thus, even if these were genuine counterexamples (I
will argue in the next chapter that they are not), they would not count against the transitivity argument.
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would ‘get out of each other’s way’ in this kind of fashion. Yet, we observe time and
again (though this doesn’t establish the general principle) that when A grounds* B, no
other grounding relation holds in the other direction. The best explanation, concludes
Berker, for the logical behaviour of the supposedly distinct grounding relations is that
they are all species (or instances) of a single generic relation which is transitive and
asymmetric.20
Response to the transitivity and asymmetry arguments
Considerations from the logical interaction of the grounding relations, I think, constitute
the strongest argument in favour of unity. I now want to consider two arguments which
Wilson might offer in response, and show why they are found wanting.
Argument from conceptual unity. First, Wilson might argue that the fact the small-g
relations seem to obey a mixed transitivity principle stems from their being conceptu-
ally, rather than metaphysically, unified. She might argue, for instance, that when A
grounds* B and B grounds** C, there is no metaphysical reason to suppose that a fur-
ther grounding relation holds between A and C. Rather, it is our explanatory practices
which make it seem so. When B is explained in terms of A and C in terms of B, it
appears as though C is explained in terms of A. But there is no direct explanatory link
between A and C—it is rather parasitic on the mediate explanation of C in terms of B.
By coming to understand C in terms of B, and B in terms of A, it appears (to us) as
though we have come to understand C in terms of A.
There are two responses to such a move, however. First, even granting that there may
be only an appearance of transitivity, this response has no force against the asymmetry
argument. For, presumably, the analagous argument goes: when A grounds* B, it may
equally be the case that B grounds** A, but because of our explanatory practices (we
don’t like circular explanations), we routinely miss cases of symmetric explanation. Such
a response suggests that we are systematically blind to grounding relations which crop
20Wilson would probably find this argument question-begging, since she thinks we should leave open
the possibility for symmetric dependence. I find her arguments unconvincing. See Section 2.8 below.
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up where one already holds in the other direction, which seems implausible. Granting
the cogency of the response to apparent transitivity, we are still unable to say why the
various grounding relations would ‘get out of each other’s way’, as asymmetry demands.
Second, the move requires us to make a controversial assumption about explanation—
that it is generally not transitive. For, suppose that ‘A grounds* B’ and ‘B grounds**
C’ do not entail that A grounds C. In the absence of a further grounding relation,
independent from these, there is no appropriate determination relation to underwrite
the correctness of an explanation of C in terms of A. Thus, not only do we have to
accept that our explanatory practices give the appearance of grounding transitivity, we
also have to accept that those practices are wrong.
Argument from overgeneralisation. The second argument is a kind of reductio. For
a similar kind of transitivity argument seems to show that grounding and causation are
unified—an apparently unwelcome result. Consider the following example from Lange
(2013):21
(15) The expansion of a balloon is caused by the fact that its internal pressure is
greater than the external atmospheric pressure.
(16) That the internal pressure is greater than the external pressure is grounded in
the forces exerted by the gas molecules on the balloon’s interior.
From this it seems to follow that the forces exerted by the molecules on the balloon’s
interior determine the expansion of the balloon. Should we should then conclude that
grounding and causation are species of the same kind of relation? I say that we should.
We already have a generic term for such a relation—determination. Moreover, it seems
plausible that causation and grounding stand in a general asymmetry principle. (This
follows immediately if determination is transitive and irreflexive.)
If one finds such a position too unpalatable, there is a way of understanding the
example without invoking a generic determination relation. All that is required is that
21Lange uses the example only to show that metaphysical and causal (or, as he says, scientific)
explanation stand in a transitivity principle.
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we replace ‘the balloon expands’ with its microphysical description—to replace the fact
that balloon expands with its ground. Then facts about the forces exerted by the
gases cause the microphysical facts about the balloon, which in turn ground the fact
that it expands. Diagrammatically (where A denotes the microphysical facts about the
gas, B the facts about the pressure of the gas, C the expansion of the balloon, and D












Figure 2.1: Grounding and causation without determination
This contrasts with how ‘upwards causation’ (or what we are calling determination) is














Figure 2.2: Determination or ‘upwards causation’
Although I do not think we are forced to such a conclusion, my preferred view is that
causation and ground exhibit unity. While I think the relations are unified, I nevertheless
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think they can be teased apart—though this is a difficult topic we will postpone until the
next chapter. Thus, I don’t think that the argument from transitivity overgeneralises.
2.7.4 Are grounding claims explanatory?
Earlier I speculated that the crucial upshot of Wilson’s argument is that bare grounding
claims are unexplanatory. If true, that would seem to remove one of the key motivations
for the posit of ground. But I think Wilson’s charge attributes to the grounding theorist
something they do not hold. Grounding theorists do not claim that assertions of the
holding of a grounding relation are explanatory. Compare: General Relativity explains
the perihelion of Mercury. That is true, but it is not in itself an explanation. It is entirely
unilluminating. It does not tell us why, exactly, the orbit of Mercury has the particular
shape that it does. Rather, it asserts that an explanation exists—of the perihelion of
Mercury in terms of General Relativity. But that is a rather involved story. Similarly,
the claim that a certain mental property is grounded in some set of physical properties
isn’t itself an explanation—that is also likely to be a long and involved story. The claim
merely asserts the existence of such an explanation. The grounding theorist’s claim here
is not that grounding claims are explanatory, but that grounds explain what they ground.
The explanatory connection may sometimes be somewhat opaque. Presumably, a
physicalist would maintain that there is an explanation of some mental property in terms
of some set of microphysical properties. Be that as it may, it seems likely that the mental
facts and the microphysical facts will occupy opposite ends of a long grounding chain. We
shouldn’t expect a description of the microphysical facts to transparently explain how
some mental property arises—they must be mediated by the grounds between. When
a grounding theorist attempts to convey the content of her posit, she typically gives
uncontroversial examples of (near) immediate ground. In such examples, the explanatory
connection is usually (fairly) transparent. For instance, that a ball’s sphericality grounds
(explains) its disposition to roll. By contrast, the interesting grounding claims made by
philosophers are rarely uncontroversial and are rarely immediate. As such, it is not
surprising that an unadorned grounding claim would be explanatorily opaque. But
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then, philosophers do not make extravagant, unembellished grounding claims—they are
accompanied by theory. And grounding claims operate against the background theory.
To illustrate, suppose a Humean about laws claims:
(17) Laws of nature are grounded in the Humean mosaic.
If Humeanism about laws is correct, (17) is true, but it can hardly be considered an
explanation in itself. What the Humean theory of laws does is first, give an account of
what laws are, and second (drawing on the account of what laws are), show how exactly
the laws of nature are grounded. To simplify the story somewhat, let’s assume we’re
dealing with a naive regularity theory of laws: laws are just true generalisations (perhaps
with some extra feature). Then, since a generalisation is grounded in its instances, so
too is a law grounded in the particular features of the mosaic which instantiate it. This
story is explanatory insofar as it tells us what is responsible for making the laws what
they are, and showing us how it makes them what they are. (I will give a fuller account
of how this works in the next chapter.)
Wilson seems to have conflated the two following enterprises: (1) giving a general
account of ground, saying how it figures in philosophical theorising, and describing the
general rules for its application, and (2) actually seeking the grounds for various phe-
nomena. Only the latter actually provides explanations within first-order metaphysics.
But to explain some phenomenon isn’t merely to assert a grounding claim—even if that
claim happens to be true. It is to show how that phenomenon is grounded in its ground,
and that often involves invoking background theory. No grounding theorist expects a
theory of consciousness to fall out of a theory of ground. It would just not be appropriate
for a theory of ground to generate first-order metaphysical explanations.
2.8 Wilson’s Alternative: The Primitive Fundamental
I hope by now to have shown that Wilson’s criticisms of ground are unconvincing. But
she also gives a positive proposal—one she claims is better than the grounding picture.
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If we can show that Wilson’s framework is inferior (including by several of her own
measures), then we will have indirectly defended the grounding programme.
Kit Fine and Benj Hellie offer the following response to Wilson: even if talk about
metaphysical dependence must advert to more specific dependence relations, these rela-
tions are not enough on their own to establish a relationship of ground unless we invoke
further assumptions—assumptions which make a crucial appeal to ground. My hand
is a proper part of my body. But from this nothing follows as to whether my hand is
dependent on my body or vice versa.
Wilson concedes that the small-g relations are unable to fix the direction of priority
without invoking further assumptions, but denies that these assumptions must involve an
appeal to ground. Instead, following ‘standard metaphysical methodology’, one first as-
sumes a fundamental base and then sees what follows from this. ‘Fundamental’, however,
cannot be understood as the grounding theorist understands it—as the ungrounded—for
this would involve a tacit appeal to ground. Instead, the fundamental must be taken as
primitive. As Wilson says, “[w]hich entities are in the fundamental base is primitive; this
primitive specification then fixes the direction of priority” (p.561). Moreover, Wilson
contends, this is the most appropriate way to characterise the fundamental:
. . . the characterization of the fundamental as the un-Grounded is metaphysically
suspect. . . the fundamental should not be metaphysically characterized in negative
terms—or indeed, in any other terms. The fundamental is, well, fundamental:
entities in a fundamental base play a role analogous to axioms in a theory—they
are basic. . . the fundamental should not be metaphysically defined in any other
terms, whether these be positive or negative. (p. 560)
When considering how the non-fundamental stands to fundamental, it is easy enough
to see how this primitive characterisation of the fundamental should work. Assuming
that atoms are fundamental (for argument’s sake), H20 molecules are clearly dependent
on two H atoms and an O atom. But how are we supposed to determine the direction
of priority between non-fundamental entities? Wilson responds that her view does not
encode facts about relative fundamentality between non-fundamenta—but, that this is
a “feature, not a bug” (Wilson 2016). For instance, both hands and bodies are non-
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fundamental entities. However, qua mereological sums, bodies depend on hands, and
qua functional objects, hands depend on bodies.
2.8.1 Absolute Fundamentality and Priority
Schaffer (2016a) thinks that Wilson’s framework suffers a number of shortcomings when
compared to the relative fundamentality framework—chief among which is that Wilson
is unable to make sense of relative fundamentality. The proponent of relative fundamen-
tality has a ready definition of absolute fundamentality (as the ungrounded), but there
is no obvious definition in the other direction. This makes problems for Wilson in two
ways. First, she cannot make sense of dependencies between non-fundamenta (though,
as stated above, Wilson replies that this is a feature, not a bug).22 And second, she
cannot make sense of structure in worlds with infinite descending chains of dependence
(in which grounding is non-well-founded). Consider a world in which matter is gunky,
rather than particulate. In such a world there are infinite descending chains of parthood,
with no level serving as the fundamental base. On a relative fundamentality framework
we can easily make sense of this, but on an absolute fundamentality framework we
cannot—there is no absolutely fundamental level.
Wilson (2016) replies that she can make sense of such a world in two ways. For
instance, if the chains of dependence converge on a limit, such as point-sized chunks of
matter (in the same kind of way that the series 1, 1/2, 1/4, converges on 0), we can take
that limit as the fundamental base. Second, in keeping with a standard metaphysical
methodology, if there is a level beyond which the deeper structure is irrelevant, we can
simply select that level as fundamental. Moreover, claims Wilson, it is the relative
fundamentality framework which is impoverished compared to hers. On her framework
22Though Wilson considers this a feature, we might wonder whether the small-g relations deserve to
be called ‘dependence’ relations when there is no clear direction of priority. When considering my hand
and my body, it seems all we can say is that my hand is a part of my body or that my hand’s functional
properties are a subset of my body’s functional properties. Nothing about dependence follows.
Furthermore, it’s questionable whether this particular feature is desirable. With regard to the specific
example, the appropriate response (as Kit Fine has suggested to me) may simply be to deny that bodies
qua functional objects are identical to bodies qua mereological sums—in the same way that a statue is
distinct from the clay which composes it.
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she is able to make sense, for instance, of cases in which the fundamental entities are self-
or mutually grounding, as per a Malebranchean or Leibnizian view. Wilson considers
these important philosophical doctrines which shouldn’t be ruled out of court.
I will grant Wilson these methods for establishing a fundamental base.23 I want to
take issue with her contention that her framework is more expressive than the grounding
theorist’s.
Relative Fundamentality for Absolutists?
Suppose the fundamental entities are self-grounding. Then on Wilson’s view, one or
other of the small-g grounding relations holds between a fundamental thing and itself.
Even granting there’s a suitable relation capable of holding reflexively, how is it supposed
to work as a grounding relation? On Wilson’s view, for a small-g relation to work as a
grounding relation one of its relata has to be clearly more fundamental than the other.
But in the case of a self-grounding relation, both relata (being the same thing) are
equally fundamental. Similarly for mutually-grounding fundamenta. Thus, it’s not clear
how Wilson can make sense of these cases.
In a later paper, Wilson (forthcoming) clarifies her position. Small-g relations don’t
encode a direction of priority—that makes them apt to hold symmetrically. (Whether
we want to call such relations ‘grounding relations’ isn’t really a substantive dispute.)
And although the small-g relations don’t encode relations of priority, we can neverthe-
less settle questions of priority—if appropriate—on her framework. We just need the
following:
• The holding of a small-g relation.
• A specification of which things are fundamental.
• A ‘fairly specific’ account of how the fundamenta stand to the non-fundamenta.
• Accounts of the natures of the non-fundamenta.
23Actually I think that these responses betray Wilson’s equivocation on ‘fundamental’. See Section
2.8.2.
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And again, Wilson claims that this is just ‘standard methodology’. Consider again
hands and bodies. The operative assumptions we need here regard the nature of the
non-fundamenta. If hands and bodies are functionally defined, then bodies are prior
to hands, since hands inherit their function from bodies. If they are mere mereological
sums, then priority tracks the parthood relation.
All is not as it appears, however. Wilson has glossed over some crucial steps as to how
we derive priority relations. Even the case of the fundamental to the non-fundamental
is not so straightforward. Let’s examine the cases in more detail.
Case 1. Fundamental to non-fundamental. Assume that mereological atoms are
fundamental. Given that the whole is a fusion of the atoms, does it follow that atoms are
prior to the whole? Yes, according to Wilson, that is how such questions of priority are
generally decided. But consider: it is possible that two things x, y are each fundamental,
and yet x grounds y. Hence, given that x is fundamental, and x grounds y, it does not
follow that x is prior to y. Perhaps the problem is that some crucial information is
elided: wholes are non-fundamental. Clearly now, atoms are prior to wholes. But
small-g relations don’t encode priority! We need a principle connecting priority to (non-
)fundamentality. Perhaps this would do:
(18) If x is fundamental, and y is non-fundamental, then x is prior y.
But this generates too many priority relations. Suppose the as compose A and the bs
compose B. We don’t want to say that the as are prior to B. (We might want to say:
the as are relatively more fundamental than B.) What we need is all three facts:
(19) If x is fundamental, y is non-fundamental, and x (small-g) grounds y, then x is
prior to y.
This involves one more assumption than Wilson says we need, but so far, so good.
Case 2. Non-fundamental to non-fundamental. Which is prior: my hand or my
body? Suppose we have the other requisite assumptions: the physical is fundamental;
hands and bodies are fusions of the physical; and bodies are fusions of their parts.
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How do we extract the conclusion that hands are prior to bodies? We have a priority
principle connecting fundamentality, non-fundamentality, and the small-g relations, but
no principle connecting two non-fundamental things and a small-g relation. There are
two ways I can see to extract the desired conclusion. The first—not an option—is if
parthood is inherently directed. The second is that the standing of the fundamental
and the non-fundamental in a small-g relation encodes that relation with a direction
of priority. Effectively, the fundamental-to-non-fundamental small-g relation ‘switches
on’ the accompanying priority relation, such that parts are prior to wholes. The effect
of this, however, is that parthood gets associated generally with a certain direction of
priority—something Wilson explicitly wanted to avoid. Either way, I do not see how
to resist the conclusion that small-g relations must be encoded—directly or indirectly—
with a direction of priority.
Symmetric grounding
The grounding theorist can express facts Wilson can’t: priority relations. But Wilson
also claims that she can express facts the grounding theorist cannot: relations of sym-
metric grounding. I do not advocate giving up asymmetry,24 but since we are debating
the relative expressiveness of our frameworks, it is worth noting that doing so allows
us to (consistently) express symmetric grounding relations. And, moreover, we can still
define absolute fundamentality:
(20) Absolute Fundamentality (with self- or mutually grounding fundamenta):
x is fundamental =df there is no y such that y grounds x and x doesn’t ground
y.
And we have the choice whether to keep a version of asymmetry restricted to the non-
fundamental:
24The assumption of asymmetry is not universally held by those sympathetic to grounding. Carrie
Jenkins (2011), for instance, argues that it is bad methodology to assume that grounding is irreflexive.
She grants that it sounds bad to assert ‘x grounds x’, but denies that this entails anything substantive
about irreflexivity. The way I see it, if it sounds bad to say ‘x grounds x’, that is defeasible evidence
that we have trouble understanding it. And our having trouble understanding it is defeasible evidence
that it doesn’t make sense. Thus, the burden of proof is with the denier of irreflexivity.
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(21) Restricted Asymmetry:
If x grounds y and y grounds x, then x, y are fundamental.
Such a principle allows us to derive a contradiction whenever x or y is clearly non-
fundamental. One may think the obvious downside to this view is that grounding can’t
be viewed in general as one of relative fundamentality. Thus, the question arises as to
whether the grounding theorist can account for priority. This is easily answered. We
just need to adopt a weak notion of relative fundamentality (≤f ), rather than a strict
notion (<f ). We then take grounding to be encoded with this weak notion. Given that
A grounds B, it follows that A ≤f B. If we want to establish that A <f B, we just need
to further establish that B doesn’t also ground A. Thus, the methods for determining
relative fundamentality are just those for determining grounding.25
2.8.2 Slogans
We now consider Wilson’s conceptual rationale for taking the fundamental as primitive.
Recall: she thinks it is inappropriate to characterise the fundamental in any other terms
(let alone the negative, relational), because the ‘fundamental is, well, fundamental’. The
are two problems with this. First, as Berker (2015, footnote 67) notes, Wilson seems to
have conflated two things: the characterisation of the fundamental, and what entities
we take to be fundamental. Or, more perspicuously:
(22) ‘Fundamental’ is a primitive term.
(23) That x is fundamental is primitive.
25The last point here is somewhat of a cheap shot, so I relegate it to a footnote. Wilson’s criticism
that the grounding framework rules out Leibnizian or Malebranchean views is an explicit appeal to
ecumenicalism—that general philosophical frameworks should not rule out, as a matter of stipulation,
substantive philosophical positions. I’m not sure I share Wilson’s commitment to ecumenicalism. Any
framework (having content) is going to rule out some views—and we can appeal to our framework when
deciding between views. If we encounter a particularly appealing first-order theory which is inconsistent
with our framework, then that may be reason to revise it, but Wilson has not provided one. Even
granting that Malebranchean and Leibnizian views are inconsistent with grounding (though I don’t
think they must be), Wilson’s framework arguably rules out positions which are more plausible than
these. On her view there can be no relations of dependence or relative fundamentality between non-
fundamenta. If a choice must be made between a framework which accommodates current popular
views and a framework which accommodates views of historical interest (but which few take seriously
these days), I don’t think that will concern too many grounding theorists.
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Here, ‘primitive’ doesn’t even seem to be employed with a consistent sense. In (22) it
applies to an undefined term. In (23) it is used to designate a fact or claim which is
assumed at the outset of inquiry. The upshot of the distinction is this: we can still
assume, as a starting point of inquiry, which entities or facts are fundamental, and we
can say what it is to be fundamental. Whether or not Wilson is correct that standard
metaphysical methodology is to assume some level as fundamental, and then see how
the rest of the facts hang together, this strategy is open to (and often employed by) the
proponent of relative fundamentality. Questions of relative fundamentality are hard,
and often one must consider such questions holistically. This is essentially the kind of
strategy employed by Schaffer (2010a) when considering whether wholes or parts are
prior. Thus, Wilson’s appeal to ‘standard metaphysical methodology’ doesn’t motivate
her taking ‘fundamental’ as a primitive term. Furthermore, the grounding theorist can
accommodate the driving intuition behind her slogan ‘the fundamental is fundamental’—
that the starting point of inquiry is to assume some set of phenomena as fundamental.
What of Wilson’s contention that it is inappropriate to characterise the fundamen-
tal in any other terms, let alone non-basic, relational, negative terms? I submit that
fundamentality is an inherently relational notion. First (for whatever it’s worth), there
is the linguistic evidence: the fundament is literally the the ground of something, and in
many languages the terms are the same (Italian: il fondo vs fondamentale). Second, and
more to the point, the characterisation of something as fundamental when it fails to be
the ground of anything is gratuitous. In a world with a flat structure, in which nothing
grounds anything else, the notion of (absolute) fundamentality is redundant—it doesn’t
add anything to our conception of such a world. Indeed, what is interesting about such
a world is that no relation of relative fundamentality holds between any two things.
We can turn this thought into a modal argument. Suppose that quarks are among the
absolutely fundamental things. Further suppose there is a nearby world in which quarks
are built from hyperquarks. (And that everything about quarks can be accounted for in
terms of hyperquarks.) In such world we are inclined to say that it is the hyperquarks,
and not the quarks, which are fundamental. Since Wilson takes fundamentality to be a
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primitive, non-relational, matter, she has no principled reason for preferring to take the
hyperquarks, rather than the quarks, as fundamental. Of course, Wilson is fully entitled
to primitively specify that it is the hyperquarks which are fundamental in such a world,
and refuse to say anymore on the matter. But that is not very satisfying. Not only do we
want to take hyperquarks as fundamental, we can why. Can Wilson rule out this world as
impossible? Could she say that quarks are essentially or necessarily fundamental? Sure.
But she should say why we should regard them as such. And I cannot see any plausible
reason other than that quarks are essentially unstructured. And that is to characterise
fundamentality in structural (hence, relational) terms. Thus, either quarks might have
been structured, and thus non-fundamental. Or they are essentially structureless. Either
way, fundamentality is intimately bound up with the notion of structure.
To top this all off we can give what I think is a satisfying positive characterisation of
the fundamental. On this characterisation ungroundedness turns out to be a materially
adequate definition of the fundamental, but it doesn’t really capture what is special
about the fundamental. It is this. The world is a vast hierarchy of facts. What is special
about the fundamental facts is that they occupy a unique and privileged position in
this hierarchy. It is not that there is nothing below the fundamental, but that the




There is an underappreciated controversy—the formulation controversy—among ground-
ing theorists: how should we represent grounding claims? The operator theorist thinks
that grounding claims should be expressed using a connective or operator. There is
perhaps no natural language analogue for such an operator—but ‘because’ comes pretty
close. ‘A grounds B’ is to be read as something like ‘B because A’, with ‘because’ read in
a metaphysical, rather than causal, sense. The predicate theorist thinks that grounding
is a relation, and so naturally represented with a relational predicate. On this view, ‘A
grounds B’ is to be taken at face value, with ‘grounds’ serving as the required relational
predicate. It is, of course, a further controversial matter, which we will come to below,
what kinds of entity A and B should be taken to denote. Often, operator theorists
speak informally of a ‘grounding relation’, or of one fact’s grounding another. It will be
helpful to reserve a term which is neutral between the operator and predicate views. I
will reserve ‘grounding connection’ or simply ‘connection’ for such purposes.
The formulation controversy is often noted, but quickly passed over, with words to
the effect: ‘nothing in my argument depends on any particular formulation of grounding
claims’. In most cases this is true. But there are interesting and important cases in
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which it’s not. The first half of this chapter aims to do two things. First, it aims to
show why the dispute matters more than is often supposed (answer: it has immediate
consequences for how we theorise with and about grounding). And second, it defends the
predicate view. My concern is not to show that it is illegitimate to represent grounding
claims with an operator. (And thus my argument in no way undermines work on the
logic of ground which takes it to be an operator.) It is rather to show that grounding
is—most basically—relational. Operational grounding claims are fine, so long as it is
recognised that the operator is defined in terms of the relation, and not the other way
about.
The formulation controversy is entangled with another controversy about grounding:
how does it relate to explanation? It is generally agreed that grounding is intimately
related to explanation, but there is no consensus on the precise nature of that relationship
(and like the formulation controversy, it’s hard to detect in the literature a sense that
it really matters). But there are two broad views we can discern. In Raven (2015)’s
memorable terminology, we can be separatists or unionists. The unionist thinks that
a relationship of ground just is an explanation. If A grounds B, then A explains B
because, well, that’s just what it is for A to ground B. The separatist, on the other hand,
thinks that while grounding and explanation are intimately related, they are distinct.
The relationship is rather that grounding backs, underwrites, or grounds(!) metaphysical
explanation in the same way that causation backs causal explanation. Now, I don’t think
the settling of either dispute would settle the other. But one can see how the operator
view sits more naturally with unionism (if explanations are canonically expressed with
‘because’, then so are grounding claims), while the predicate view sits more naturally
with separatism (if ground stands to explanation as causation does, and causation is a
relation, then it’s natural to think of ground as a relation)—and indeed this is borne
out in the dividing lines among grounding theorists.
After arguing for the predicate view, then, the second half of this chapter is devoted
to defending separatism. Along the way we settle some outstanding issues regarding
the relationship between grounding and causation. But most importantly, we moti-
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vate a theory of philosophical explanation—explanation by philosophical theory—with
grounding at its heart.
3.2 The Logical Form of Grounding Claims
3.2.1 Operational Grounding Claims
Let us begin by formulating the operator and predicate views a little more precisely.
Take an informal grounding claim: ‘the truth of A and the truth of B together ground
the truth of A ∧ B’. How should we render this officially? According to the operator
theorist, we should define a grounding operator:
Γ < φ
where Γ is an unordered list1 of sentences representing the grounds, φ is a sentence
representing what is grounded, and < says that the γi ∈ Γ ground φ. Here is the official
rendering of our grounding claim:
A,B < A ∧B
Γ is taken to be unordered because the order in which the grounds are listed does not
affect the truth of a grounding claim. The following is also an official rendering of our
grounding claim:
B,A < A ∧B
Informally, we can read ‘A,B < A∧B’ as ‘A∧B because A,B’ or ‘A∧B is true because
A is true and B is true’.
1Why not a set? The pedantic reason is that we can’t flank a sentential operator with set names
and get a well-formed formula. The substantive reason is that it is not a set of grounds which enter
into a grounding connection but the grounds themselves.
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3.2.2 Predicational Grounding Claims
The predicate theorist has no need for a grounding operator. For her, grounding is a
relation, so it will be denoted by a relational predicate. Let R denote the grounding
relation (which we take to be variably polyadic to the left). Then
aRb
is taken to mean ‘a grounds b’. We are neutral here as to what kinds of things a and b
are. Most predicate theorists consider R’s relata to be facts. If φ is a sentence, we will
take [φ] to denote the fact that φ. For the predicate theorist, the official rendering of
our grounding claim is then:
[A], [B]R[A ∧B]
Since this is rather ugly, we will unofficially take a, b, c . . . to stand for arbitrary facts.
‘abRc’ is easier on the eye. If one thinks, as Schaffer (2009, 2016b) does, that grounding
can relate objects of arbitrary category (including facts, properties, and individual enti-
ties), then a, b, c . . . will range over arbitrary objects of arbitrary category. This is fine,
so long as we’re dealing with a pure logic of ground. But an impure logic of ground will
have to distinguish categories.2
3.3 Motivating the Operator View
There are three principle motivations for the operator view. The first appeals to an
analogy with explanation. The second is pragmatic—the operator approach is useful for
building logics of ground. The third, most substantive, motivation is that operational
grounding claims are ontologically neutral. Let’s dispense quickly with the first two,
and focus on the third.
2See Fine (2012a). Whereas the pure logic of ground deals with the structure of the grounding
relation, the impure logic also deals with the internal structure of the relata. Thus transitivity may be
seen as a principle of the pure logic of ground. But the principle that a conjunction is grounded in its
conjuncts belongs to the impure logic of ground.
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Grounding is an explanatory notion. We can explain why a given fact obtains by
appealing to its grounds. We can explain why a certain object has a disposition to roll
by citing its sphericality. We might say: the ball has a disposition to roll because it is
spherical. The canonical representation of an explanation, it seems, makes use of the
operator ‘because’. A grounding operator is just taken to indicate a restricted sense—the
metaphysical sense—of ‘because’.
There are two problems with this approach. First, it straightforwardly begs the
question against the separatist. Even if a grounding claim is an explanation, and so
canonically represented with ‘because’, it does not follow that a grounding connection
itself is an explanation. Ground may stand to explanation as causation does—it is
the relation which gives explanation its required metaphysical backing. Second, even if
grounding is a kind of explanation, it is not clear that explanation is basically opera-
tional, rather than relational. Sure, we can represent explanations with ‘because’, but
we can also represent them with a relational predicate: ‘A explains B’. This motivation
is inconclusive.
The second motivation is not, as far as I know, explicitly mentioned in the literature,
but it is worth exploring. The operational approach is overwhelmingly favoured by
formally-minded grounding theorists who like to build logics of ground (see Fine 2012b;
Correia 2010; Schnieder 2011; Litland, forthcoming). The reason, we might surmise, is
pragmatic. Grounding logicians take ground to be an operator in large part because it
is easier to build a logic around an operator. The structural properties of ground can be
captured with introduction and elimination rules. And the choice carries no ontological
significance since operational grounding talk is in principle translatable with relational
grounding talk (Litland (forthcoming) makes this point explicitly). How might the
translation go? Replace the inference rules with axioms in a first-order theory—axioms
governing the non-logical grounding predicateR. Take the cut rule. Its role can be played
by an axiom expressing the generalised transitivity of R. Or take Fine’s non-circularity
rule ‘A < A ` ⊥’. Its role can be played by an irreflexivity axiom: ∀x¬(xRx).3
3The relative merits of such systems may be unclear. It is at least generally acknowledged that
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But that intertranslation is possible does not dissolve the dispute. We want to know
if ground is most basically operational or most basically relational. Pragmatic concerns
about building logics are silent on this issue. We can define a grounding operator in terms
of a grounding predicate and vice versa, but so what? Defined terms are interesting only
insofar as what defines them is interesting.
This brings us on to the third motivation. When pressed, the operator theorist
has a fallback defence—operational talk is ontologically non-committal. Prima facie, an
operational claim is ontologically neutral in two respects. First, it frees us of commitment
to any kind of special entities, such as facts, which stand in a grounding relation. Correia
(2010), for example, writes that his
preference goes to [the operational] approach for reasons of ontological neutrality:
it should be possible to make claims of grounding and fail to believe in facts. (p.
254)
Second, the operator view frees us of commitment to a grounding relation. Just as a
conjunction need not commit us to some kind of worldly conjunction operation (its truth
value directly depends on the truth values of its conjuncts, taken individually), so too we
can talk about ground and grounded without invoking some kind of ‘spooky’ grounding
relation. In any case, we can talk about ground and grounded without having to attend
to the details of what kind of relation, if any, ground might be. In this vein, Raven
(2015) writes:
Perhaps the main benefit of the operator approach is that it postpones controversies
immediately arising for the relational approach. The latter strongly suggests that
ground is a relation, and so prompts us to engage with the controversies over what
this relation is and what its relata are. (p. 324)
The neutrality motivation has two interpretations of unequal strength. The stronger
claim is that a grounding ideology incurs no ontological cost. The weaker claim is that
a grounding ideology may incur an ontological cost, but it is open as to what that cost
axiom systems are cumbersome to use, but sometimes it is easier to prove adequacy results about them.
And the relative difficulties are going to depend, to a great extent, on how exactly you set up your
semantics and deductive apparatus.
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is—it may not commit us to facts, but it commits us to some entities or other. I will
argue, first, that if we think that a grounding ideology incurs an ontological cost, it is
ill-advised to postpone questions as to what that cost is. And second, I will argue that
it is implausible we can adopt a grounding ideology without incurring a cost in ontology.
3.3.1 Against Postponement
Relation Neutrality
In many cases we can make grounding claims without attending to the details of what,
exactly, the grounding connection is, or what its ‘relata’ are. We can say, for example:
(24) The fact that the ball is red is grounded in the fact that it is maroon.
Or we can say:
(25) The ball is red because it is maroon.
But the underlying grounding claim depends on the particularities of neither formulation.
This is not true in every case. Suppose we take ground to relate facts. How do we
distinguish facts? The dominant view is that a fact is an obtaining state of affairs—a
property or relation together with some objects(s) which instantiate(s) it. A fact is a
‘chunk of the world’, so to speak. If a is F , then there is the fact of a’s being F . We
might think of this fact as a kind of abstraction from a—but the important point is that
facts, like events, are things in the world. The key upshot of this is that the identity of
a fact depends in no way on how we might represent it. If F and G denote the same
(worldly) property, and a and b denote the same object, then a’s being F and b’s being
G are the same fact. Call this the worldly view of facts. If, additionally, we want to
distinguish facts by the way they are represented, then we get a conceptual view of facts.
Disputes about how we ought to understand facts have already given rise to dis-
agreements about the kinds of grounding claims we ought to accept and the relationship
between grounding and other notions. For instance, Rosen (2010) takes a conceptual
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view of facts (this is how Audi (2012b) reads him anyway). This allows him to dis-
tinguish facts by their senses as well as their worldly constituents. He can distinguish,
for instance, the fact that something is square from the fact that it is an equilateral
rectangle. The upshot is his Grounding-Reduction Link: if the fact that q reduces to
the fact that p, then p grounds q. If reduction indicates identity, then this presents a
problem, as grounding is irreflexive. Irreflexivity can be maintained, however, if we can
distinguish conceptual facts from their worldly counterparts.4
The distinction between worldly and conceptual facts may be thought irrelevant the
to operator/predicate dispute. After all, we can distinguish propositions by their senses.
And we can stipulate whether grounding is to be sensitive to differences in sense. If we
suppose that facts, being worldly kinds of things, do not have senses, and we wish to
uphold the Grounding-Reduction Link, then we can take grounding to be operational.
There are many positions to carve out in logical space. But the point is that, whichever
position we wish to carve out for ourselves, our views on the relata, grounding connection,
and grounding’s relationship with other terms will have to cohere. This is highlighted
by the case of reduction.
Further disagreements about grounding claims are generated if we think, like Schaffer
(2009, 2016b), that grounding can relate entities of arbitrary category. Schaffer thinks
that objects can ground and be grounded. For instance, an object—Socrates—grounds
the fact that Socrates exists. A complex object—a married couple—is grounded in the
fact that Ann is married to Bill. Socrates grounds {Socrates}. The operator theorist
won’t just deny such grounding claims—she won’t even be able to express them. Sen-
tential operators can’t take singular terms as arguments. Fact-talk and proposition-talk
is plausibly intertranslatable. But object-talk and proposition-talk cannot be.
We might see fit to dismiss Schaffer’s view out of hand. After all, ground is supposed
to be explanatory. How can it relate objects? Objects just don’t seem like the kinds
4As I say, this is Audi’s reading of Rosen. As I read Rosen, he simply denies, contra Audi, that
reduction must be understood as identity. It is not that being square and being an equilateral rectangle
are different representations of the same property, but that they denote different properties.
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of things that can explain or be explained (except in some extended sense).5 If this is
right, then Schaffer’s view further obscures the relationship between ground and expla-
nation. Grounding explanations are a kind of explanation why. Given a grounding claim
like ‘the fact that Socrates exists grounds the fact that {Socrates} exists’, the correlate
explanation is obvious: ‘{Socrates} exists because Socrates does’. But we cannot ask
‘why {Socrates}?’. We might say: that Socrates grounds {Socrates} backs the expla-
nation ‘{Socrates} exists because Socrates exists’. But two worries. First, the question
of how exactly the grounding claim relates to the explanation remains. In the former
explanation, the explanans is the ground, the explanandum is the grounded. Here they
are different. So what must be the relevant connection between ground/grounded and
explanans/explanandum? Second, why would two grounding relations back the same
explanation? To be sure, this does not look like a usual case of overdetermination, as
when two logically independent facts both fully ground some other fact.6 Rather, it
looks as though one of these grounding claims is properly redundant.7
There may be more to be said for Schaffer’s view, however. It would permit, for
instance, the assimilation of some nearby notions to ground, allowing for greater ideo-
logical parsimony. Take ontological dependence. It seems that {Socrates} ontologically
depends on Socrates. With a liberal view on what can ground and be grounded, we can
assimilate this talk: Socrates grounds {Socrates}. This would be attractive to someone
who thought that the kind of dependence involved in ontological dependence looks very
much like that involved in grounding.
It might be thought we could easily define ontological dependence in terms of fact-
grounding: x ontologically depends on y iff the existence of y grounds the existence of
x. There is a potential snag, however. If facts are made up of particulars and their
5Carrie Jenkins (2008, p.64) gives the following example: Mr Smith’s broken steering wheel is the
explanation of the car crash. But it seems clear that what is doing the explanatory work is the fact that
the steering wheel was broken. In fairness, Jenkins only observes that our linguistic practices suggest
that explanations can be of any category.
6As when p ∨ q is grounded by both p and q, though each on its own is a full ground.
7Perhaps it could be replied that an object a is a limiting case of a fact—the fact that a exists. But
this is implausible, since it entails that every object is identical to a fact. Socrates and the fact that
Socrates exists are very different kinds of things.
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properties, but there is no existence property, then there are no existential facts. On the
other hand, existential truths are unobjectionable. And it seems as though existences can
clearly be explained—Socrates’ existence clearly accounts for the existence of {Socrates}.
If one is resistant to the idea that objects can ground or explain, but wants to maintain
that existences can ground and explain, one should opt for the operator approach.
Relation Neutrality
Why be neutral about a grounding relation? Perhaps, being properly metaphysical, it
is a ‘spooky’ kind of relation. Operator theorists who stress that grounding is nothing
more an than explanatory notion might be read as attempting to allay such concerns.
Dasgupta (2014, p. 558) writes: ‘[a]s I use the term, [ground] is a purely explanatory
notion: to say that some facts ground another is just to say that the former explain the
latter, in a particular sense of “explain”.’ The thought is: we have a pretty good handle
on explanation, and we are antecedently committed to it. If grounding just is (a kind
of) explanation, then we have no need to be skeptical about it (prima facie, at least).
Though one feels the pull of the spookiness charge, it is quite hard to say what
it amounts to. I surmise two possible candidates. First, it might be meant with the
kind of sense in which Mackie (1977) uses ‘queer’—that grounding is a relation quite
unlike any other relation. It is a determination relation between ‘non-distinct’ relata
(cf. Schaffer (2009)) which gives rise to special type of objective explanation. Though
causation shares similar features (apart from non-distinctness of its relata), it is not
spooky because it is a folk notion, and is perhaps even perceptible (Anscombe 1971). The
second—related—interpretation is that grounding represents Hofweber (2009)’s esoteric
metaphysics. One has to be antecedently committed to grounding in order to make
sense of grounding talk. Because no reductive account is forthcoming, the uninitiated
might find it hard to see what is meant by ‘grounding’, find the notion slippery, and
consequently become skeptical it has any definite sense.
Whatever the merits of such skeptical worries, it is hard to see why they should
concern operator theorists less than predicate theorists. The ‘spookiness’ or otherwise
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of a grounding connection is not to be attributed to its being relational. Indeed, it might
be thought a world exhibiting operational structure without correlate relational structure
is even spookier. And one is unlikely to find operational grounding talk intelligible but
balk at relational grounding talk. In any case, the alleged ‘spookiness’ of grounding
ought only to worry those antagonistic to metaphysics generally. Such an attitude is
unlikely to be well met by adopting the operator view. Even if grounding claims are
explanations, those explanations are meant to be properly metaphysical. Moreover,
operational neutrality only postpones the inevitable question. Isn’t explanation a kind
of relation? That we may postpone controversies about what kind of relation grounding
is (and what its relata are) is not a good reason to believe that relata and relation do
not exist, and thus does not motivate taking ground to be basically operational.
3.4 Grounding and Ontological Commitment
3.4.1 Logical Form and Ontological Commitment
We now consider how an operator theorist might renounce any ontological commitments.
The operator theorist I have in mind thinks that there are true grounding claims, and
yet denies their truth commits her to any new kinds of entity—neither to relata nor
relation. Why should we be inclined to accept this? The reason is Quinean in spirit
(notwithstanding that grounding theorists self-consciously aim to build a post-Quinean
metaphysik). We need be committed only to the values of bound individual variables.
And the logical form of operational grounding claims contains no individual variables,
let alone bound ones.
But we might resist this idea. There seem to be valid inferences which quantify into
sentence position of grounding claims. Consider:
(26) A < (A ∨B)
‘A grounds (A or B)’
(27) B < (A ∨B)
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‘B grounds (A or B)’
(28) So, ∃p[(A < p) ∧ (B < p)]
There is something both A and B ground.
At the very least, then, we should think that operational grounding claims commit us to
propositions. Perhaps such entities are less suspect than facts, but they are certainly not
uncontroversial. If this is true, then the motivation for the operator view is weakened.
But, alas, things are not so straightforward. There are good reasons for treating
sentential variables (or predicate variables) differently to individual variables (see Textor
2005). A grounding claim no more commits us to propositions than does the claim that
the Earth is flat. The reason that existential generalisations on individual constants
carry ontological commitments is that the unquantified sentence already presupposes
such a commitment. Consider:
(29) Socrates is wise.
(30) So, ∃x(x is wise).
The reason this inference is even valid is because (29) is logically stronger than (30)—
that is, it contains more information. Analagously, if ‘A < B’ does not already commit
us to propositions, neither will ‘∃p(A < p)’.8
But suppose the Quinean is right. Then, while the predicate theorist might be
committed to facts (as the values of the singular terms flanking our predicate), she
will not be committed to a grounding relation (since predicates are ontologically non-
committal). That the predicate view should be committed to relata but not relation, I
think, highlights the shortcomings of reading ontological commitments off logical forms.
We are verging on the incoherent.
8So how are we to understand quantified sentence variables? The usual strategy is to take such
quantifications to be substitutional. As Wolfgang Künne (2003, p. 356) puts it, ‘if one construes
the quantifiers substitutionally, quantification into positions of any grammatical category is permitted’
(emphasis original). Such quantifiers are not associated with a domain of objects, but rather with a class
of suitable substituends. Thus, ‘∃p(A < p)’ is true iff we can find a suitable expression to substitute for
p and the result be true. ‘A ∨B’ is such an expression.
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Perhaps a better way to determine ontological commitments is via truthmaking : what
is required of the world in order for a grounding claim to be true?
3.4.2 Truthmaking and Ontological Commitment
In order for a sentence to be true the world must be a certain way. It is natural to
conclude that a sentence commits us to whatever the world must be like in order for
that sentence to be true. This proposal captures a similar sentiment to Quine’s, but
is more general. Quine’s criterion commits us to the values of the individual variables
which must exist for a sentence to be true. The truthmaker criterion of ontological
commitment does not impose such strictures. If there must be properties for p to be
true, then p commits us to properties. However the world must be for p to be true is
what p commits us to.
This kind of proposal certainly packs intuitive force, and has eminent advocates (see
Armstrong 2004; Heil 2003; Cameron 2008a). I’d certainly like to advocate something
like it. But deriving ontological commitments from truthmaker commitments doesn’t
sit well with grounding theory—or at least, not the kind of grounding theory I’d like to
advocate. Let me explain.
A plausible principle governing grounding and truthmaking is this:
(31) If t is a truthmaker for p, and p < q, then t is a truthmaker for q.
This is plausible since a truthmaker is sufficient for the truth of what it makes true,
and a ground is sufficient for the truth of what it grounds. This is why Schaffer (2008)
thinks that truthmaking is useful for determining fundamentality commitments, but
not ontological commitments. If we need be committed only to those entities which
must exist in order for some claim to be true, we need only be committed to its most
fundamental truthmaker—that is, the lower bound of its grounding chain. That is bad
in two respects.
First, it removes what (for me at least) is one of the most attractive features of
grounding theory—that it allows for an abundant, yet methodologically acceptable, on-
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tology. We can countenance all the higher-level facts—about numbers, universities,
human beings, or what have you—provided they are grounded on a sparse fundamental
basis (Schaffer 2009). On the truthmaker account of ontological commitment, though
we may speak truthfully about such things, they don’t really exist. As I see it, that’s a
major loss.
Second, the truthmaker approach favours the operator view. If only the fundamental
facts or states of affairs exist, and p grounds q, then either the fact that q does not exist,
in which case, there’s nothing to be related. Or else the fact that q just is the fact
that p, and by irreflexivity, the fact that p cannot ground the fact that q. To restore
irreflexivity, ground must to taken to be a connection between representations of the
facts (and so distinguished by sense), not the facts themselves.
Even if one is inclined to accept that only the fundamental really exists (or is really
real), I would not advocate the truthmaker approach to ontological commitment. For the
truth of a grounding claim would then depend not on the world, but on our representation
of it. For if p and q both represent the same state of affairs, then the only thing that
could make a difference to whether p grounds q or vice versa would be a difference in
the representations themselves. This flouts one of the main lessons of Fine (2001):
[W]e need to restore ourselves to a state of innocence in which the metaphysical
claims are seen to be about the subject-matter in question. . . and not the means by
which it might be represented or cognized. (pp. 7–10)
Can we retain some lesson from the truthmaker account of ontological commitment,
while still retaining the spirit of grounding theory? The lesson I’d like to retain is this:
the ontological commitments of a given claim are just what the world must contain for
the claim to be true. This can be achieved easily enough. Let t be the ultimate (most
fundamental) truthmaker for p. We define a battery of related notions.
First, truthmaking is closed under full grounding.
(32) If t fully grounds t′, then t′ is also a truthmaker for p.
We can think of t′ as an intermediary truthmaker. This allows for mediate and immediate
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notions of truthmaking—analagous to mediate and immediate ground.
(33) t is an immediate truthmaker for p just when t is a truthmaker for p and there
is no truthmaker t′ for p such that t grounds t′.
We can also define the notion of an ultimate truthmaker :
(34) t is an ultimate truthmaker for p just when t is a truthmaker for p, and there is
no full ground for t which is also a truthmaker for p.
Now, I say that a truth is committed to all of its truthmakers. But one problem remains.
We must include among the truthmakers the partial truthmakers. For t may be the
ultimate truthmaker for p, and yet fail to be fundamental. But if we are committed to
a truthmaker, we should also be committed to its grounds. Thus, let us say that
(35) t is a partial truthmaker for p just when t partially grounds t′ and t′ is a truth-
maker for p.
If there are conjunctive facts, then the fact that p will be a partial truthmaker for ‘p∧q’.
We could go further, and define the notion of an ultimate partial truthmaker (which
would just be a fundamental, or ungrounded, fact). But these notions will suffice. I
say that a truth is committed to both its truthmakers and partial truthmakers.9 This
comports nicely with the idea that a truth commits to whatever must obtain to make
it true. A truth certainly commits us to its ultimate truthmaker, and an ultimate
truthmaker commits us to whatever it grounds.
3.5 Truthmakers for Operational Grounding Claims
Here is the view I wish to defend:
9It may be objected that a truth has many possible truthmakers. They need not all obtain for
the truth to be true. So why must a truth commit us to all of its truthmakers? I don’t really see a
problem here. Take the truth ‘there are cats’. This has many possible truthmakers: Felix, Tibbles,
Garfield. . . The truth doesn’t commit us to any particular a cat. It commits us to some cat or other
(or ‘the arbitrary cat’). If a truth has many possible truthmakers, it seems natural to say that it is
committed to one or other of them.
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(36) The immediate truthmaker for an operational grounding claim is a grounding
fact [aiRb], where ai is (are) the ground(s), b is the grounded, and R is the
grounding relation.
Thus, if it is true that B because A, then this is because the grounding relation holds
between a, the fact that A, and b, the fact that B.
My strategy will be to argue that, in general, a non-truth-functional claim is true
just in case some (possibly monadic) relation makes it true. This is because truth
depends on the way the world is. But operators are linguistic, rather than worldly,
items, though the worldly counterpart of an operator is a relation. While truth-functional
operators may safely be regarded as ontologically neutral, they are disanalagous to non-
truth-functional operators. The disanalogy arises because truth-functional operators
are eliminable—nothing more is required of the world than that their arguments have
certain truth-values. Non-truth-functional operators require more of the world. Since,
when construed as an operator, grounding is non-truth-functional, it follows that an
operational grounding claim must be made true by the holding of a relation.
3.5.1 Non-Truth-Functionality
The usual truth-functional operators are familiar: ¬,∧,∨,→. Such operators take an
ordered pair of truth values (or a single truth value, in the case of negation) and return
another truth value. Consequently, the truth of ‘φ ∧ ψ’, say, depends only on the truth
values contributed by φ and ψ. We do not require of the world that there be some kind
of non-linguistic conjunction operator for a conjunction to be true. All that is required
is that each conjunct be true. (See Schnieder 2008 for an account of truth-functionality
defined explicitly in terms of dependence.)
We cannot appeal to the ontological neutrality of the truth-functional connectives
in defending the ontological neutrality of grounding, for the grounding operator is non-
truth-functional. If you are not convinced, suppose A and B are true. Then (37) is true,
while (38) is false.
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(37) A,B < A ∧B
(38) A ∧B < A
Since A and B are true, these claims would be materially equivalent, if truth-functional.
A non-truth-functional operator may be a function of truth values plus ‘something
else’, or it may merely be a function of something else. For instance, ‘because’ statements
seem to presuppose that both antecedent and consequent are true (Schnieder 2011, p.
451). To say that John got cancer because he smoked when he doesn’t smoke or have
cancer is at best highly infelicitous. But even it is true that John both smoked and
got cancer, it does not immediately follow that John got cancer because he smoked.
John’s cancer could have been due to a genetic predisposition or exposure to asbestos.
So in addition to truth, we must have the right connection between antecedent and
consequent. With the causal sense of ‘because’, this is causation. The event described
in the antecedent must be a cause of the event described in the consequent. The truth
conditions of a causal because-sentence are then something like:
(39) ‘B because A’ iff A and B are true, and the A-event caused the B-event (plus
some extra pragmatic stuff).
Since causation cannot relate non-obtaining events, the truthmaker for a causal because-
sentence then is just an obtaining causal relation.
On the other hand, an operator such as strict implication does not depend on the
truth values of its constituents (at least not their actual truth values). ‘A strictly implies
B’ is true iff if A is true, B must be true, whether or not A is actually the case. Since,
the truth-values of A and B do not determine the the truth of a strict implication, its
truthmaker must be something else. In a simple case, it will just be the entailment
relation: ‘A strictly implies A ∨ B’ is true because ‘A’ entails ‘A ∨ B’. In other cases
it will be the necessitation relation: A necessitates ‘Socrates is self-identical’, because
there is no world in which the former is true, and the latter false.
The problem with appealing to the ontological neutrality of truth-functional oper-
ators is that it is implausible that it carries over to non-truth functional connectives.
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The truth value of a truth-functional claim is determined by the truth values of its
constituent sentences. The truth value of a non-truth-functional claim is not. Thus, a
truth-functional claim commits us to nothing over and above certain truths. To account
for the truth of a non-truth-functional claim, we must appeal to something else.
We might think of the distinction as (imperfectly) analagous to the distinction be-
tween internal and external relations. An internal relation, like being taller than, is one
whose holding depends only on the intrinsic properties of its relata. If Bill is 5’10 and
Jim is 5’8, then those properties alone fix that Bill is taller than Jim. Nothing ‘external’
to Bill, Jim, and their intrinsic properties, is required. An external relation, on the other
hand, requires something in addition to its relata’s intrinsic properties—something prop-
erly located ‘outside’ them. For instance, London’s being south of Sheffield is not some-
thing we can surmise from knowing all the intrinsic properties of London and Sheffield.
We need to know how things are with London with respect to Sheffield. The point is:
it seems we can straightforwardly deflate the need to recognise internal relations—they
can be reduced to monadic properties. Likewise, we can deflate the need to recognise
worldly conjunction operations—we just need to talk about truth values. But we cannot
so easily dispense with external relations or the relations to which non-truth-functional
operators must answer.
Simply put, my argument is an inference to the best explanation. Non-truth-
functional operational claims require more of the world than that their constituents
have certain truth values. The best candidates for the ‘more that is required’ are rela-
tions. Construed as an operator, grounding is non-truth-functional. Therefore, the best
candidate truthmaker for a grounding claim is a relation.
3.5.2 Objections
Perhaps it will be countered: okay, of course there are many operational claims whose
truthmakers are relations, but surely not all operators require relations. The ‘’ operator
seems to be an example. I reply that the exact wording of my thesis was that the
truthmakers for non-truth-functional operators were ‘possibly monadic’ relations, i.e.
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properties—the intention being to cover unary operators as well. And it seems evident
to me that the  operator at least requires a monadic property. Among other things,
debates about metaphysical modality are debates about what makes modal claims true,
or whether modality can reduced to something else. The modal realist considers ‘p’ to
be true just when p is true in all (relevantly similar) concrete, non-actual, worlds. The
truthmaker for ‘p’ may be then regarded in a number of ways: as a relation between
p and the worlds; a property of all the worlds, or a property of p. In any case, the
truthmaker is a property of something. The dispositionalist thinks that modal claims
are made true by categorical, dispositional, properties. The primitivist thinks modal
claims are made true by irreducible properties the actual world has—ways the world
might have been.
The second objection to consider stems from what Bennett (2011) calls the ‘superin-
ternality’ of grounding: that a grounding relation holds in virtue of the intrinsic nature
of just one of its relata—the ground. If grounding is superinternal, then the truthmaker
for a grounding claim is just the fact doing the grounding. No relation is required. And
in such cases we can assign truth conditions to operational grounding claims without
making reference to a relation. I reply that what we have here is a case of mediate truth-
making. ‘A’ is a mediate truthmaker for ‘A < B’, but the immediate truthmaker is the
grounding relation between the fact that A and the fact that B. The objection makes
the same mistake as the simple truthmaking account of ontological commitment. That
is, it would commit us only to ultimate truthmakers, thereby wiping out the paradise
afforded by grounding theory.
The last objection to consider is that we have no reason to consider grounding as a
relation between facts, as opposed to a relation between propositions. Necessity claims
might be reduced to properties of, or relations between, propositions, but we have not
shown that necessity requires a property of a fact. It is true that I have not shown
that grounding ought to be considered a relation between facts as opposed to proposi-
tions. My general claim about non-truth-functional operational claims is only that their
truthmakers are facts involving relations (properties). I take no stand on the nature of
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the relata here. My aim was only to show that grounding is a relation between some
things or other. If we are satisfied that grounding is indeed a relation, now is the ap-
propriate time to investigate the nature of its relata. But more substantively, it is not
clear that the distinction will have much ontological significance, if the truthmakers for
propositions are facts.
3.6 Unionism vs Separatism
Grounding theorists hold (as far as I can tell, unanimously) that grounding is an ex-
planatory relation—indeed, the tightest explanatory relation: ‘if there is a gap between
the grounds and what is grounded, then it is not an explanatory gap’ (Fine 2012a, p.
39). Despite this, the literature on the precise nature of grounding’s relationship with
explanation is relatively impoverished. In what sense, exactly, is grounding an explana-
tory relation? Does grounding underwrite, as the separatist holds, a certain kind of
explanation (like causation underwrites causal explanations), or is grounding itself, as
the unionist holds, a kind of explanation? While several authors have taken a stand
on this issue,10 others (including Fine) have been less than entirely perspicuous. Mat-
ters are muddied by the operator/predicate dispute—the operator view lends itself more
naturally to unionism. But having settled that debate in favour of the predicate view, it
doesn’t immediately follow that separatism is true—it may be that a grounding relation
just is an explanation relation. Nevertheless, I will argue that the relations do indeed
come apart.
A couple of sociological observations worth noting: first, despite more than half a
century of literature on explanation from philosophy of science, grounding theorists offer
virtually no engagement with it.11 Now, clearly grounding theorists are aware of this
literature. The best explanation for their not engaging with it is that they don’t think
it is relevant. This suggests that they regard metaphysical explanation as fundamen-
10See Schaffer (2016b) and Audi (2012b) for explicitly separatist views, Raven (2015) for an explicitly
unionist view.
11Though Wilsch (2016) and Schnieder (2010, 2011) are notable exceptions.
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tally different to causal explanation—different enough, at least, that the philosophy of
science literature sheds little light on metaphysical explanation. That there has been
little discussion of metaphysical explanation, as distinct from grounding, is explained if
unionism is in fact the dominant view. For unionists, in discussing grounding, would re-
gard themselves as thereby elucidating metaphysical explanation. (Then again, perhaps
I’m being overly charitable.) These observations are significant for my central theses:
(40) Separatism is true.
(41) Metaphysical explanation and causal/scientific explanation are species of a single
genus of explanation.
These theses will be refined below. (In fact, two senses of (41)—both true—will be
distinguished.)
Hopefully the discussion will be fruitful regardless of its eventual fate. For if meta-
physical explanation and causal/scientific explanation really are fundamentally different
beasts, presumably we’d like to know in what their difference consists. It would therefore
be helpful to know why these arguments fail.
3.7 Seven Decades of Scientific Explanation (with a lot of
gaps)
A couple of clarifications are in order. First, by ‘explanation’ we will mean an explanation
why. There are other senses of explanation. One can explain the rules of chess, for
example. But to explain the rules of chess is not to explain why the rules of chess are
the way they are. Rather, it is to give some (contextually adequate) information about
the rules of chess. The question ‘why are the rules of chess the way they are?’ could
be interpreted causally (who came up with them?), or as a request for the reasons its
inventors chose those particular rules (a request for a teleological explanation).
Second, we often speak of this or that theory explaining some phenomenon. For
instance, we often say of General Relativity that it explains the perihelion of Mercury.
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But no mention of Mercury appears in any axiomatisation of General Relativity, so
what do we mean when we say such things? We will consider this question more fully
later, but for now we need only note it is not the sense of explanation we are primarily
concerned with. For one thing, the notion does not appear to be factive. We often
say things such as ‘Newtonian Mechanics explains the motions of slow-moving bodies’,
even though we know Newtonian Mechanics to be false. Perhaps we mean that NM
would explain such motions, were it true. But in the case of singular explanation—of
explaining one particular fact by another (or collection of facts)—this non-factive sense
of explanation does not appear to be available. The following conversation, for example,
would be highly irregular:
(42) A: Why did John get cancer?
(43) B: Because he smoked.
(44) A: John’s never smoked a day in his life!
(45) B: Still, it would explain why he got cancer.
(46) A: Stares incredulously.
Third, we will remain neutral as to whether the relata of the explanation relation
are facts, propositions, or representations thereof. (We do not claim to remain neutral
on whether explanations have relata!) Some writers on explanation take it to relate
truthbearers or representations. If event (or fact) c causes event (or fact) e, then it is
C, the description of c, which explains E, the description of e. There are interesting
questions regarding the relata of explanation—but they are orthogonal to our primary
concerns.
To sum up, the notion of explanation that concerns us is singular explanation why,
of explaining one fact by some other(s). The notion is (or at least appears to be)
factive. And the explanatory relation holds between fact-like entities. Though we will
sometimes speak of a subject S explaining the fact that p, we will take this to mean
that S is communicating an explanation of p.
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3.7.1 The Deductive Nomological Model
Probably the most influential early account of scientific explanation was Hempel’s ill-
fated deductive-nomological model of explanation (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948). On
this account an explanation is a deductive argument, where the conclusion is the ex-
planandum and the premises—one of which must be a law of nature—are the explanans.
To explain the fact that a metal rod expands when heated is to derive it from some law
concerning metal (all metals expand when heated) and some initial condition (this metal
rod was heated).
The worst problem with the DN model, and a problem which aﬄicted many other
models, is that it can’t account for the strict order of explanation. This is illustrated by
the infamous flagpole problem: suppose a flagpole of height h casts a shadow at noon
of length l. Why is the length of the shadow l? Using the position of the sun and some
elementary trigonometry, we can derive l from h. Notice, however, that we can also use
l and the other conditions to derive h. But the length of the shadow does not explain
the height of the pole!
3.7.2 Causal Theories of Explanation
Fast-forward two or three decades. The causal theory of explanation is in fashion.
The most basic version of this is Lewis’s (1986a): to explain an event is to give some
information about its causal history. To explain an event could be as simple then as
citing its (salient) cause: the car crashed because the tyre blew. A more sophisticated
version of the causal theory (Salmon 1984) holds that explaining involves not only citing
causes (the aetiological aspect of explanation), but describing how the relevant causal
processes work (the constitutive aspect of explanation).
All versions of the causal theory easily circumvent the flagpole problem—indeed they
explain why explanations are generally asymmetric. Intuitively, the problem is that the
flagpole causes the shadow, but the shadow does not cause the flagpole. Since causation
is asymmetric and is necessary for explanation, explanations cannot be symmetric.
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The main problem for the causal theory of explanation is that there are perfectly
good explanations which do not appear to involve causation—even in science. Walter’s
possessing certain antibodies explains his being immune to flu. But Walter’s possessing
those antibodies does not cause his being immune to flu—they are in some way constitu-
tive of his immunity. The sphericality of a ball explains its disposition to roll, but does
not cause it. The volume and molecular kinetic energy of a gas explain its pressure.
3.7.3 Explanatory Realism
In the nineties a new theory of explanation emerged. It was a direct reaction against
the extant explanation literature in philosophy of science. Ironically, it caught on more
among metaphysicians. That theory was explanatory realism. Proponents of explanatory
realism (Kim 1994; Ruben 1990) were at pains to stress that explanation is an epistemic
notion. (Kim especially lamented that, despite the seemingly platitudinal status of this
claim, much of the 20th century philosophy of science literature on explanation failed to
fully appreciate it.) But being epistemic does not devoid a notion of objectivity. Knowl-
edge is an epistemic notion, but it requires truth, and derives objectivity therefrom. An
explanation is a piece of information which advances understanding. And understanding
appears to be a kind of knowledge. If one understands why John got cancer, one knows
something about how the fact that John got cancer relates to other facts. Or perhaps
understanding is just knowledge organised in a certain way (cf. Kim 1988). Either way,
it is clear that understanding is an epistemic notion.
The first tenet of explanatory realism (the ‘realist’ part) is that explanations have
some kind of objective, mind-independent, truth- or correctness-conditions (and not
merely pragmatic felicity conditions). This contrasts with van Fraassen’s (1980) prag-
matic theory of explanation, according to which an explanation may be perfectly ‘good’,
despite being false. That is not to say that explanations don’t have any subjective,
interest-relative, or context-dependent adequacy conditions—merely that such condi-
tions will not be sufficient on their own for an explanation. One can hold that an
explanation must meet both objective and subjective conditions in order to count as an
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explanation in a given context.
This brings us onto the second tenet of explanatory realism: explanations track
determination relations. Unpacking a little: A explains B only if A plays a role in
determining B. Or as Ruben (1990) puts it, determination relations give explanation
its required ‘metaphysical backing’. Let’s take a causal example:
(47) John got cancer because he smoked.
If John didn’t smoke, then this is not an explanation of his getting cancer. The problem
is not that it is false, but that it involves a kind of presupposition failure. In order even
be eligible to explain, the explanans must be true. We also get presupposition failure
if John didn’t have cancer. Only facts (or true propositions) can be explained. If John
smoked, but his cancer was caused by exposure to asbestos, then, again, this is not
an explanation of his getting cancer. This does not constitute a case of presupposition
failure—the presupposition holds. Rather, it is merely a case of a false (or incorrect)
explanation. But if John did in fact smoke, and his smoking played a (causal) role in
his contracting cancer, then this is an explanation of why John got cancer. Perhaps it
is not a full, or the best, explanation, but it is an explanation nonetheless.
It is widely accepted that causation is distinct from explanation. But we should be
careful not to conflate them. This can be difficult when it looks like we have a one-
one correspondence between causal relations and causal explanations. If all it takes to
explain an event is to cite its causes, then we have such a correspondence. But that is not
all it takes to explain. Lipton (2004) noted that the Big Bang was a cause of everything,
but explains very little. Causation is necessary, but not sufficient, for explanation. Or
as explanatory realists like to say, causation backs or underwrites explanation. This idea
is intuitive enough, but we can be more explicit. Kim (1988, p. 149) put it this way:
‘[causation] is an objective relation among events that, as we may say, “grounds” the
explanans relation.’ All I’d do with this is remove the scare quotes.12 Since a causal
12While many philosophers used the grounding idiom prior to Fine (2001), Kim’s use of it is interest-
ing for two reasons. First, it was clear that he was using it consciously, as indicated by his frequent use
of scare quotes. Second, Kim was one of the first contemporary philosophers to recognise a non-causal
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relation is insufficient for an explanation, we can further refine this:
(48) The fact that A causally explains B is partially grounded in the fact that A
caused B.
This clears up what is meant by ‘underwriting’. But what constitutes a full ground for
a causal explanation? That requires a thesis all its own. But in addition to the relevant
causal relation, it will have to include, at the very least, pragmatic and interest relative
factors.
3.7.4 The Realist Account of Metaphysical Explanation
Now, if this were the whole story, then explanatory realism would be no different from
the causal theory of explanation. Kim’s innovation was to recognise other explanatory
(non-causal) determination relations. This is one of Kim’s earliest examples (1974):
(49) Xanthippe became a widow because Socrates died.
This explanation is not plausibly interpreted causally. This is trivial if one is inclined
to think that causation must be diachronic. Xanthippe became a widow at the exact
moment Socrates died, not immediately after. The relationship also seems too intimate
to be causal. Hume reminds us that there is no logical connection between cause and
effect. But a husband’s death necessitates his wife’s widowhood. The relationship is
not intimate enough to be identity, however. We’re inclined to think that Xanthippe’s
becoming a widow depends on Socrates’ dying and not conversely. And if events have
locations, then Socrates’ death occurred in the prison, while Xanthippe’s becoming a
widow occurred wherever she was. Perhaps some events can be spatiotemporally scat-
tered, in which case Xanthippe’s becoming a widow happened in part where Xanthippe
was, and in part where Socrates was, but still, identity would not follow. Socrates’ death
happened wholly where Socrates was, and in no part where Xanthippe was. We have,
dependence relation (see Kim 1974)—in addition to being one of the most forceful early detractors from
supervenience (Kim 1993).
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nevertheless, what appears to be a perfectly good explanation. The causal theory of ex-
planation cannot account for this. If, however, we recognise other forms of explanatory
determination relations, and it can be shown that this example exhibits one, then it is
easily accounted for.
Explanatory realism really is a nice theory. It explains why some DN arguments are
explanatory but not others (some DN arguments track determination relations, others
don’t). It subsumes the causal theory of explanation, which works very well in its re-
stricted domain. On top of this, it offers an account of understanding: as determination
relations structure the world, so explanations structure knowledge—understanding is
just structured knowledge (or perhaps knowledge of structure). And since the effect of
this structuring is cumulative (accumulating more explanations imposes more structure
on one’s knowledge), we can explain why subsumption and unification give rise to under-
standing (they impose a lot of structure at once, cf. Friedman 1974; Kitcher 1989). No
wonder it has seduced several grounding theorists—most prominently Jonathan Schaf-
fer and Paul Audi. Unfortunately, it is a theory adopted without much argument as
to whether it is a suitable theory of metaphysical explanation. We will now attempt to
reconstruct such arguments.
3.8 Metaphysical Explanation is Epistemic
Kit Fine (personal communication) has put to me that the sense in which he took ground-
ing to be explanatory was not an epistemic one, of making something intelligible, but an
ontic one, of accounting for something. Explanations may have epistemic byproducts,
such as understanding (perhaps even necessarily!), but Fine is skeptical that it is of the
essence of an explanation to yield such epistemic goods. I am going to argue that there
is at least one sense in which metaphysical explanation is an epistemic notion. I will
argue that if there is an ontic sense of metaphysical explanation, it cannot be usefully
distinguished from grounding. Similarly, if there is an ontic sense of causal explanation,
it is just causation.
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3.8.1 Metaphysics or Epistemology?
My jumper’s being maroon grounds its being red. Given this, there is a sense in which
my jumper’s maroonness accounts for its redness. I also understand why my jumper is
red. I know that it is maroon, and I know that anything maroon is thereby red. It is
prima facie very plausible that there is an epistemic sense of explanation. For there are
cases of causation and grounding in which explanation is clearly lacking. Thus, these
metaphysical relations are insufficient for explanation. Given the lack of understanding
which accompanies them, it is natural to conclude that what is missing is something
epistemic.
Unexplanatory Causes
There are at least three ways in which a cause may be unexplanatory. First, we may
have a full cause whose relevance is unapparent because it is too distal with respect
to the explanandum event. Second, we may know the full immediate cause, but be
unfamiliar with the mechanism by which it brings about the explanandum. And third,
the relevance of a partial cause may be elusive unless the full cause is known.
The Big Bang is an example of a full cause which explains very little. I’m writing this
dissertation because the Big Bang occurred. The Big Bang is a (many-times!) mediate
cause of my writing this dissertation.13 But it obviously doesn’t explain my writing this
dissertation. The structure of this case is of a full or sufficient cause which stands at
the end of a very long causal chain—the vast majority of whose intermediary events are
unknown. Now, in order to understand an event we do not need to understand why
all of its causes occurred. But for an explanans event to be explanatory, we ought,
at the very least, be able to trace its causal efficacy to the explanandum event. As it
stands, it is hard to see what explanatory relevance the Big Bang has for my writing
13The claim is unobvious and unintuitive, but ultimately, I think, unobjectionable. Consider: the
correlate counterfactual is certainly true—if there had been no Big Bang there would have been no
essay; there is seemingly a very high degree of influence (see Lewis 2000) between the Big Bang and my
writing this essay—the tiniest change in the Big Bang may well have resulted in my not existing, let
alone writing this essay.
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this dissertation.
A quite different case is illustrated by Salmon’s (2004, pp. 183–4) anecdote of the
friendly physicist, the balloon, and the accelerating airplane. As Salmon recounts it, the
friendly physicist
was sitting on a jet airplane awaiting takeoff. Directly across the aisle was a young
boy holding a helium-filled balloon by a string. In an effort to pique the child’s
curiosity, the friendly physicist asked him what he thought the balloon would do
when the plane accelerated for takeoff. After a moment’s thought the boy said that
it would move toward the back of the plane. The friendly physicist replied that he
thought it would move toward the front of the cabin. Several adults in the vicinity
became interested in the conversation, and they insisted that the friendly physicist
was wrong. A flight attendant offered to wager a miniature bottle of Scotch that
he was mistaken—a bet he was quite willing to accept. Soon thereafter the plane
accelerated, the balloon moved forward, and the friendly physicist enjoyed a free
drink.
The acceleration of the airplane did indeed cause the balloon to drift toward the front
of the cabin. But if any of those bystanders had asked why the balloon drifted forward,
and it had been replied that the plane accelerated, their curiosity would not have been
satisfied. If indeed citing the cause did amount to an explanation, that is not because
it improved anyone’s epistemic situation.
A better ‘explanation’ cites Einstein’s equivalence principle—that an acceleration is
equivalent to a gravitational field. Since balloons travel upward in the Earth’s gravita-
tional field, so they travel toward the front of a plane if a ‘gravitational field’ is placed
at the back of the cabin. Perhaps this ‘explanation’ does something to alleviate our
sense of puzzlement vis-à-vis balloons and accelerations. But it is at least open as to
whether it counts as an explanation proper. For one thing, it doesn’t tell us why a
balloon travels away from the Earth’s gravitational field. If we knew that, and we also
knew of the equivalence between accelerations and gravitational fields, then perhaps
we’d understand why balloons move toward the front of accelerating planes.
But why ask why balloons rise in gravitational fields? This is something we ex-
pect. Indeed it is, but that may just be because we are accustomed to it. Given that
things generally fall in gravitational fields, there is still puzzlement to be relieved (cf.
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Salmon ibid.). But we know what the cause of the balloon’s moving forward is—it’s the
acceleration of the plane! What more is needed to achieve explanation?
The second explanation for why the balloon moves forward is that the collision of
the rear cabin wall with the air molecules in front creates a pressure gradient along the
length of the cabin. Why is this an explanatory story? Perhaps the problem was that
we just couldn’t see in what way the acceleration of the plane could bring about the
balloon’s moving forward. This might suggest that what was missing was not knowledge
of causes, but knowledge of mechanism. We knew that the acceleration brought about
the forward motion; we wanted to know how it did so. As Salmon (1984, p. 297) would
have put it, we had an etiological explanation of the event, but what we wanted was a
constitutive explanation.
There is something to this distinction. (Perhaps causal mechanisms ground causal
relations, and that is how constitutive explanations are explanatory in the first place.)
The distinction can’t, however, always capture what is lacking in our epistemic state.
Why did the glass shatter? The etiological explanation merely reports that it was
dropped. The constitutive explanation describes the mechanism by which the dropping
resulted in the shattering—gravity, the fragility of the class, the hardness of the floor,
and whatnot. But, ordinarily, people do not understand such mechanisms. To be sure,
they know that things fall when dropped, but who can really claim to understand how
gravity works? Yet, when we find shattered glass, we’re content with the explanation
that a glass was dropped.
The third kind of case involves partial causes. Now, there are times when we are
happy to accept partial causes as explanatory. For example, in seeking to understand a
case of heart disease, smoking will usually satisfy as an explanation—even though the
full cause may very well include the patient’s poor diet and lack of exercise. But say
that Jack’s living in Scotland is cited as the cause of his developing rickets. Citing this
cause does not suffice for explanation. But add that rickets is often brought about by
a vitamin D defiency; that Scotland, being relatively far from the equator gets little
sunlight; and that Jack had a genetic disorder affecting his ability to synthesise vitamin
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D from sunlight, then we begin to see how Jack’s living in Scotland can be explanatory—
as part of a larger explanatory story. The difference between the two cases is that in
the former, but not the latter, we can see how the partial cause might fit into a fuller
explanatory story. Since, in the latter case, we might be unfamiliar with any of the
mechanisms by which living in Scotland contributes to developing rickets, the relevance
of the cited cause eludes us.
Unexplanatory Grounds
Just as there are unexplanatory causes, so there are unexplanatory grounds. The cases
are (imperfectly) analagous.
As to the first kind of case, though every event shares the same ultimate cause, we do
not ordinarily think every fact shares the same ultimate ground. If, like priority monists,
however, we thought that parts were dependent on wholes, we might think every fact
has an explanatory story in terms of the entire universe (see Schaffer 2010a). Be that
as it may, there is certainly no transparent explanatory story between the existence of
the universe and my being conscious.
But priority monists are few; we need another example. It is easy to imagine abstract







Figure 3.1: A ‘non-branching’ grounding structure
Suppose that each node represents a full ground for the next link in the grounding
chain. A case of unexplanatory grounding arises when the relevance of g0 is obscured
with respect to gn—even though the explanatory links may be stepwise transparent. If
you like, you can view it as a Sorites problem: g0 is clearly relevant to g1, insignificantly
less so to g2, and so on. By the time we get to gn−1 any relevance is completely lost.
Now, the problem with finding concrete examples of this kind is that few ground-
ing chains have this simple ‘non-branching’ structure. (Causal examples of this kind
are ubiquitous—let each node represent the falling of a domino.) The most common









Figure 3.2: A branching grounding structure
We can certainly find cases like this in which g0 is unexplanatory with respect to gn.
But such cases are not very revealing of this type of unexplanatory ground, for g0 is
only a partial ground of gn. The case is thus more analagous to the case of a partial
ground or cause whose relevance is obscured when taken in isolation. Unfortunately, I
am unable to find a convincing concrete case.14 But the abstract case should illustrate
at least the conceptual possibility of full, unexplanatory distal grounds.
To illustrate the second kind of case, take Fine’s beloved example once more. Some-
one unfamiliar with set theory might be at a loss as to how the existence of Socrates
explains the existence of {Socrates}. What is it about elements which guarantees the
existence of their singletons? If asked why singleton Socrates exists, it will not do to
14To be clear, there are obvious examples of grounding chains with such a structure (truthmaking
and the determinate/determinable relation are the obvious ones), but the relevance of lower bounds in
such chains is plausibly transparently relevant to the upper bounds.
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reply, ‘because Socrates exists’. It is the connection between them which is sought. A
felicitous reply will cite the pairing axiom (or some primitive ‘set-builder’ operation).
As to the third case, in which the relevance of a partial ground is obscured with
respect to explanandum, such cases are ubiquitous. Assume there is a table here because
some molecules are arranged in a certain way. Then the fact that a certain molecule is in
a certain location partially grounds the fact that there is a table here—but it certainly
does not explain it.
There is a further kind of example of unexplanatory ground, which (though I’m less
sure of it) is interesting since it doesn’t seem to have a causal correlate. It is one in
which there just seems to be no epistemic context in which a certain full ground could
be explanatory. Though the determinate/determinable relation is often ushered as a
paradigm example of a grounding relation, one might think it is an odd choice for a
discussion about explanation. There is apparently no situation in which the answer
‘because it is maroon’ is a felicitous answer to ‘why is your jumper red?’.15 Indeed, the
answer just sounds facetious. The reason (I think) is that when we ask why something is
red, we can’t plausibly be interpreted as asking after the grounds of redness. Everyone
knows in what redness consists—it consists in something’s being a determinate shade
of red. Since everybody knows this, and everybody knows everybody knows this, such
an answer can only constitute a flagrant flouting of Gricean maxims. What’s more,
that something is red by virtue of being a determinate shade of red seems such a basic
conceptual truth, that is questionable whether anybody might earnestly enquire into the
grounds of something’s redness. So the reason such grounding claims fail to be explana-
tory is not because the grounding relations they track are inherently unexplanatory, but
because they can’t improve anybody’s epistemic situation (at least actually.) On the
other hand, there are plenty of felicitous responses if the answer is interpreted causally
(‘I fell into a vat of red dye’) or teleologically (‘because I want to affirm my status as a
15Because of this example I used to doubt that the determinate/determinable relation was a genuine
grounding relation. I thought: grounding is an explanatory relation, so there must be some context in
which any grounding relation is explanatory.
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Labour supporter’)—such answers are non-trivial.16
Ontic Explanation?
We have what appear, on the face of it, to be (at least) three cases in which a fact
is grounded but unexplained by its ground. Thus, grounding and explanation clearly
come apart. But the unionist has a reply. She can maintain that there are two senses of
explanation—an epistemic sense and an ontic sense. In these cases, it is explanation in
the epistemic sense which is lacking. We still have ontic explanation. The universe ac-
counts for my being conscious, even if it doesn’t render it intelligible. Socrates accounts
for the existence of {Socrates}, even if we don’t know by what mechanism. And the
existence of a certain molecule partially accounts for this table, even if it doesn’t par-
tially explain it. Epistemic explanations are highly context-dependent and must meet
an array of pragmatic conditions. But ontic explanation—accounting for—is robustly
metaphysical, and holds even when such conditions are not met. A grounding relation
is identical with an explanation in this ontic sense.
Suppose the unionist is right. Then nothing more is required of the world for an
ontic explanation to hold than for a grounding relation to hold. But unless we can
give an independent account of ontic explanation, such a view is either vacuous or
trivial (and at any rate, uninteresting). It is vacuous if the claim adds nothing to our
theory of grounding. That is, since a theory of grounding just is, ipso facto, a theory of
explanation, we need say nothing more on the matter. It is trivial if the sense in which
grounding is explanatory is just built into the notion itself—that grounding is a kind of
accounting for, and accounting for is a kind of grounding. But it seems neither trivial
nor vacuous that grounding is explanatory, and it would be desirable to know what is
distinctively explanatory about it! That said, I am happy to grant that there is such
a notion of explanation (for it is merely grounding by another name). I just maintain
16Note, in contrast, that such ‘facetious’ explanations do not appear to arise in the case of causation.
Shadows are always caused by some object’s blocking the light. But we can answer the question ‘why is
there a shadow?’ without sounding facetious. I’m not exactly sure why this is so. Perhaps it is because
there is no essential conceptual connection between explanans and explanandum—even though they are
constantly conjoined.
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that it holds no interest over and above the interest of grounding.
Is there another sense of ontic explanation, one on which it is neither merely ground-
ing, nor a matter of epistemology? There is, though it is not strictly a unionist view.
It is the view on which there is a robustly metaphysical kind of explanation which is
grounded by a grounding relation. That is, that A grounds B grounds the fact that A
ontically explains B. It then makes sense to ask, ‘what is it, over and above the ground-
ing relation, that is required of the world in order for an ontic explanation to hold?’.17
But now the problem is that it is far from clear what this might be. p grounds p ∨ q.
What more is required of the world (since we’re talking about a robustly metaphysical
relation) for p to explain p∨ q? One possibility is that p determines p∨ q. In this sense,
grounding (like causation) is a determinate of the determinable determination.18 Thus
being a determination relation is something over and above being a grounding relation.
But it is not clear that this ‘something more’ gets at what it is to be ontically
explanatory. To be sure, on the theory of explanation we’re dealing with, it is the deter-
mination relation (or its species/determinates) which ground (epistemic) explanations.
Perhaps it grounds them by virtue of being ontically explanatory—but we are still in
the dark as to what this ontic explanatoriness is!
My principal complaint about unionism is that the view leaves entirely unilluminated
the (interesting) sense of ontic explanation its proponents apparently have in mind, and
I have trouble reconstructing what such a form of explanation might take. That is hardly
a knockdown argument. Unionists can take it as an invitation to do better. But I think
there is an interesting epistemic sense of explanation to be elucidated, and compelling
reasons to think that such explanations are associated with grounding. Hence, I am
inclined to believe that grounding an explanation come apart. Their relationship is
17N.B. I am not claiming that the grounding relation is insufficient for the explanation. The fact
that p fully grounds (and so is sufficient for) the truth of p. But p’s being true consists in more than
the fact that p—in the sense that the truth of p is not reducible to the fact that p. We want to be
able to distinguish correspondence theories of truth from, disquotational or identity theories of truth
which, although they would agree on ‘Tp ↔ p’, make very different claims on the metaphysics of the
case. Regarding the present case, there is ‘more to’ an ontic explanation than a grounding relation,
even though the latter is sufficient for the former.
18Try saying that quickly!
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rather that grounding grounds explanation.
3.8.2 The Unity of Explanation
The previous section argued that grounding and explanation come apart. This section
will argue that there is one kind of explanation why—or that grounding explanation and
causal explanation are flavours of the same kind of explanation. The argument for this
is quite straightforward. It is the only view which can accommodate so-called ‘hybrid’
explanations—explanations which cite both both grounds and causes. Recall that we
already considered a hybrid explanation in the previous chapter. The possibility of such
explanations was apparently a consequence of the transitivity argument for the unity of
grounding. In Lange (2013)’s example we had a grounding explanation chaining with
a causal explanation (A grounds B, which causes C). Here, we’ll consider a converse
example (A causes B, which grounds C) due to Schaffer (2016b, p. 89). The mean
molecular kinetic energy (MMK) of a gas at t0 (A) causally explains its MMK at t1 (B).
















Figure 3.3: Hybrid explanation
We already know that metaphysical explanation chains, and that causal explanation
chains. Now, given that causal explanation chains with metaphysical explanation—and,
as we argued in the previous chapter, conversely—it follows that explanation chains
generally. The best explanation for this is that we have a single relation of explanation,
regardless of whether it is backed by causation or grounding or what have you.
I said I would distinguish two senses in which explanation is univocal. The above
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argument establishes that the epistemic sense of explanation is univocal. I will now argue
that ontic explanation—accounting for—is univocal. Recall that on our working theory
of explanation A explains C only if A plays a role in determining C. We also know that
A causally (metaphysically) explains C only if A causes (grounds) C. It follows that if
A causally explains B and B metaphysically explains C, then A determines C. Since I
don’t see any useful notion of ontic explanation over and above the notions of causation
and grounding, it is natural to conclude that a generalised notion of ontic explanation
is just determination. This is just another inference to the best explanation. Given
that causal and metaphysical explanations chain, the best explanation for this is that
the relations which underwrite them chain. And the best explanation of their ability to
chain is that they are but species of the same generic relation. Moreover, as I pointed out
in the previous chapter, it looks as though causation and grounding stand in a general
asymmetry principle. If A causes B and B grounds A (or vice versa), it looks as though
A is causing itself (albeit with some movement between levels).
3.9 More on Logical Form: Contrastivity
3.9.1 Contrastive Explanation
Cases of unexplanatory grounding and causation show that these notions should not
be conflated with metaphysical/causal explanation. But the unionist has a route of
response which we should put to rest.
Since van Fraassen (1980), explanation has been widely thought to be contrastive.
A contrast is a statement or proposition of the form ‘p rather than q’. Contrastivists
about explanation hold that there is no such thing as an explanation of q simpliciter.
Explanations cite difference makers. We must cite what makes the difference between q
and something else. That is, we must explain why q rather than q′. To use a well-worn
example: paresis is the result of latent untreated syphilis. Supposing that Smith, but
not Jones, had syphilis, we can explain why Smith, but not Jones, developed paresis:
because Smith, rather than Jones, had latent untreated Syphilis. But suppose Jones
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too had untreated syphilis. Then the explanation will not do—we have not cited the
relevant difference between Smith and Jones.
The idea that explanation is contrastive is supposed to capture the fact that it is
interest relative. Hanson (as cited in van Fraassen 1980, p. 125) put the point thus:
There are as many causes of x as there are explanations. Consider the cause of
death as might have been set out by the physician as ‘multiple haemorrhage’, by
the barrister as ‘negligence on the part of the driver’, by a carriage builder as a
defect in the brakeblock construction, by the civic planner as ‘the presence of tall
shrubbery at that turning.’
If, as Hanson claims, ‘there as many causes of x as there are explanations’ (and analagously
for grounding) then the unionist can respond that our putative examples of unexplana-
tory grounding are no such thing—we just haven’t identified the relevant contrasts. Of
course, if unionism and contrastivism about explanation are both right, then that entails
that grounding is contrastive. But that may not be too heavy a price to pay for the
unionist—for even separatists have argued that grounding is contrastive.
3.9.2 Grounding is not Contrastive (and neither is Causation)
Jonathan Schaffer is a big fan of contrastivity—not just regarding grounding. Schaf-
fer advocates contrastive treatments of causation (Schaffer 2005a), knowledge (Schaf-
fer 2005b), explanation, and grounding (Schaffer 2012). His reasoning is remarkably
Lewisian in style: he presents some problem cases for the target notion, and then shows
how a contrastive treatment of the notion dispels all the problems. Now, other things
being equal, a theory which solves more problem cases is preferable. But, of course,
other things are rarely equal. The inequality in the present case is this: contrastive
accounts of causation and grounding have no independent plausibility. That is because,
as Schaffer rightly emphasises, these are worldly relations, and it is hard to see how a
worldly relation could be contrastive.
Schaffer (2012) has three arguments that grounding is contrastive. First, explanation
is contrastive, so viewing grounding as contrastive makes it more amenable to under-
writing explanation. Second, it sustains the analogy with causation, which Schaffer also
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takes to be contrastive. And third, it easily resolves some apparent counterexamples to
the transitivity of grounding. We will dispense with each of these, beginning with the
counterexamples.
Counterexamples to Transitivity
The Dented Sphere. Imagine a sphere σ with a dent in it. σ’s precise shape (call it S)
is a determinate of the determinable, more-or-less-spherical (call this M). Now, the fact
that σ has a dent (partially) grounds the fact that it has shape S, and having shape S
grounds the fact that it is M. But having a dent cannot ground having shape M. σ is
more-or-less-spherical despite the dent, not because of it. That is, the dent is irrelevant
to whether or not σ has shape M.
The Third Member. Let A be a set with exactly three members, one of which is
c. Then c partially grounds A’s having three members, and A’s having (exactly) three
members grounds the fact that A is finite. But c cannot ground A’s being finite, since c
may be a member of an infinite set (just take ω ∪ {c}). A is finite despite having c has
a member, not because of it.
The Cat’s Meow. Suppose Cadmus the cat is meowing. This is (partially) grounded
in facts that make this cat Cadmus. Given the essentiality of origin, the meeting of
sperm S and ovum O ground the fact that this cat is Cadmus. Moreover, that Cadmus
is meowing grounds the fact that something is meowing. Hence, the meeting of S and O
grounds the fact that something is meowing. But this is implausible, since the meeting
of S and O has nothing to do with whether something is meowing.
How is the contrastive analysis supposed to resolve the examples? First, we recast
grounding claims with a contrastive structure. ‘A grounds B’ is taken to be elliptical
for
(50) (A rather than A∗) grounds (B rather than B∗).
(The parentheses indicate that the contrasts are to taken as single units, albeit with




If (contrast1 grounds contrast2) and (contrast2 grounds contrast3), then (contrast1
grounds contrast3).
The idea is that the counterexamples exhibit illicit shifts in the middle contrast.
(52) (A rather than A∗) grounds (B rather than B∗).
(53) (B rather than B∗∗) grounds (C rather than C∗.)
A case exhibiting this structure, then, fails to satisfy the conditions for (differential)
transitivity, and so fails to count as a counterexample. Consider again the dented sphere
(the other cases are solved analogously, as the reader can verify). The sphere’s having
a dent grounds its being shape S. This must be understood as elliptical for something
like:
(54) (σ’s having a dent rather than not) grounds (σ’s being S rather than S∗ (perfectly
spherical)).
The claim that being of shape S grounds being of shape M (more-or-less spherical) must
now be analysed along the same lines. Now we get
(55) (σ’s being of shape S rather than shape S∗) grounds (its being of shape M rather
than M∗ (more or less cubic, say)).
But this is false. The dent makes no difference to whether or not σ is of shape M. It
would have been more-or-less-spherical either way. A true grounding claim—riding on
a relevant difference—would be something like
(56) (σ’s being shape S rather than shape S∗∗ (perfectly cubic)) grounds (its being
M rather than M∗).
19Schaffer defines a new property on quaternary relations (which he calls ‘differential transitivity’)
which is formally equivalent to the principle laid down here. I think it is more perspicuous presented
this way.
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But now we have an illicit shift in the middle contrast. This case is no counterexample.
This is an elegant solution to a nonexistent problem. For these are not genuine
counterexamples to transitivity, as I will shortly argue. In each case, I will offer reasons
to think that the grounding claim Schaffer denies is, after all, acceptable. First, note
that each example concerns partial, rather than full, grounding. Each example turns,
moreover, on the apparent irrelevance of a lower bound in a grounding chain to an upper
bound in the grounding chain. The moral of story I will tell is that relevance is a highly
context sensitive matter. The relevance of a partial ground often only becomes apparent
in the context of a full ground, as we argued above. The relevance of the position of a
certain molecule is obscured with respect to the existence of a table—unless we know
the positions of the other relevant molecules.
Mackie (1974) provides a notion which will be of use to us here: the insufficient but
necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient (INUS) condition.20 This is a useful way
of thinking about grounds for assessing claims of relevance (I do not claim this is what
grounds are). There are different ways of being grounded. p ∨ q can be grounded in p
or it can be grounded in q. Now consider (p ∧ p′) ∨ (q ∧ q′). Here p does not constitute
a full ground. But it is a part of a full ground—indeed a necessary part. But p is not
a necessary partial ground for (p ∧ p′) ∨ (q ∧ q′) because there is another full ground—
q ∧ q′—of which it is not a part. I propose thinking of Schaffer’s counterexample this
way. The apparently irrelevant (partial) grounds only seem irrelevant because there are
other full grounds in which they do not feature. But, as it happens, they do actually
feature in the full grounds. In this sense they are relevant.21
The Dented Sphere Solved. It is true that σ would have been more-or-less spherical
had it not had a dent. But in this scenario, σ is not of precise shape S, but some other
precise shape S∗ (perfectly spherical). That is a sufficient ground for σ’s being M, but
it is not the only possible sufficient ground. Being shape S is a sufficient ground. And
20This was Mackie’s ill-fated attempt at analysing causation.
21Similar remarks are made by Litland (2013) in his discussion of Schaffer’s examples. He stresses
that grounds are ways for facts to obtain. Here ‘way’ is not intended to have any metaphysically inflated
sense. The idea is merely that for each fact there are a number of possible states of affairs that would
ground it, if they obtained. For a different approach see Raven (2013).
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a necessary part of what it is to be S is to have a dent.
The Third Member Solved. The solution here is slightly more interesting (it is similar
to Litland (2013)’s and quite different from Raven (2013)’s). First, it might be objected
that sets have their members essentially, so Schaffer’s reasoning stops dead in its tracks.
But we can easily circumvent this problem by letting A be a more coarse-grained col-
lection, like an orchestra. The identity of an orchestra is not wholly dependent on its
members. You would still be seeing the London Philharmonic if a second violin fell ill
and couldn’t make the gig. And it is conceivable that the London Philharmonic might
have precisely the same members as the London Symphony Orchestra. The orchestra
you see is the one whose name is on the ticket.
What grounds the fact that the LPO has n members? I consider the problem to
be analagous to the problem of finding suitable grounds for universal claims, ∀xφ. Let
a1, . . . , an be all the things there are, and assume all instantiate φ. Then it is true
that ∀xφ. But φ(a1), . . . , φ(an) do not necessitate ∀xφ,22 for there might have been an
n+ 1th thing which is not φ. Fine (2012)’s solution to this, borrowed from truthmaker
theory (see Armstrong 2004, ch. 6), is to invoke a ‘totality’ clause. φ(a1), . . . , φ(an) can
witness ∀xφ—so long as we know we have enumerated every member of the domain. We
just need to add clause that states that everything there is among a1, . . . , an. Now, it is
clear that a collection’s cardinality depends on its members. But only all of them can
determine its exact cardinality. At best, a1, . . . , an ∈ A is a full ground only for ‘A has
at least n members. (It may be a partial ground for ‘A has exactly n members’.) Just as
with universal claims, we must add the further claim that that’s all the members there
are. Assuming n is finite, does A have finitely members despite having a1 as a member?
After all, we could drop a1 or replace it. No. a1’s being in A is a necessary part of a
sufficient ground for having finitely many members.
The Cat’s Meow Solved. This example is perhaps the easiest to solve. (I’m slightly
puzzled as to why Schaffer even entertained it. But we will go through the reasoning
22Though see Skiles (2015) and Litland (2015) for arguments that grounds needn’t necessitate what
they ground.
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explicitly for the sake of completeness.) Let’s grant that part of what grounds the fact
that Cadmus is meowing are facts which make Cadmus Cadmus, i.e. the fact that S
and O met.23 If it were Tibbles, and not Cadmus, that was meowing, facts that make
Tibbles Tibbles (the meeting of S∗ and O∗) would have to ground this. That is, whatever
cat is meowing, facts about the identity of that cat are necessary to ground that it is
meowing. Now, the fact that something is meowing is certainly not fundamental; it
must be grounded. Nor could it be prior to the fact that Cadmus is meowing. For
then it would presumably also be prior to the fact that Tibbles is meowing. And by
necessitation, every cat would be meowing. But it is implausible that this fact could
be grounded in anything other than the fact that some cat or other is meowing. Thus,
given that it is actually Cadmus meowing, and that the meeting of S and O is necessary
to ground this, the meeting of S and O must, as a matter of fact, ground that something
is meowing.
Worldly Relations are not Contrastive
I agree with Schaffer (2016b) that the similarities between grounding and causation
should be taken seriously. But I see no strong reason to accept that causation is con-
trastive, and so the causal analogy does not motivate the contrastivity of grounding.
Schaffer (2005a) lays down several arguments for the contrastivity of causation. Or
rather, he presents several problem cases which are easily resolved by a contrastive anal-
ysis. But there are two problems here. First, Schaffer does not address the possibility
that we routinely conflate causation qua production (see Hall (2004)) with causal expla-
nation, and it is perhaps this conflation which gives rise to putative counterexamples.
Second, it is just implausible that contrastivity could be a feature of the world, rather
than our representations of it. I will argue for this latter claim directly. I will then
provide a natural account of how a non-contrastive dependence relation may underwrite
23One might think that identity facts lack grounds. After all, what is more basic than the fact that
something is self-identical? Criteria of identity should be interpreted as materially adequate conditions,
not grounding claims. On the other hand, perhaps the ground of a non-fundamental existence is also
the ground of its self-identity. See Fine (2016) for discussion of these issues.
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a contrastive explanation.
If there are worldly contrastive relations, then their relata—that is, contrastive facts
or events—must be worldly too. It might be fairly objected that a contrastive fact ‘p
rather than q’ is made up in part of a negative fact. It is equivalent to: ‘p and not q’.
But it is unclear how a negative fact is to stand in a worldly relation.24 I’m at least
open to the idea that there could be negative facts, so I will not press the point. There
are other troubles afoot. Causal relations proliferate implausibly and we have a looming
reference class problem.
Suppose that Smith’s having syphilis caused his later developing paresis. On the
assumption that causation is contrastive this is elliptical for
(57) (Smith rather than Jones had syphilis) caused (Smith rather than Jones devel-
oped paresis)
What makes (57) true is that Jones is a relevant member of Smith’s contrast class, and
that the relevant difference between them is that Smith, but not Jones, had syphilis.
Suppose in addition that Schmidt was syphilis free. Now we have
(58) (Smith rather than Schmidt had syphilis) caused (Smith rather than Schmidt
developed paresis)
On the assumption that causation is contrastive, we have here two distinct causal rela-
tions (in fact, one for each member of Smith’s contrast class). But this is implausible.
There is just one causal relation—Smith’s syphilis causing his paresis!
An obvious fix is to say that the relevant contrast is the entire class of people who
do not have syphilis (call this ¬S), which we can pick out—pragmatically—by one of its
members. Whatever the merits of this proposal (there aren’t many), we now have the
conclusion that this causal relation is highly modally fragile—and not in the usual way.
Turn to a world where Schmidt does not exist. But now ¬S no longer exists. So we have
24The problem is similar to that of finding truthmakers for negative truths. It apparently requires
that there be negative facts, but such facts have obscure natures. This is the problem of non-being in
a modern guise.
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a different causal relation. In this world ¬S′ is the relevant contrast class. But this is
implausible! Whether or not Schmidt exists does not make a blind bit of difference to
whether Smith got paresis because he had syphilis.
The Structure of Underwriting
Schaffer thinks grounding is more amenable to underwriting explanation if, like expla-
nation, it is contrastive. That is simply false. Straight dyadic dependence relations can
equally well underwrite explanation. Recall that a contrastive treatment of explanation
was supposed to capture its interest-relativity. Contrasts fulfil a pragmatic role, not
a metaphysical one. They zero in on the part of the causal nexus that interests us.
The upshot is that the truth of causal statements does not shift with context, but their
relevance does.
To illustrate, suppose we are asked why Smith got paresis. It is true that syphilis was
a cause of his paresis and, given what else we know about the context, perfectly relevant.
But we are pushed further: ‘But Jones had syphilis too, and he didn’t develop paresis’.
It is still perfectly true in this context that Smith’s syphilis caused his paresis—we know
that causal statements don’t imply exceptionless generalisations (Anscombe 1971)—but
it fails to explain why Smith rather than Jones got paresis, because it doesn’t identify
the relevant causal difference between Smith and Jones’s cases. Note, I am not claiming
that the following is true in this context:
(59) Smith rather than Jones got paresis because Smith rather than Jones had syphilis.
This claim is not equivalent to the claim that Smith’s syphilis caused his paresis. (59)
presupposes that Jones did not have syphilis. The claim is not just about Smith, it’s
about Jones. That Smith had syphilis is unexplanatory because it still leaves us in a
state of puzzlement regarding Jones. Moreover (59) has different truth conditions to the
claim that syphilis caused Smith’s paresis. Minimally, we expect it to be true only if
(60) Smith’s having syphilis caused his paresis and it is not the case that Jones’s
having syphilis caused his paresis.
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A contrastive causal claim, then, is at least the affirmation of one causal claim, and the
denial of another.
Now further suppose that Jones’s syphilis was treated—which prevented his devel-
oping paresis. That is, treatment is the relevant difference between Smith and Jones.
Now we have the following contrast:
(61) Smith rather than Jones got paresis because Smith rather than Jones had un-
treated syphilis.
Which, I claim, is true only if
(62) Smith’s having untreated syphilis caused his paresis, and it is not the case that
Smith’s having untreated syphilis caused his paresis.
Schematically, this suggests the following structure for underwriting (we write A/A′ for
‘A rather than A′’):
(63) A/A′ explains B/B′ only if A determines B and not-(A′ determines B′)
Careful readers will notice this gives only a necessary condition for explanation. By no
means is it meant to capture every pragmatically relevant factor to explanation. What it
does show is that there is no prima facie reason to believe that contrastive explanations
need be underwritten by determination relations which are themselves contrastive.25
3.10 Philosophical Explanation
Much has been made of importance of grounding for metaphysical explanation. Less has
been made of its importance for philosophical explanation. That is probably because
grounding is studied almost exclusively by metaphysicians. But Fine (2012a, p. 38) did
write that “Ground. . . stands to philosophy as cause stands to science.” That thought
strikes me as natural and I propose to run with it.
25Shortly before submission I became aware of Krämer and Roski’s (2017), which explores these
topics in much more depth than I am able to here.
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As I understand it, philosophical explanation is to be distinguished from metaphys-
ical explanation (though they have an interesting relationship). The difference is not
that metaphysical explanation is explanation in the metaphysical domain, while philo-
sophical explanation applies more broadly. If the kinds of explanations typically sought
by philosophers must be underwritten by grounding relations, and that is sufficient to
make an explanation metaphysical, then it is trivial that all philosophical explanation
is metaphysical explanation. There is not much interest in pursuing such a claim.
The notion I’m interested in capturing is more the intellectual or epistemic goal
of philosophy itself. What kind of intellectual exercise are we engaged in, and how
do we go about it? Those are ambitious questions, and I shall not attempt to tackle
them fully. However, it seems that the philosophical theory is central. After all, most
‘positive’ work done in philosophy involves theory building. (The ‘negative’ mostly
comprises offering counterexamples to those theories.) At the highest level, philosophy
rarely proceeds by considering knockdown arguments for or against a certain position.
For such arguments are rarely to be had. Rather, it proceeds by theory comparison,
of comparing theoretical virtues—particularly explanatory virtues. The theory which
offers the best (overall) explanation of the target domain is to be preferred. (For all
our extolling of the deductive argument, it appears we may rely disproportionately on
inference to the best explanation.)
But this is not singular explanation—the kind we’ve been considering thus far in this
chapter. This is theoretical explanation, which we set aside in Section 3.6. There we noted
that there is a sense in which theories explain which is quite distinct from the sense in
which a fact explains. Newtonian Mechanics explains the motions of slow-moving bodies.
This seems perfectly intelligible, and indeed, true, even though singular explanation
appears to be factive in both positions. My proposal is that philosophical explanation
is to be understood in a similar fashion. Philosophical explanation is explanation by
philosophical theory. The causal theory of reference explains why ‘Kripke’ refers to
Kripke (rather than to Nixon)—even if it is false. Consequentialism explains why we
should switch tracks (even if it is false). The Best Systems Account of Laws explains
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why the second law of thermodynamics is a law of nature, but ‘all gold spheres are less
than a kilometer in diameter’ isn’t (even though, as I will argue in Chapter 5, the BSA
is false).
If the philosophical theory is indeed so central, then the pressing question is ‘what
is a philosophical theory?’—another ambitious question, and one to which I suspect
there is no definitive answer.26 However, there does seem to be a prevalent class of
theories aimed at real definition, at providing definitions of things, rather than of words
or concepts. The justified true belief theory gives a (false)27 real definition of knowledge.
Divine command theory offers a real definition of moral rightness. I do not claim that
every philosophical theory aims at real definition—only that a large and important class
of them does. My account is meant only to cover such theories. (That task is ambitious
enough.)
On Gideon Rosen (2015)’s account of real definition, a property F is defined by a
property Φ iff it lies in the nature or essence of F to be grounded by Φ. Similarly,
On a naïve essentialist view, Φ defines F iff it lies in the essence of F things to be Φ.
I needn’t take a stand on the correct account of real definition. All I require is that
philosophical theories feature essence claims (essentially!). The correct account of real
definition won’t change any substantive detail of my proposal. So I am just going to
assume (for simplicity) that statements of real definition are essence claims. Regarding
26Just look at the literature on scientific theories. The first ‘received view’ was that theories were sets
of sentences (the syntactic view). Then the view that theories were sets of models (the semantic view)
became dominant. And recently attention has turned back towards the syntactic view (see Halvorson
2012, 2013 for discussion).
27In contrast to definitions of words, real definitions cannot be stipulated, which makes them apt to
be false. We cannot stipulate the real definition of knowledge. Aside from anything else, this would
trivialise philosophical theorising. To be sure, we could stipulate ‘knowledge’ to denote justified true
belief. And this would be ‘false’ in the sense that such a definition does not conform to common usage.
But strictly speaking, we could redefine ‘knowledge’ as justified true belief and truly describe justified
true belief as knowledge.
Now the really interesting cases arise. In instances of explication we typically replace a pretheoretic
notion with a regimented, or theory-laden, alternative—perhaps because it is thought that there is no
real definition to be had of the pretheoretic notion, or because we regard the theoretical notion as
more useful. For instance, we might think the pretheoretic notion of free will is something like the
libertarian notion of free will, but that, lamentably, it is implausible that we could possess such free
will. Nevertheless, we might think the compatibilist notion of free will is close enough, and that it is
useful to think of ourselves as free in this sense. Is this a stipulative real definition of free will? Or a
redefining of ‘free will’ and offering a real definition of its new denotation?
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philosophical theories then (or at least an important class of them), my claim is that
they are simply essence claims (or collections thereof). For example:
(64) JTB Theory of Knowledge
Knowledge is essentially justified true belief.
Following Fine (1995) we can regiment this a little further. We write:
(65) knowledge S knows that p ⇐⇒ S has a justified true belief that p.
for ‘it lies in the essence of knowledge that S knows that p whenever S has a justified
true belief that p’. This claim just is the JTB theory of knowledge. There is no more,
or less, to the JTB theory.
Now let us return to the question of philosophical explanation. How does our ac-
count of philosophical theories feature there? I will avail myself of one final piece of
ideology: the explanatory inference (Litland, forthcoming). An explanatory inference is
a move in an impure logic of ground. The basic inferences correspond to relations of










where F is a determinate of determinable G.
(Officially, we are predicationalists about grounding, but there is nothing to bar us from
representing explanatory inferences in this way so long as—officially—we take them to
be underwritten by grounding relations.)
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To cover the mediate cases we can generalise the notion of an explanatory inference.
The generalised notion of the explanatory inference is the explanatory argument—an
argument composed of explanatory inferences, which we define inductively as follows:
(69) Explanatory Arguments
• Explanatory inferences are explanatory arguments.
• If φ0, . . . , φn ` ψ0
and ψ0, . . . , ψm ` ξ
are explanatory arguments, then so is
φ0, . . . , φn, ψ0, . . . , ψm ` ξ.28
We can now define philosophical explanation. Let T be a philosophical theory and
e some explanandum of the target theory. Then
(70) Philosophical Explanation
T philosophically explains e iff there is an explanatory argument from T to e.
For a straightforward example again consider the Humean theory of laws. In its simplest
form this theory consists of one essence claim:
(71) (Naïve) Humean Theory of Laws
law λ is a law ⇐⇒ λ is a true generalisation.
As an essence claim, this tells us what it takes for a proposition to be a law. It must
be a true generalisation. Now consider an arbitrary generalisation L. Our stock of
explanatory inference rules—basically, generic statements of full, immediate ground—
point the way to the explanantia of L’s being a law. Regardless of its plausibility,
the Humean implicitly relies on this grounding principle (as when she says things like
‘everything there is—including laws—depend only on local matters of particular fact.’).
(72) Generalisations are grounded in their instances.29
28This definition is a somewhat simplified version of Litland (forthcoming)’s.
29As we saw in the previous section, this introduces a problem for those who hold that grounds
necessitate what they ground.
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We can either encode this principle as an inference rule:
(73) Generalisation Grounding
Fa1 ∧Ga1, . . . , Fan ∧Gan
∀x(Fx→ Gx)
provided a1, . . . an are all the F s there are
Or we can just state a generic grounding principle as a premise. However we choose to
represent it exactly, we are now in a position to represent Humean reasoning explicitly.
(i) law ‘all F s are G’ is a law ⇐⇒ ‘all F s are G’ is
a true generalisation.
(Humean Theory of Laws)
(ii) Generalisations are grounded in their instances. (Generic Grounding Claim)
(iii) Fa1 ∧Ga1, . . . , Fan ∧Gan (and that’s all the F s
there are).
(Assumption)
(iv) All F s are G. (from (ii) and (iii))
(v) ‘All F s are G’ is a law. (from (i) and (iv))
The Humean theory of laws (laws are true generalisations), together with a grounding
principle (generalisations are grounded in their instances) explains why a given propo-
sition is a law (because its instances hold). Moreover, by displaying the explanatory
reasoning explicitly, and citing those grounding rules upon which we have relied, we
have shown how the Humean Theory of Laws accounts for the lawhood of those propo-
sitions which are laws.
There are some interesting features of this account. First, it recognises a distinct
role for philosophical explanation, but makes essential use of grounding/metaphysical
explanation. The explanatory power of theories derives in large part on grounding prin-
ciples. It is because the explanandum is derivable via grounding principles that a theory




A theory T is explanatorily adequate with respect to some domain D (of facts or
explananda) just in case each d ∈ D is derivable from T using only explanatory
inferences.
In the case of lawhood, at the very least, our D will be a (possibly exhaustive) set of
explananda of the form ‘p is (not) a law’. We want our theory not only to correctly
‘predict’ which propositions are laws, but also to explain why those propositions are
laws. It is a common complaint of the philosophical theory that, although it makes the
correct predictions about its target phenomena, it fails to illuminate (in an explanatory
sense) why those phenomena hold. For instance, the Best Systems Account of laws
correctly ‘predicts’, by and large, which propositions count as laws. But as I will argue
in Chapter 5, it does not plausibly explain why those propositions are laws. Indeed,
that is the chief anti-Humean complaint.
Second, out of this falls nicely a vindication of our preference for explanatory virtues
in the course of theory comparison. We often appeal to the theory which we feel ‘best
explains’ the target phenomena—although everyone agrees it extraordinarily difficult to
say why explanatory virtues should be a guide to truth. On this account they are trivially
a guide to truth. We are in the business of seeking grounds (which by their nature are
explanatory). Thus, if it seems that a theory does not explain, that is defeasible evidence
that there is no grounding chain between our target phenomenon and its hypothesised
essence.
Third (and most tentatively), if all grounding principles are metaphysical principles
(however metaphysics is to be demarcated), and all parts of philosophy rely on grounding
principles in order to explain, then all philosophy is (at least partly) a kind of applied
metaphysics. This affords metaphysics a privileged place within philosophy, since it is
primarily the job of the metaphysician (presumably) to discover what the grounding
principles are. I suspect that many metaphysicians have felt this way all along. And
many non-metaphysicians recognise metaphysics at least as a central component of phi-
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losophy. But for those who are generally suspicious of metaphysics, it will be unwelcome
news to them that they implicitly rely on it. I merely note this interesting consequence
of my account, and withold judgment on it.
3.10.1 Objections
I pause now to consider some objections to my account. Recall that a key difference
between philosophical and metaphysical explanation is that latter is factive whereas the
former is not. But since philosophical explanation is parasitic on metaphysical explana-
tion, it would appear that there couldn’t be non-factive philosophical explanation. Let
T be a theory (i.e. an essence claim) and e some explanandum. Factivity will fail if
either of T or e is false/doesn’t obtain, but the interesting case is where T is false. This
is, in fact, true of the case we’ve been considering. Laws, whatever they are, are not
(merely) true generalisations. Note, however, that although the theory itself is false, the
grounding claim on which the philosophical explanation relies is not. Generalisations
are (partly) grounded in their instances (cf. Rosen 2010). Thus, e is derivable from T
by explanatory inferences. And hence, the factivity of grounding is compatible with the
non-factivity of philosophical explanation.
But now consider a case in which our grounding principle is false. Assume for the
sake of argument that generalisations are not grounded by their instances. (Here, we
don’t strictly have a failure of factivity since the putative ground and grounded may
be true although the grounding claim is not.) Nevertheless, we have the appearance
of explanatoriness. The Humean theory appears to explain why some propositions are
laws. But I am happy to say just that—we have the appearance of explanation. The
appearance of explanatoriness arises because the grounding principle on which the ac-
count relies is prima facie plausible, though ultimately false. If you like, call the theory
quasi-explanatory.
Second, some may worry that the account suffers from a drawback similar to that of
Hempel’s deductive-nomological account of explanation—it reduces explanation to a set
of argument patterns, not really distilling what is essential to explanation. Kim (1994,
Metaphysical Explanation 118
p. 52) laments that after
[philosophers of explanation] get past the initial paragraphs about the importance
of explanation and understanding, they quickly launch into highly technical con-
structions heavily laden with terms like ‘law’, ‘derivation’, ‘causality’, ‘probability’,
‘simplicity’, and their forbidding technical kins, and we never see a serious dis-
cussion of just what these concepts have to do with understanding something of
making something intelligible.
We’re in danger of making the same mistakes all over again, it seems.
This worry is easy to allay. First, the representation of explanations as argument
patterns is strictly optional. All that is required is that we can link the theory (the
essence claim) via a grounding relation to the explanandum. Explanatory inference
rules are merely supposed to encode relationships of ground. The use of explanatory
arguments is convenient, though, because grounds necessitate what they ground, and are
thus truth-preserving. Second, the account illuminates explanation by showing how—via
the inference rules (generic grounding principles)—a fact is grounded. Since the inference
rules encode immediate ground, each step of the argument is transparent. So although
it may be opaque how some phenomenon is mediately (and interestingly) grounded,
explanatory arguments provide understanding by being stepwise transparent.30
Here is where one might resist the analysis. How do we know what the general
grounding principles are? (As Litland notes, a logic of ground should appropriately re-
main silent here.) And how do they explain if they are brutely stipulated, while revealing
nothing about the nature of the explanatory connection? A fair complaint, but I fear it
gets things the wrong way round. It is because, when considering the paradigm examples
of ground, we recognise an explanatory asymmetry, that we conclude to some connection
capable of underwriting such an explanation.31 I have a pretty strong intuition that the
truth of a conjunction A ∧ B is explained by the truth of its conjuncts—and not the
30Note the connection here with Wilson’s charge, discussed in the previous chapter, against ground-
ing’s alleged explanatoriness.
31Indeed, this is how Audi (2012b)’s positive argument for grounding proceeds. Paraphrased a little
more neutrally, the arguments goes: there are non-causal explanations; so there must be a non-causal
explanatory connection (call it ground). Of course, the proper conclusion of the argument is that
there is at least one non-causal explanatory connection, but Audi considers challenges to unity to be
undermotivated.
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other way round. No small-g relation, for instance, accounts for this asymmtery. It
is not entailment—a conjunction symmetrically entails its conjuncts. Truth definitions
don’t help—they’re couched as biconditionals. Perhaps it is truthmaking. Maybe. But
note that we can also ask why truthmaking should be an explanatory connection. Why
does the fact that a is F account for the truth of ‘Fa’? Either we posit, brutely, that
truthmaking is an explanatory relation. Or else we posit some more basic explanatory
relation to underwrite it. We can similarly ask why a determinate property should ac-
count for the holding of a determinable. Why does a’s being scarlet account for its
being red? Again, either we posit, brutely, that the determinate/determinable relation
is explanatory, or else we posit a general explanatory connection which can take determi-
nates and determinables as relata. We do not posit a distinctive explanatory connection
and then use it to explain. We recognise distinctive explanations and conclude to some
connection which might account for them.
Lastly, there are a couple of technical worries with the account we should preempt.
First, it is not strictly true, in most cases, that we can derive our explanandum from
just an essence claim—we must use extra assumptions, as we did above. In addition to
the claim that laws are essentially generalisations, we needed to assume the instances
of a given generalisation in order to explain why it is a law. We could discharge this
assumption. For instance, if we use conditional proof, we can derive from just the essence
claim that ‘if Fa1 ∧ Ga1, . . . , Fan ∧ Gan’, then ‘∀x(Fx → Gx)’ is a law. This would
require us to add conditional proof to our stock of explanatory inference rules. There
are surely some plausible instances of this. What could be a better explanation of why
‘p → q’ holds than a derivation of q from p? But I can’t confidently claim this holds
generally.32 The main worry with this, however, is that it was not a conditional claim
we wanted to explain. We wanted to explain why L is a law, not why L would be a law
if its instances were true.
We may, after all, have to amend our account to allow our assumptions to include
‘background’ conditions. It is Humean theory of laws plus certain background conditions
32Though it certainly sounds plausible that if T, p explain q, then T explains p→ q.
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which explain why L is a law. Intuitively, there appears to be nothing wrong with this—
given certain features of L, we can explain why L is a law. Perhaps the worry is that
now we must restrict ourselves, in some non-ad-hoc fashion, to a permissible set of
background assumptions—those which are explanatorily relevant. This worry turns out
to be unfounded, however, since our restriction to explanatory inference rules ensures
that all background assumptions are explanatorily relevant. If there is an explanatory
argument from Γ to p, then the permissible set of assumptions is the (not necessarily
unique) smallest Γ0 ⊂ Γ such that there is an explanatory argument from Γ0.
The second technical worry is that the last step of the argument ((iv) to (v)) ap-
parently does not involve an explanatory inference. The inference is underwritten by
an essence claim (a kind of equivalence) rather than a grounding relation. Thus, our
‘explanatory argument’ relies on more than just explanatory inferences. There are a
number of moves we could make here. We could adopt Rosen (2015)’s account of real
definition, according to which (in this case) it lies in the nature of lawhood that laws
are grounded in true generalisations. This entails directly that the last step is explana-
tory after all. The second move we could make is to take essence claims to express a
generalised identity (in the sense of Correia and Skiles, forthcoming). Then, for L to be
a law just is for L to be a true generalisation. Thus, the grounds of L’s being a true
generalisation just are the grounds for its being a law. This eliminates the last step from
the argument. The final, most interesting (and controversial) move, is to take essence
claims to be a kind of explanation à la Fine (2015). There Fine distinguishes two senses
of metaphysical explanation: explanations why, and explanations what. Explanations
why are just grounding explanations. Explanations what are essence explanations. We
can explain what singleton Socrates is by saying that it is the set whose sole member
is Socrates. For Fine, explanations what correspond to constitutively necessary condi-
tions (it is constitutively necessary of Socrates that he is the sole member of singleton
Socrates), while explanations why correspond to constitutively sufficient conditions. The
existence of Socrates is constitutive of the existence of singleton Socrates. Given this,
one might well think, according to Fine, that
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if the existence of singleton Socrates is to be explained in terms of the existence of
Socrates, then this explanatory link must itself somehow arise from the identity of
singleton Socrates; it should somehow be part of the nature of singleton Socrates
that its existence is to be determined in this way from the existence of Socrates.
(ibid. p. 297)
This bears some similarities to the present proposal. Our account of laws (true gen-
eralisations) points towards their grounds (their instances). But if the proposal is to
extend our explanatory logic to include principles of essence as inference rules, then the
question arises as to how exactly explanation what stands to explanation why. In order
to respond satisfactorily to the present concern, it is imperative at the very least that
they chain: if p explains why q, and q explains what it is to be the case that r, is there
a useful sense in which p explains q?
Each of these moves require further motivation, and I am still unclear on which
move I prefer. I mention them only to show that the worry about explanatory inference,
though legitimate, is by no means a knockdown objection.
3.11 Distinguishing Grounding from Causation
Plenty has been written on the close analogy between grounding and causation. So
much so, that it’s almost a more pressing question what sets them apart, rather than
what unifies them. For, presumably, we do not want to conclude that grounding is
causation.33 Absent reductive accounts of causation and grounding, it could be difficult
to give a precise account of the difference. Who cares? We’re doing fine without a
reductive account of grounding, thank you. And we are very well able to distinguish
cases of grounding from cases of causation; what’s the value of a distinguishing criterion?
First, of the differences that have been proposed, most are superficial, and subject to
counterexamples. This opens grounding theorists to the challenge that we don’t really
have a secure grasp on the notion after all. Second, in the previous chapter, we argued
33Though Alastair Wilson (2017) thinks grounding is a kind of causation. Interestingly, Bolzano
thought that causation was to be defined in terms of grounding. For Bolzano, event c causes event e,
if the proposition (Bolzano thought ground related propositions) that c occurs grounds the proposition
that e occurs (see Schnieder 2014 for discussion).
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the logical behaviour of the small-g relations (they chain and obey a non-circularity
constraint) suggests that they are unified. But the very same behaviour then suggests
that causation and grounding are unified. Lest this be seen as a reductio of grounding
unity, we need a defeating criterion of grounding-causation unity. The structure of the
argument for grounding-unity is then: the logical behaviour of the small-g relations
provides defeasible evidence of unity. This evidence is undefeated. Therefore, we have
reason to believe the small-g relations are unified. We can then defeat the analagous
move to grounding-causation unity by providing a defeater—in this case, a principled
(non-ad-hoc) distinguishing criterion.
So what is the difference between grounding and causation. Several differences have
been noted in the literature, most of them off-the-cuff remarks, and few serious attempts
to capture any deep differences. So let’s survey these, in order of plausibility.
3.11.1 Grounding is Well-Founded?
Schaffer (2009, p. 376) remarks that although grounding is similar to both causation and
proper parthood in formal structure, ‘it differs from both in requiring minimal elements’.
He later justifies this claim in his Schaffer (2010a, p. 62), where he argues that if there
were no ultimate ground, ‘[b]eing would be infinitely deferred, never achieved.’ (This, in
turn, is meant to motivate Schaffer’s priority monism. If the fundamental is necessarily
fundamental, and gunky worlds are possible, then we must look ‘upwards’ for a stable
foundation.) Causation, on the other hand, needn’t be well-founded, since, as Cameron
(2008b, p. 8) notes, it is plausible that the universe could be infinitely old, and even if
it is not, there is no minimum duration for an event. (Think Zeno’s paradoxes.)
There are two problems with this distinction. First, (non-)well-foundedness is hardly
characterising of either notion. Suppose there must be a first cause. Does this substan-
tially change our notion of causation? It does not seem to me that it does. A billiard ball
strikes another. It makes no difference to the intrinsic nature of this relation whether
it stands an open causal chain, or a closed one. Similarly with grounding. Second,
the arguments for the well-foundness of grounding are unconvincing. Why must there
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be something fundamental? In worlds with infinitely descending grounding chains, it
seems most natural to say that nothing is absolutely fundamental. And if there can be
infinitely descending chains, why can’t chains of dependence continue endlessly in every
direction (in which case we can’t look upwards for the fundamental, either)? Moreover,
Raven (2016) shows how we can define a reasonable notion of fundamentality, even when
there are no terminating grounding chains.34
3.11.2 Grounding is Synchronic?
Schaffer (2012, p. 122) offers an alternative gloss on the grounding-causation distinction.
He says:
Grounding is something like metaphysical causation. Roughly speaking, just as
causation links the world across time, grounding links the world across levels.
One way of reading this is that whereas causation is a diachronic relation (causes tem-
porally precede their effects), grounding is a synchronic relation—grounds precede what
they ground not temporally but ontologically (or in the fundamentality order or what-
ever). This assumption is natural given the paradigmatic cases. The paradigm examples
of causation (rock throwings, bottle smashings) are indeed diachronic. The paradigm
examples of grounding (marooness, redness) indeed synchronic.35
Sara Bernstein (2016) presses this point of disanalogy in her argument against
grounding-causation unity (or elucidating grounding by analogy with causation). She
claims it reveals three deep differences between grounding and causation. First, because
questions about the metaphysical relationship between causation and time are more
complex and rich than those involving ground and time. It is a substantive meta-
physical question whether causes always precede their effects. But it is not a sub-
stantive question whether grounders are metaphysically prior to what they ground:
they must be. (p.24)
34Albeit with some degree of repeating structure. Roughly, he defines something as fundamental if
it recurs in every ground below it in the grounding chain.
35I’m not sure Schaffer would endorse this reading. Nor is it necessary. Grounding relations may
drive the world across levels by acting ‘diagonally’—forwards across time and upwards through levels.
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This point simply equivocates on ‘precede’, however. It is indeed a substantive question
whether causes always precede their effects—temporally. But it is trivial that causes
causally precede their effects. The substantive question is whether causal priority entails
temporal priority. Conversely, it is trivial that grounds are metaphysically prior to what
they ground. But is substantive whether grounds must be simultaneous with what they
ground. It is substantive whether there are any cases of diachronic grounding. Certainly,
the relationship between grounding and time is far less explored than the relationship
between causation and time, but it may be equally rich. (Or the relationship between
causation and time may turn out to be less important than previously thought.)
Second, grounding-causation unionists
face a problem of distinguishing between simultaneous causation and grounding.
For one would not want to hold that cases of simultaneous causation just are cases
of grounding. (p. 24)
Bernstein’s examples are dubious, but illustrate the point well enough. According to
Newton’s law of universal gravitation, a shortening of the distance between two bodies
will result (simultaneously) in an increase in their gravitational attraction. Intuitively,
this is not case of grounding. Likewise, when an iron ball depresses a cushion, we seem
to have simultaneous cause and effect. Certainly, it is no case of grounding.
Bernstein’s claim is that if grounding is or is like causation, then we’ll have trouble
distinguishing cases of grounding from cases of synchronic causation. This isn’t so much
a deep difference between causation and grounding as the result of an absence of one. It
is a restatement of the present concern. Given the deep similarities between causation
and grounding, what are the telling differences? Bernstein’s solution is to deny the
antecedent by reductio. For clearly, we can distinguish causation and grounding.
Third,
the diachronicity of causation allows for hasteners and delayers, modifiers that
hasten or delay an event’s occurrence.
whereas there is no analagous phenomenon in the case of grounding. Disregarding
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concerns about whether hasteners and delayers are possible,36 this may well be a genuine
difference between causation and grounding. But it does not seem to me to be a telling
one. The possibility or otherwise of hastening and delaying will be decided by our theory
of events—whether they be fragile or robust. It will not hang, directly, on our theory of
causation.37
In any case, counterexamples to the synchronicity of grounding are abundant. Nor
do the counterexamples concern pathological cases. They are quite run-of-the-mill. It’s
thus hard to see how synchronicity should be regarded as providing even a rough-and-
ready demarcating criterion (the paradigm examples notwithstanding). The following
list details some non-pathological (though not uncontroversial) grounding relations which
are non-synchronic.
(75) (Causal Theory of Reference) That ‘Kripke’ (now) refers to Kripke is grounded
in Kripke’s past initial baptism.
(76) (Social institutions) That Bill is presently married to Sue is grounded in the fact
that a marriage ceremony took place.
(77) (Moral Obligations) That I am now obliged to comment on my colleague’s paper
is grounded in the fact that I promised to last week.
(78) (Truthmaking) The truth of ‘there will be a sea battle tomorrow’ is grounded in
tomorrow’s sea battle.
36The doctor delays death by administering treatment. But does the patient die the same death they
would have died without the treatment? That will turn on the how modally fragile we take events to
be.
37Overall, I find Bernstein’s argument uncompelling. Her overarching aim is to undermine the
intelligibility of grounding. But the argument seems to be self-defeating.
1. Grounding theorists attempt to elucidate grounding by analogy with causation.
2. But the analogy can only elucidate grounding if the similarities run deep.
3. The similarities are superficial; the differences run deeper.
4. Therefore, grounding theorists cannot elucidate grounding by appeal to causation.
The trouble is that if we are to uncover points of deep disanalogy, we had better have a somewhat secure
grasp on the target notions. If we did not, how would we recognise the dissimilarities? Bernstein herself
says that the purported analogy ignores the ‘intricacies that genuinely characterize each notion’ (2016,
p. 35, my emphasis).
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(79) (Humean Laws) That all ravens are black is grounded in the blackness of every
past, present, and future raven.
(80) (Mathematical Truths) That there is a Gödel sentence is grounded in the diagonal
lemma.
(81) (Lewisian Modal Realism). The fact that I might have been rich (rather than a
philosopher) is grounded in the existence of a world much like this one, containing
an individual much like me who decided to go into banking.
If this list is anything to go by, then there really isn’t a straightforward relationship
between grounding and time. The first three examples exhibit diachronic (past-to-future)
grounding relations. The fourth example exhibits a ‘backward’ diachronic (future-to-
past) grounding relation. The fifth exhibits relationships moving along all dimensions of
time. And the last two seem to be ‘atemporal’: mathematical facts transcend time; and
modal realist modals are grounded in facts which are stipulated to be spatiotemporally
disconnected (they transcend time and space).
3.11.3 Ground and Grounded are not ‘Wholly Distinct’?
Audi (2012b, p. 687) offers this remark about the grounding/causation distinction:
[The relation between ground and grounded] seems too intimate to be a causal
relation; the facts are not wholly distinct in the way causation apparently requires
its relata to be. (My emphasis)
Distinctness in this sense is not non-identity; ground and grounded are taken to be
be non-identical. Rather, the sense is similar to that of ‘non-separateness’. To take
a physical example, a statue is distinct from the clay which composes it. It is not,
however, ‘separate’ from the clay. I certainly do not mean that a ground composes
what it grounds—merely that the sense in which a ground is not separate or not wholly
distinct from its ground is similiar to the sense in which a statue is not separate from
its matter. The distinction seems to hold up in the usual examples. I flick a switch,
the light comes on; cause and effect seem wholly distinct. My jumper’s maroonness and
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its redness however are not entirely distinct. Both facts concern the same thing—my
jumper. And redness and maroonness do not appear to be wholly distinct properties.
This distinction seems to capture something genuinely characteristic of grounding—
that its relata are particularly intimately related. I take this to be the most plausible
distinction offered in the literature. But, alas, it is subject to counterexamples. Coun-
terexamples to synchronicity double up as counterexamples to non-distinctness; facts
which obtain at different times cannot be non-distinct. For a synchronic counterexam-
ple, take truthmaking. A truth (or the fact that a truth is true) is something quite
distinct from its truthmaker. The fact that snow is white is a fact concerning snow
and its colour property. The fact that ‘snow is white’ is true is a fact concerning a
truthbearer and one of its semantic properties. These facts are quite distinct.
3.11.4 An Informal Distinction
Although non-distinctness proved an inadequate distinguishing criterion, it came closest
to characterising the intuitive distinction between causation and grounding. So perhaps
something in the vicinity is available? Non-distinctness captured the particularly ‘tight’
relationship between ground and grounded. Something like this is offered as character-
istic of grounding by Fine (2012a, p. 38–9). Suppose a particle is accelerating. If we ask
in virtue of what the particle is accelerating, it may be answered that it is being acted
upon by a net positive force. But in that case there is a sense that a stricter account can
be given of that in virtue of which the particle is accelerating: that it is increasing its
velocity over time. In this case, says Fine, ‘there is—and could be—no stricter account
of that in virtue of which the explanandum holds’ (p. 39). Though we may have an
account of the explanandum’s full and immediate cause, we may not possess the fullest
and strictest account of the explanandum. There is a further why-question to be asked.
It is the strictness of grounding in-virtue-of claims, I propose, which sets them apart
from causal in-virtue-of claims. This strictness also captures what was captured by
the non-distinctness criterion—the particularly tight connection between ground and
grounded. The distinction is informal, to be sure. A lot rides on how we are to un-
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derstand ‘tightness’, of which I know no revealing analysis. And the distinction is
non-reductive. It won’t help us distinguish a causal relation from a grounding relation—
unless we have already have a fair idea what kind of relation we’re dealing with. But,
should we suspect that there is no stricter account of some phenomenon, that is a reason
to suspect we are dealing with a relationship of ground. What the distinction won’t do
is tell us when there is no stricter account to be had of a given phenomenon. A reductive
distinction between causation and grounding, one that is genuinely characterising, would
presumably have to be grounded in reductive accounts of both causation and ground-
ing. The demand for such a distinction is unreasonable, given that most theorists agree
grounding is primitive.
Recall, moreover, that the need for a distinction was motivated by our desire to block
the extension of the argument for grounding unity to grounding-causation unity. Our
criterion blocks the inference to grounding-causation identity, while still allowing for a
good deal of similarity. That is to be welcomed.
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3.12 Introduction
If A grounds B, then it is a fact that A grounds B. Call such facts grounding facts.
Since grounding facts are facts, we can ask if they too are grounded. Suppose they are.
Now we have introduced yet further grounding facts. We can ask if they are grounded.
Regress. Thus, suppose that grounding facts are fundamental (that is, ungrounded).
It seems eminently plausible that the constituents of a fundamental fact must also be
fundamental. Thus, B is fundamental. But B is not fundamental—it is grounded by A.
Contradiction.
This dilemma—are grounding facts grounded or not?—is the problem of meta- or
iterated grounding. The trouble is that neither horn seems at all plausible. And if
neither horn is plausible, the posit of grounding must be misguided. This conclusion
must be resisted. Recent treatments of the problem have made clear why. For Bennett
(2011), the dilemma threatens flatworldism, the view that the world has absolutely no
structure—everything is on a par, ontologically speaking. Electrons and universities
alike. For deRosset (2013), the dilemma threatens The Collapse—that absolutely every-
thing is fundamental. And for Dasgupta (2015), the dilemma precludes the formulation
of physicalism—for grounding is unable to take us beyond the basic physical facts.
Unfortunately, no current treatment of the problem is adequate. In this chapter I
present my own solution. In the next section I formulate the problem more explicitly.
In sections 4.3 and 4.4 I show why some apparently obvious fixes will not work. We
will then examine some extant solutions to the dilemma and show why they are found
wanting. Particular attention will be given to Dasgupta (2015)’s solution, since it is the
most similar to mine. This will then motivate my own solution. In a nutshell, my view is
this: grounding—the very relation—is fundamental, and grounding facts are grounded
in its essence. The key advantages of this approach are that it does without any extra
posits (unlike Dasgupta’s approach), and it does justice to our intuitions regarding the




There are two reasons to doubt that grounding facts are fundamental. The first is due
to a principle defended by Ted Sider (2011, chs. 7-8):
(82) Purity Principle (PP)
A fundamental fact has only fundamental constituents.
This is not the exact principle Sider defends—he casts it in explicitly representational
terms. This formulation cuts to the metaphysical chase, and thus sidesteps criticisms
that it is largely beside the point (see Wilson, forthcoming). Why believe the principle?
Because there’s a sense in which the fundamental must exist ‘before’ (metaphysically
speaking) the derivative comes into being. But a fact cannot exist ‘before’ its con-
stituents do. Now, PP directly implies that grounding facts cannot be fundamental,
since the right hand side of a grounding fact is grounded—by definition. Thus, if we
accept PP we are going to have take the first horn of the dilemma.38
The second reason to deny that grounding facts are fundamental is noted by Schaffer
(as cited in Bennett 2011). It is that
(83) Modal Freedom (MF)
Any combination or ‘permutation’ of the fundamental is possible.
This needs unpacking a little. Say that some entities xi are modally free just in case we
can change the intrinsic nature of any xn—either its existence or its intrinsic properties—
without changing the intrinsic nature of any other xm. (In more homely terms, we can
‘wiggle’ xn without wiggling xm.)39 Why believe MF? Because if an entity is not modally
free, it would appear that it is dependent on something else. For instance, truth is not
modally free—it covaries with truthmakers. Grounding facts are not modally free in this
sense—they covary with grounds. Maroonness never grounds blueness (as per Cameron
38It would be a fair strategy to tackle the dilemma by attacking the principles which generate it.
PP is, after all, a highly theoretical philosophical principle. It is hardly beyond dispute. Though I’m
surprised the strategy remains unexplored, I will not explore it here, since I think the principle is true.
39This is my unpacking of the gloss that ‘any combination of the fundamental is possible’. cf. Schaffer
(2003, 2010b) and Wang (2016).
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2016)—it always grounds redness. Indeed, it must ground redness. Necessarily, if x is
maroon, then it is a fact that x’s being maroon grounds its being red.40
MF is less plausible than PP. It faces a well-known problem—the ‘problem of free
mass’ (Schaffer 2003). There appear to be necessarily co-instantiated properties which
are nonetheless fundamental. Having mass and being shaped both seem fundamental.
Yet, anything with mass is shaped. Though neither quantity can exist without the
other it does not seem as though either grounds the other. And since both appear
fundamental, it does not seem like they share a common ground. Nevertheless, each
quantity necessitates the other. Although it may be doubted that MF is generally
true, however, I will argue later on that there is a reasonable sense in which grounding
conforms to it. Though the principle may not be generally true, it may well be mostly
true. That A necessitates B is defeasible evidence that B depends on A.
What about the other horn of the dilemma? Why should we resist the regress? The
problem is not that we would have an infinitely descending grounding chain (see Rabin
and Rabern 2016)—there is nothing obviously objectionable about that (cf. Cameron
2008b). It is that, to even get off the ground, we need infinitely many grounding facts.
The problem arises even if we assume there are terminating grounding chains. Let f1
be a fundamental fact and suppose it grounds f2. We have
f1 grounds f2
But the question is now: what accounts for this grounding relation? What makes it the
case that f1 grounds f2? We need to introduce another fact, f0, the purpose of which is
just to ensure that f1 grounds f2.
f0 grounds [f1 grounds f2]
And something must account for the holding of this grounding relation. By assumption,
40This is an instance of a principle Litland (2015) calls internality. Litland argues against the
principle, but it is consistent with his view that instances (indeed, most instances) of it are true.
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our first-order grounding chain terminates—f1 is fundamental. We have generated an







Figure 3.4: The meta-grounding regress
If the fact introduced at each stage must be novel, then this regress is clearly vicious.
Our best bet then is to find a plausible ‘benign’ regress—a mere infinite series. And
in fact, this is the strategy everyone adopts—myself included. But before we consider
implementations of this strategy, let us assure ourselves that the problem is not easily
dismissed out of hand.
3.14 No Cheap Fixes
3.14.1 Purity is false
Here’s the dilemma: either grounding facts are grounded, and regress looms, or they
are fundamental, and so is everything else. A quick response is to deny PP. It’s a nice-
sounding slogan, but that is not a reason to suppose it is true. Moreover, there seem to
be counterexamples to both its sufficiency and its necessity. Here is a counterexample
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to its sufficiency: suppose f, f ′ are fundamental facts. It is plausible that conjunction is
a fundamental operation. So f ∧ f ′ contains only fundamental items, yet it is grounded
in f, f ′. As regards necessity, consider that the distance between things seems to be
a fundamental relation. Yet this relation can hold between non-fundamental objects.
There doesn’t seem to be anything further to say (groundingwise) as to why the distance
between two objects is what it is.41
Further, it may be responded, as does Wilson (forthcoming), that metaphysical and
mathematical facts are typically seen as outside the purview of physicalism. Physicalism
requires only that ‘broadly scientific’ phenomena be accounted for by the physical. A
physicalism of the type Dasgupta characterises—every fact is physical or grounded in
the physical—is too strong to be taken seriously. If we discard PP and relax our view
of physicalism, it appears we have a simple way out of the dilemma. The grounding
facts are fundamental, despite having non-fundamental constituents, and this does not
conflict with physicalism, since the grounding facts are properly metaphysical.
But that response is hardly satisfying. Suppose, to use Dasgupta’s favourite example,
there is a conference occurring (call this fact C). Now C is grounded in a slew of fairly
high-level facts—involving the participants, their actions, and perhaps their mental lives
(call these facts ci). Now, it is a fact that the ci ground C. There is surely something
wrong with the thought that this fact is fundamental. It does not sit well with the
hierarchical picture of reality. At some high level, we have a conference come into being.
Yet this conference must already be present in the foundation of the hierarchy, as part
of the fundamental fact which ensures that the conference is grounded! It verges on the
incoherent to claim that a fact can exist before its constituents do.
I am not so much concerned with preserving Dasgupta’s conception of physicalism.
I imagine that a physicalist would be motivated to defend the strongest physicalist
doctrine she can. But regardless of what actual physicalists think, I agree with Wilson
41Mark Textor has put to me that perhaps causation is a fundamental relation, yet it can relate
non-fundamental events. I have some sympathy for this view. However, Kroedel and Schulz (2016)
offer a view on which causal relations between higher-level events can be understood as grounded in
the causal relations between their grounds: if C,E ground C′, E′ respectively, and C causes E, then [C
causes E] grounds [C′ causes E′].
Metaphysical Explanation 134
that Dasgupta’s interpretation is overly strict, and consequently less plausible.
3.14.2 Primitivity vs. Fundamentality (again)
Another easy response is to deny that the question ‘what grounds grounding?’ can, or
should, be given an answer. After all, grounding is a primitive notion. But to ask in
virtue of what a grounding relation holds seems to presuppose otherwise. If we could
say in virtue of what A grounds B, we would be able to say, in more basic terms, what
it is for A to ground B, so a grounding ideology would be eliminable—something we
have explicitly eschewed.
I admit to feeling the pull of this worry, but we must tread carefully. One way
of viewing it is as conflating primitivity with fundamentality. We criticised others for
this conflation in Chapter 2. Recall that on one interpretation ‘the fundamental is
fundamental’ is true—it is trivially true when the first instance of ‘fundamental’ picks
out the extension of ‘fundamental’. That is, it is true that the fundamental things are
fundamental. But when it picks out its intension—what it is to be fundamental—it is
false. What it is to be fundamental is to be ungrounded. Are we making a similar
mistake here? It is true that
(84) ‘Grounding’ is fundamental.
At least when ‘fundamental’ is interpreted as ‘primitive’. (Otherwise I’m unsure what
it could mean.) But what is at issue is whether
(85) Grounding is fundamental.
That is, whether grounding is ungrounded. To make things more complicated, there are
numerous ways of interpreting this too. On the one hand, it could be asking whether all
the individual grounding facts—that A grounds B, that A′ grounds B′, and so on—are
fundamental. On the other, it could be asking whether the grounding relation (or its
existence) is fundamental. Let’s leave aside this latter question for now, and focus on
the former.
Metaphysical Explanation 135
On the face of it, the complaint trades on this conflation:
(86) The grounding facts are fundamental.
(87) What it is for a grounding fact to obtain is fundamental.
(86) is at issue. (87) is what the primitivity of grounding amounts to. But suppose
(86) is false; grounding facts are grounded. Is that compatible with (87)? Let g be
a grounding fact. Since (86) is false, g itself has a ground. But can’t we answer the
question ‘what is it for g to obtain?’ by citing its ground? That turns on what it takes
for a term (or notion) to be nonprimitive. The orthodox answer is that it is to have an
analysis. According to Horvath (forthcoming), the textbook account of analysis is that
analyses are strict biconditionals:
(88) Necessarily, analysandum ⇐⇒ analysans.
The claim that a grounding fact (A grounds B) is analysed by its ground g, then,
amounts to the claim that
(89) Necessarily, A grounds B ⇐⇒ g.
In cases where more than one (full) ground is possible, this condition is unsatisfied, since
a grounded fact would not necessitate its ground. Thus, ‘x is maroon’ does not analyse
‘x is red’. This is a desirable result. There is more to redness than maroonness. So we
have a large class of facts which are not analysed by their grounds.
It is more plausible, however, that a fact is analysed by the disjunction of all its
possible grounds. Indeed, a popular (and natural) view of determinables is that they
are ‘nothing more’ than disjunctions of their determinates.42 It is entirely possible that a
grounding fact has only one possible ground—in which case the biconditional is plausibly
true. And if this is anything like the correct account of analysis, it follows that grounding
facts are analysed by their grounds, in contradiction to primitivity.
42Note that this doesn’t affect the common assumption that determinables are grounded in their
determinates—it just entails that this is a special case of grounding a disjunction in its disjuncts.
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The textbook view of analysis is not plausible, however (see Horvath, forthcom-
ing). Among the least of its problems, it doesn’t even ensure a strict direction between
analysans and analysandum, so a ground could be analysed by what it grounds. But
Horvath’s own, more sophisticated, view of analysis (or what he calls ‘concept analysis’)
might still cause problems. On his view, an analysis is a strict biconditional in which the
concepts expressed in the analysans ground the concepts expressed in the analysandum.
Thus, for example, the JTB analysis of knowledge would be successful iff
(90) Necessarily, S knows that p ⇐⇒ S has a justified true belief that p. And
(91) S’s knowing that p is grounded in: p’s being true, S’s believing that p, and S’s
belief in p being justified.
On this view, (89) provides a successful analysis of a grounding fact only if the concepts
in g ground the concept of grounding. For sake of argument, assume that they do.
Not only does it now look like grounding is nonprimitive, but it must still bootstrap
itself in to being. Structurally, we have something similar to the inductive vindication
of induction. Past experience, by induction, vindicates induction. Similarly, g, by
grounding, analyses grounding. The analysis is not circular in the same way that an
ordinary circular argument is circular (the conclusion is among the premises). Rather,
it is circular in the way that a rule-circular argument is circular—the conclusion is
among the rules of inference.43 To avoid another regress, we must proliferate and iterate
different kinds of grounding relation.
Luckily, we so far have no reason to suppose that the concepts in g ground the
concept of grounding. To that end we must look at some plausible candidates for ‘meta-
grounding’ facts. What makes it the case, for instance, that promises ground obligations?
Why does my promising to ϕ ground my obligation to ϕ? It is hard to say. An apparently
reasonable answer—and perhaps this counts in favour of primitivism—is ‘that’s just
what promises do!’. There’s nothing more to be said about it. It is brute. A different,
but hardly more informative answer, is ‘it is the nature of a promise that it creates
43I learnt the distinction from Psillos (1999, ch. 4). He attributes it to Braithwaite (1953).
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an obligation’. Without saying more about what that nature is—and that may not
have a straightforward answer—this doesn’t tell us much. Nevertheless, it too seems a
perfectly reasonable answer in the context. What both of these answers have in common,
however, is that neither suggests that a meta-grounding fact contains an analysis of
grounding. It has something to do with promising, not with grounding, that promises
ground obligations. There is no indication that the concepts in the meta-grounding fact
ground the concept of grounding.
So how is it possible to say what grounds grounding facts, yet not have an analysis
of grounding? Some imagery may help. Imagine grounding is a black box.
ground ⇒ grounding ⇒ grounded
Since grounding is primitive, we can’t say in more basic terms what happens inside the
black box. However, we can describe the input to the box—the ground. We can describe
the input, but not the mechanism. We can say what is responsible for the obtaining of
a grounding relation, but we cannot say what it is for a grounding fact to obtain. This
is so even when the output of a grounding relation is another grounding relation. We
can iterate the grounds all while never being able to peer inside the black box:
ground ⇒ grounding ⇒ ground ⇒ grounding ⇒ grounded
Perhaps this precludes a general account of meta-grounding? For surely the clue to
what makes grounding facts hold—generally—is to be found in the nature of grounding
itself. But it seems we can only point to the grounds of particular grounding facts.
Maybe. This does not preclude our giving a schema however. What we need is a general
account of things of the right shape (grounds) to plug into the black box. The upshot




The conclusion we are trying to avoid is that the dilemma reveals an inherent tension
in the notion of grounding, so we should give it up. That response is unacceptable. It
should be noted (contra what others have claimed) that other conceptions of dependence
face the same dilemma. If one thinks the dilemma shows an incoherence with grounding,
one should think it shows an incoherence with dependence generally. But one does not
give up the notion of truth in the face of the semantic paradoxes. It is just accepted
that they present difficult problems to be solved. Likewise, the present dilemma needn’t
show there is something inherently wrong with the notion of dependence, just that there
is an obstacle to be overcome. Just as thin notions of truth, such as disquotationalism,
are unable to avoid the paradoxes, so thin notions of dependence are unable to avoid
the dilemma. Establishing this is the aim of this section.
Jessica Wilson (2014, forthcoming) thinks that ‘bothersome’ questions, such as ‘what
grounds grounding?’, do not arise for her small-g conception of metaphysical depen-
dence. They are ‘spandrel’ questions, she says, generated by the overly abstract nature
of grounding. No one has ever asked in virtue of what the determinate/determinable
relation holds, or the subset relation, or set-membership.44 We have an antecedent un-
derstanding of these notions. And discussions of how the mental depends on the physical,
for instance, take for granted that these relations suffice for metaphysical dependence.
There is a perfectly adequate formulation of physicalism in terms of the small-g rela-
tions: that all broadly scientific phenomena are nothing over above (in some or other
small-g fashion) the physical.
This is unconvincing. As we argued in Chapter 2, questions of dependence are not
44Wilson’s first example is of identity. I’m not convinced myself that it is entirely unreasonable to
ask in virtue of what an identity holds, but I can see why that might be doubted. Everything just is self-
identical. What more can be said? On the other hand, suppose we’re dealing with a nonfundamental
entity a—an entity whose existence is grounded. Then surely it is not a fundamental fact that a is
self-identical. We might say that in order for an entity to be self-identical it must exist. So a’s existing
grounds its being self-identical. Or we might say the two facts are actually one and the same. Perhaps
neither is a genuine fact, since they involve non-properties. But these interesting issues are moot, since
we deny that identity is a grounding relation—small-g or otherwise.
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settled by the small-g relations. For one thing, most are not inherently directional.
Nominalists and realists about properties agree that a red ball is a member of the set of
red things, but they disagree about the direction of dependence.45 Most pertinently, it is
not clear that determinates can account for the ‘reality’ of their determinables. Thus, the
mental, for instance, cannot be ‘small-g generated’ from the physical. This is not so much
a problem for the reductive physicalist (which Wilson is not),46 but it creates problems
for the non-reductive physicalist. For she will be left, unless she countenances further
dependence relations, without the resources to show how the reality of the fundamental
accounts for the reality of the nonfundamental.
Further, it is perfectly reasonable to ask why a small-g relation holds. We can ask,
for instance, why A is a subset of B, and it may be replied that all of A’s members are
members of B. I concede that there is less pressure to pose such questions than there
is to ask why a grounding relation holds. But this seems to me to be because of an
epistemic gap, not a metaphysical one. It is obvious when the determinate-determinable
relation holds. It is not always so obvious when a grounding relation holds. But it is
equally obscure why, metaphysically speaking, either should hold. The temptation to
ask why a grounding relation holds apparently stems from the need to justify it. To
see this, consider the statement: red is a determinable of determinate maroon. The
question why this is so comes across as flippant—if it is interpreted as request for a
reason as to why this particular instance of the relation holds. ‘What do you mean?
It just is.’ seems the most appropriate response. If interpreted, however, as a request
for information on how the relation works generally, it is a perfectly reasonable (though
difficult) question. Now, supposing it makes sense to ask why a small-g relation holds
we can generate the regress—the only difference being that at each stage of the regress
there are several different small-g relations which might be invoked.
Wilson’s most promising avenue, I would have thought, would be to appeal to prim-
45It is a familiar complaint of nominalist, empiricist, anti-realist, or otherwise ‘metaphysically light’
approaches to philosophical problems that they get the direction of dependence or explanation wrong.
46It is most natural to interpret the reductive physicalist as looking for identities, not dependence,
between ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ level phenomena.
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itive fundamentality. Since, for her, it is primitive what things are fundamental, she
could appeal to primitively fundamental grounding relations with nonfundamental con-
stituents. Aside from being grossly ad hoc, however, we have already argued relative
fundamentality is superior to absolute fundamentality, so I will not consider this proposal
further.
3.16 The Grounds Ground Grounding?
Bennett (2011) and deRosset (2013) independently argue that if A grounds B, then
this fact itself is grounded in A. I’ll focus on Bennett’s exposition here. Grounding,
according to Bennett, is what she calls a superinternal relation. Internal relations are
already familiar. An internal relation is one which holds in virtue of the intrinsic nature
of its relata. Comparative quantities provide the well-known examples. If Adam is five
foot 10 and Bob is five foot eight, then it is already settled that Adam is taller than Bob.
There is nothing more to the obtaining of the taller-than relation than that its relata
possess the intrinsic natures that they do. They are no addition of being, an ‘ontological
free lunch’. Superinternal relations are similar—except they hold in virtue of the nature
of just one side of the relation. If aRb holds in virtue of the intrinsic nature of a (or b)
alone, then R is a superinternal relation.47
The thought is that superinternality is what makes grounding generative—and this
makes it particularly well-suited to characterising physicalism. The physicalist does not
claim that the physical grounds the mental because of the intrinsic nature of both the
physical and the mental. The physicalist’s claim is that the physical alone can account
for all else. So it is the physical alone which generates the mental and ensures that it
has the intrinsic nature that it does.
47Bennett adds the condition that in superinternal relations a also guarantees that b exists and has
the intrinsic nature that it does. But I think we should allow for the possibility of ‘trivially superinternal’
relations. For instance, a superinternal relation R can be defined on any monadic property P : xRy iff
Px.
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This proposal has interesting consequences for our regress. Suppose
A grounds B
This itself will be grounded in A:
A grounds [A grounds B]
Which is also grounded in A, and so on. So we have an infinite series, but, claims
Bennett, not a vicious regress. Her claim is that it is similar to the truth regress, which





is unproblematic because each stage is ultimately grounded in p. Indeed, although
the series in infinite, there is a finite chain of dependence between each stage and its
ultimate ground.48 A regress is vicious (cf. Bliss 2013) when an ultimate ground is
infinitely deferred. Thus, for instance, if we reversed the direction of dependence in the
truth regress—p because Tp—the resulting regress would be vicious. For we would never
reach the ultimate ground of p.
If anything, Bennett’s regress is even less problematic. For though she generates
infinitely many grounding facts, she does not generate ever longer chains of dependence.
Whereas each stage of the truth regress—barring ‘Tp’—is mediately grounded in p,
each stage of Bennett’s regress is immediately grounded in the ground of the first-order
grounding relation. Compare the following structures:
48In the same way that although the set of natural numbers is infinite, each natural number is finite.
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p < Tp < TTP < TTP < . . .
A
A < B A < (A < B) . . .
Figure 3.5: The truth regress vs. Bennett’s regress
Bennett’s proposal, then, offers an elegant solution to the dilemma. Grounding
facts are grounded, and immediately so. Grounds for grounding facts are not infinitely
deferred. We have an explosion of grounding facts, to be sure, but this is no more
problematic than the explosion of truth-facts generated by a single proposition. And
we have a story of how grounding takes us beyond the fundamental: the fundamental
itself ensures that this is so. If fundamental fact f0 grounds f1, then that is because of
f0 itself. Unfortunately, the account is dead wrong.
3.16.1 The grounds don’t ground grounding
Bennett’s proposal, elegant though it is, misses something rather basic, as Dasgupta
(2015) points out. Grounds are supposed to explain what they ground. It might sound
plausible in the abstract that A explains why A grounds B, but many concrete instances
of this schema just don’t offer satisfying explanations. Consider the standard example
of a disjunction’s being grounded in its true disjunct. On Bennett’s account, it is true
that
(92) That snow is white or grass is blue is grounded in the fact that snow is white,
and is so-grounded because snow is white.
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But that a true disjunction is grounded in its true disjunct(s) has nothing to do with the
content of those disjuncts—in this instance, nothing to do with the whiteness of snow. It
has everything to with the nature of disjunction. It is because of how disjunction works
that a disjunction is grounded in its true disjunct(s). This point can be made clearer if
we consider that Bennett’s proposal entails that grounding facts which intuitively have
very different explanations get the same explanation. p not only grounds p ∨ q, it also
grounds ¬¬p—which has nothing to do with the content of p, and everything to do with
the nature of negation.
It might be replied, drawing on what was argued in the previous chapter, that meta-
grounding claims are instances of unexplanatory grounding relations. A does ground that
A groundsB—it just doesn’t explain it. On its own, however, this response is inadequate.
In other cases of unexplanatory grounding we usually have a fair idea of why they are
unexplanatory. Bennett’s meta-grounding relations don’t fit any such cases described
in the previous chapter. We have no reason to suppose that such grounding relations
would be unexplanatory. Moreover, we do have plausible candidate explanations of
these grounding facts, as outlined above, and we have no reason to suppose that these
explanations are not indicative of grounding relations.
A more ambitious response would be to argue that Bennett’s grounding claims, con-
tra appearances, are indeed explanatory. This stance is taken by Louis deRosset (2013).
He distinguishes an explanans from what he calls an explanatory story—similar to what
we have termed an explanatory argument. An explanatory story comprises the explanans
and the explanandum, but it may also contain ancillary material—information which,
given the explanans, helps make the explanandum intelligible. Let our explanandum be
p grounds p ∨ q
deRosset’s claim is that p is the explanans of this grounding fact, and an appeal to
the nature of disjunction, its truth table, or similar, is part of the ancillary material
of the argument. I find this response somewhat opaque, I admit. My best guess is
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that it trades on something similar to the Bolzano-Carroll regress.49 p entails p ∨ q
by disjunction introduction. But it is not the case that p and disjunction introduction
entail p ∨ q (for we would need to introduce a new rule to ensure that this entailment
holds). Nevertheless, we may refer to disjunction to make intelligible why p entails p∨q,
though it does not itself feature in the entailment.
But here is what I don’t understand. It is very clear to me that disjunction doesn’t
feature (at least not directly) in the explanans of p ∨ q. The explanans is just p. That
alone accounts for the truth of p ∨ q. But the question ‘why p ∨ q?’ is very different to
‘why does p ground p ∨ q?’. The former seeks a ground for a disjunctive fact, the latter
for a grounding fact. A causal example brings this out more clearly. If I ask why the
glass broke, a satisfactory answer is that it fell. But if I ask why the glass broke, given
that it fell, the answer ‘because it fell’ is clearly infelicitous. It is not answering the
right question. The question is why the breaking and the falling stand in such a causal
relationship—and repeating a statement of the cause just restates a presupposition of
the question. Far from being ‘ancillary’, the mechanism by which the fall caused the
breaking is directly in question.
Consider again the Bolzano-Carroll regress. If we are inclined to think that the
deductive inference rules are in need of justification, it won’t be the premises that justify
them, but ‘meta-rules’. The regress for modus ponens (MP), as Carroll (1895) taught
us, will look like this:
(93) (MP) If p and p→ q, then q. Why? because
(94) (Meta-MP) If p, p→ q and MP, then q. Why? because. . .
Although this is a regress, each stage felicitously answers the question posed at the
previous stage, and does so not citing a premise but a further rule, ensuring that the
previous rule does indeed connect the premises to the conclusion. Meta-grounding ques-
tions are analagous. Why does p ground p∨ q? We’re looking for information about the
49Bolzano asked (2014), some 57 years prior to Carroll, whether the rule of inference, in addition to
the premises, should be considered a ground for the conclusion. He concluded ‘no’, on pain of regress.
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connection between ground and grounded. Merely restating the ground does not help.
3.17 Grounding is Zero-Grounded?
A view which resembles that of Bennett and deRosset, but which fares rather better, is
Litland (forthcoming)’s Zero Grounding Account (ZGA). The view hangs on three ideas:
zero-grounding, non-factive grounding, and the explanatory argument. The explanatory
argument is already familiar. A notion of grounding is factive just in case ‘A grounds
B’ entails that A and B are the case. Otherwise it is non-factive. An intuitive gloss is
given by the subjunctive: A non-factively grounds B just in case A would ground B,
were it the case. We will continue to take ‘A grounds B’ to mean ‘A factively grounds
B, unless stated otherwise.
The notion of ‘zero-grounding’ is a little murkier. Fine (2012a, pp. 47–8) distin-
guishes an ungrounded fact from a zero-grounded fact. Ungrounded facts are simply not
grounded—among such facts we include the fundamental facts. Zero-grounded facts,
by contrast, are grounded, but not by anything. On Fine’s analogy, a set is gener-
ated from its members via the ‘set-builder’ operation. a, b, c . . . generate {a, b, c . . . }.
Given no elements, the set-builder returns the empty set, the set built from no ele-
ments, or the ‘zero-generated’ set. Some grounding theorists have found Fine’s notion
of zero-grounding to be obscure and unuseful. Dasgupta, for instance, complains that
zero-grounded facts have the same (admittedly empty) ground (2015, 590). Litland’s
innovation assuages such worries somewhat. Recall that for Litland A grounds B just
in case there is an explanatory argument from A to B. B is zero-grounded when there
is an explanatory argument from the empty set to B. Thus, the distinction between
being ungrounded and zero-grounded is just a special case of the familiar and unobjec-
tionable distinction between being underivable and being derivable from the empty set
of premises.
With the terminology in place we can now state the Zero Grounding Account:
(95) ZGA
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A grounding fact ‘A grounds B’ is grounded in A plus the fact that A non-
factively grounds B.
This resembles the BDA insofar as grounding facts are partially grounded in their
grounds. But, assuming that the non-factive grounding fact is given, it actually sounds
felicitous and plausible. Of course, the problem now is to say what grounds the non-
factive grounding fact, and this is what Litland does.
As the reader might have anticipated, Litland’s idea is that non-factive grounding
facts are zero-grounded. How do we deal with the regress? We say that zero-grounding
facts are themselves zero-grounded. (Since if p is provable, it is provable that p is
provable.) Litland develops a logic of ground on which non-factive grounding claims
may be derived from the empty set. In addition, he develops a graph-theoretic semantics
which allows grounding facts to be grounded in different ways even though they share the
same (perhaps empty) ground, offsetting Dasgupta’s concerns. For example, p grounds
both p∨ q and ¬¬p. A graph theoretic semantics allows us to trace different paths from
p to p ∨ q and ¬¬p. Fine (2012a, 2012b)’s truthmaker semantics is not fine-grained
enough to allow for this.
The obvious question is: why believe that grounding facts are zero-grounded? Litland
offers two reasons. First, the mere fact that it offers a solution to the dilemma is reason
enough to believe it. Second, once we understand what zero-grounding is, we thereby
understand that grounding statements are zero-grounded—in the same way that once
we understand what conjunction is we understand that a (true) conjunction is grounded
in its conjuncts.
I still have some misgivings about zero-grounding,50 but even granting the notion, a
50Here are two. First, I can see how zero-grounding might work if grounding is inherently operational,
but since I have argued at length that grounding is relational, the existence of zero-grounding appears
to entail that there are grounding relations with a missing relatum. Of course, if the ZGA really does
promise the most satisfying account of meta-grounding, this might just count against the relational
view.
The second worry is related to Dasgupta’s complaint about the Bennett-deRosset account. Does
zero-grounding underwrite explanations, and if so, what is that nature of such explanations? If such ex-
planations exist, then it appears that they lack explanantia. There are explanations without explainers.
But zero-grounding claims do appear to have explanantia. The explanans for why true disjuncts ground
disjunctions would appear to be (some aspect of) the nature of disjunction. I see no reason to think we
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serious problem remains—serious enough to undermine the ZGA.
3.17.1 The Tortoise’s Revenge
Suppose we want to derive that p non-factively grounds p ∨ q. First, we assume p
(for later discharge). An explanatory rule of inference tells us that we can now infer
p∨q. Since this argument contained only explanatory inferences, we can conclude that p
(factively) grounds p∨ q. And finally we can discharge the assumption that p. We know
that p would ground p ∨ q, were it true. So we conclude that p non-factively grounds
p ∨ q. As we have already pointed out, explanatory inference rules basically encode
generic principles of immediate ground. It is not surprising that we can show, given no
assumptions, that p grounds p ∨ q. It is an explanatory rule that φ entails φ ∨ ψ! We
have staved off regress while incurring something like rule circularity. We have shown
that p, p→ q entail q by conditional proof.
Of course, there are more interesting cases. We could show, for instance, that ‘p
grounds (p∨ q)∧ (p∨ r)’ is zero-grounded. This grounding relationship is not immediate
and is not directly encoded by our logic. Litland’s logic characterises the conditions
under which explanatory inferences chain to form explanatory arguments—or how rela-
tionships of immediate grounding ground relationships of mediate grounding. But this
is analagous to proving derived rules in a sequent calculus; without the primitive rules,
they are unprovable. Likewise, without the explanatory inference rules, the interesting
grounding statements are unprovable.
One way of responding to the Tortoise is to stamp one’s foot: ‘p and p→ q just do
entail q. That’s all there is to say on the matter.’ We might understand this thus: modus
ponens is fundamental. It is not in need of justification. And it would be misguided
to seek justification for it. An analagous move does not appear to be open to Litland,
however. The claim that explanatory inference rules are fundamental seems dangerously
close to the claim that grounding principles are fundamental, whence Sider’s worry
resurfaces. There might, however, be a different sense in which grounding principles are
should regard the nature of disjunction as mere ‘ancillary material’, as per deRosset’s response.
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‘fundamental’ or ‘basic’, or at any rate, not grounded. Such a sense is key to Dasgupta’s
solution to the dilemma, to which we now turn.
3.18 Grounding is not apt to be grounded
In addition to the fundamental and the grounded (the ‘substantive’ facts), Dasgupta
(2015) thinks there is a third category of fact: the ‘not apt to be grounded’, or au-
tonomous, as he officially terms it.51 The idea is this. The world forms a structure
(the familiar hierarchical picture). The bottom of the structure, the foundation, con-
tains the fundamental facts. Although such facts are ungrounded, they might have been
grounded—had the world contained deeper structure. Despite being ungrounded, then,
they are apt to be grounded. Above we find the derivative (grounded) facts. Since these
facts are grounded, they are clearly apt to be grounded. How do the autonomous facts
fit into this structure? They are the ‘scaffolding’ around the structure. As Dagupta puts
it, the correct answer to what grounds an autonomous fact is not ‘nothing’. It is that
the question does not make sense.
This kind of tripartite division finds analogues elsewhere. Dasgupta gives the follow-
ing. In a formal system, such as set theory, we have the ‘fundamental’ propositions, the
axioms. Such propositions are not derivable, but they might have been derivable, had
we chosen different axioms. Then there are the ‘grounded’ propositions, the theorems.
These are derived from the axioms. A fortiori, they are derivable. But there is another
class of proposition, the definition. We can use definitions to help us derive theorems.
But definitions themselves just aren’t the kind of proposition that can be derived. The
correct response to a request for a proof of the definition of ‘subset’ is ‘woah, back up.
We need to get clear on the role of a definition.’ The sense in which an autonomous fact
is not apt to be grounded is supposed to be similar to the sense in which a definition is
not apt to be proved.
Now, Dasgupta’s idea is not that grounding facts are autonomous. He thinks they are
51Dasgupta gives a more thorough exposition of the notion in his (2016).
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grounded, but grounded in facts which are themselves autonomous; they are grounded
in essentialist facts. Suppose that
(96) S’s being conscious is grounded in S’s physical brain state P .
Dasgupta holds that this is grounded in S’s being conscious and a (general)52 essential
connection between consciousness and brain states:
(97) It is essential to being conscious that if someone’s brain is in physical state P ,
then it is conscious.
Some of Dasgupta’s remarks indicate that he thinks, in general, it is the essence
of the grounded which grounds grounding facts. That is, that if A grounds B, this is
grounded in A and
(98) It is essential to B that if A, then B.
But this generates implausible explanations. Interestingly, the counterexamples mirror
those to Bennett’s account. For instance, a promise to ϕ grounds an obligation to ϕ.
But it is not at all plausible that S’s obligation to ϕ is grounded in S’s promising to ϕ
because S is obliged to ϕ. Rather, it is just in the nature of promising that it creates an
obligation. Promises create obligations because that’s just what promises do!53 Luckily,
there is an easy fix. We can take it to lie in both the nature of A and B that if A, then
B. It would appear that this generates specious explanations—explanations violating
non-monotonicity, for instance. It has everything to with the nature of disjunction, and
nothing do with the nature of a particular disjunct that p grounds p ∨ q. I think that
bullet can be safely bitten. It is the connection between this disjunction and this disjunct
that is at issue. As such, the nature of the particular disjunct is indeed relevant.
52This qualification is necessary to account for general patterns among grounding facts. Generally,
if a type A fact grounds a type B fact, then facts of type A invariably ground facts of type B. If
grounding facts were grounded in individual essences, it would be a massive cosmic coincidence as to
why the same kinds of brain states ground the same kinds of conscious states.
53This example is due to Kevin Mulligan (pers. comm.).
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So far, so good. But why believe that essences are autonomous?54 Dasgupta gives
two reasons. First, the question of why an essence claim holds strikes us as odd in the
same that a request for proof of a definition strikes as odd. Suppose
(99) It is essential to {Socrates} that it is the unique set whose sole member is
Socrates.
But we want to respond the question why this is essential to Socrates with something
like ‘what do you mean? That’s just what {Socrates} is!’
Second, there is a sense in which merely fundamental facts are arbitrary. The fact
that an electron is where it is appears to be such a fact. Why is it here rather than there?
There’s no (ground-theoretic) reason why an electron is where it is. Essentialist facts
are not arbitrary in this way. As Dasgupta says (p. 580), ‘[t]here is nothing arbitrary
about the fact that {Socrates} is by definition the unique singleton containing Socrates:
this is, after all, just what {Socrates} is!
3.18.1 Autonomy?
I have no knock-down objections against Dasgupta’s view. However, I find his arguments
for it unpersuasive, stemming from three qualms with the notion of autonomy. First, the
analogy with definitions in formal systems, such as set theory, is misleading. I see clearly
that definitions are not the kind of proposition that can be proved.55 But I can also
see why definitions are unprovable: they are stipulated. Stipulations are not the kind of
thing you can, or need to, prove. But you can’t just stipulate anything you like. There
are restrictions. Definitions are allowed because they don’t incur an ontological cost.
Set theory has only one non-logical predicate—‘is a member of’. All useful set-theoretic
54Dasgupta remarks (p. 580) that this claim is not important to most of his argument. What is
important is that there is a distinction to be recognised between ungrounded and autonomous facts. I
take it the idea is that we require some autonomous facts or other to ground grounding facts, and since
essentialist facts are plausibly autonomous, they can serve to illustrate the view. Fine, but Dasgupta
doesn’t offer any other candidates that could play the role, and since I cannot think of any, I will take
the claim to be essential(!) to the view.
55Actually, I think there is a sense in which definitions can be proved, but only trivially, by entailing
themselves. There is no interesting sense in which they are derivable.
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notions are definable using set-membership and the apparatus of first-order logic. Here
is the definition of subset:
A ⊆ B ⇐⇒df ∀x(x ∈ A→ x ∈ B)
But since ‘subset’ is introduced in this way, it is eliminable. We could say everything
we wanted to say with it using only the notion of set-membership (plus quantification).
If we like, we can just view it as a useful shorthand. It constitutes, as the logicans
say, a conservative extension of the basic set-theoretic language. Autonomous facts are
dissimilar in this regard. Both essentialist facts and grounding facts are substantive,
not stipulated. They incur an ontological cost. We can say things with them that we
couldn’t say without them. If grounding facts are indeed autonomous it is not because
they are relevantly similar to definitions.
An analogy which seems more apt to me is that general grounding principles are like
inference rules in a formal system. We have the premises (grounds) which, given the
inference rules (grounding principles), entail (ground) the conclusion (grounded). The
idea is that both entailment and grounding are the kinds of relations which produce
an output, given some input. The primitive inference rules, at least, cannot be proven.
They are fundamental. But that does not mean it’s misguided to ask whether they can
be proven. Derived rules, for instance, can be proven. And had we chosen a different set
of primitive inference rules, we might have been able to prove some of those rules. But
this analogy pushes us back towards our dilemma. Either we insist that the inference
rules (grounding facts) are fundamental, and we face the Siderian collapse. Or else we
accept that inference rules (grounding facts) must be proven (grounded), and we’re at
the mercy of the Tortoise.
Second, I don’t think Dasgupta has done enough to establish that essentialist facts
are autonomous, rather than being obviously fundamental. Dasgupta’s argument hangs
on our finding certain questions ‘odd’. We are supposed to find the question odd why
{Socrates} has the essence that it has. From this oddness we are supposed to conclude
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that the question has a false presupposition, or doesn’t make sense in some way. But
this oddness would be equally well explained if essentialist facts were fundamental, and
obviously so. For asking why an essentialist fact holds would be infelicitous in much the
same way that the question ‘why is your jumper red?’ is infelicitous, as we argued in
the previous chapter. The reason it strikes us as odd is that a Gricean maxim has been
obviously violated.
My last qualm with autonomy is that it constitutes a radical (non-conservative)
extension of our ideology. So far we have recognised two (relevant) kinds of fact: the
fundamental and the grounded. These our united, however, by the their both being
a part of the grounding order. The only difference is that one kind of fact occupies a
unique place in the grounding order. The working hypothesis of the grounding theorist,
as I understand her, is that the whole of reality—all the facts—can be understood as
a large grounding order. Without a direct reason to suppose that there are facts which
fall outside the order, this strikes me as too radical a departure.
Luckily, I think we can do without autonomy.
3.19 Fundamental Errors
I’m going to take quite a different approach to those outlined above. My view is that
grounding facts are grounded in ungrounded facts about grounding (more specifically,
its essence), but that this does not entail flatworldism, a collapse, or the falsity of physi-
calism. To start, I am going to reexamine the reasoning which generated the dilemma in
the first place. Recall that, on the one hand, it is supposed that grounding must be non-
fundamental because of Purity and Modal Freedom. Now, I am not going to argue that
either of these principles is false. Instead I’m going to offer an understanding of ground-
ing which both respects versions of these principles, and avoids the Siderian dilemma.
And I’m going to do it without requiring any radical departures from orthodoxy.
An instance of maroonness, as we’ve already noted, always grounds an instance of
redness; it never grounds an instance of blueness. Strictly speaking, however, all this
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indicates is that grounding relations are necessitated by their grounds. And as we are
constantly reminded, necessitation doesn’t imply dependence (as witness independent
yet necessarily coextensive properties, like mass and shape). This suggests that although
maroonness necessarily grounds redness, we can locate the source of this necessity else-
where. To foreshadow: this opens up the possibility of understanding grounding—the
relation itself—as the source of this necessity. This offers a reasonable sense in which
grounding conforms to MF.
As I say, I’m not going to challenge Purity. However, it should be noted that it does
its work against a tacit assumption. This assumption is rarely made explicit, though
Sider (2011) is an exception. He calls the assumption:
(100) Completeness
Everything is either fundamental or holds in virtue of the fundamental.
This, of course, is what Dasgupta denies. Autonomous facts are neither fundamental,
nor do they hold in virtue of the fundamental. Sider’s reasoning is that we should be able
to tell the entire story of the world using only fundamental notions. The fundamental
story of the world should not mention things like cityhood. After all, all God had to do
was create the fundamental and the rest took care of itself. This is what I take issue
with. I think it is simply false that all God had to do was create the fundamental—on
Sider’s interpretation, at least.
There is a simple argument that we can’t tell the entire story of the world using only
fundamental notions. Consider two philosophers, one an antirealist about properties, the
other a realist. These philosophers agree on the fundamental story of the world. They
agree perfectly on which facts are fundamental. Nevertheless, they have a substantive
disagreement. The antirealist thinks that there is no place for properties in the resulting
‘book of the world’. The realist agrees that (facts about) properties do not feature in
the fundamental story of the world, but nevertheless thinks, since they are grounded in
the fundamental, they feature in the overall book of the world. Thus, it is possible for
two books to differ on the world, even though their fundamental stories are the same.
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Put another away, if the fundamental story of the world were the whole story, then these
kinds of disagreement would not be possible. Yet, it is clearly possible for philosophers
to agree on the fundamental and have substantive (and reasonable) disagreements about
the derivative.
What gives? The trouble is that if grounding is non-fundamental, then Completeness
entails that grounding must somehow bootstrap itself into being. This spells trouble if
we continue to think of grounding in connective terms—as connecting the fundamental
to the less fundamental. For then grounding must always comprise the non-fundamental.
But we needn’t think of grounding this way. We can take grounding to be fundamental
without taking grounding facts (that is, connective facts) to be fundamental. Establish-
ing this is the task of the next section.
3.20 Fundamental Grounding
My position is that the very method of deriving the higher-level facts—the grounding
relation itself—is fundamental. In fact it would be helpful not to think of it as (merely)
a relation at all. It is better to think of it as a function. (We want to avoid any
tendency to presuppose that ground and grounded must exist ‘before’ the grounding
relation can kick in.) This function takes an input and returns an output. The point is,
the fundamental facts on their own cannot generate the derivative facts—they need a
mechanism by which to achieve it. That mechanism is the grounding ‘function’. Some
analogies may help.
Taking some inspiration from Dasgupta’s scaffolding analogy, let’s imagine that the
world is a building. As the world is built from facts, so this building is built from bricks.
But it takes more than bricks to build a building. A pile of bricks does not arrange
itself ‘buildingwise’. If we viewed grounding in connective terms, it would be the cement
holding the bricks together. This is not what I propose. Grounding is more like a builder.
A builder is required to take the bricks and form them into a building. Moreover, it’s
not as though we have builders merely by having bricks. The builders too must be there
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from the very beginning—else our pile of bricks will remain a pile of bricks. Similarly,
the grounding relation (function) must be there from the very beginning. Without it,
we just have a pile of facts.
For a more instructive analogy, consider the natural numbers. Suppose we have a
structure (in the model-theoretic sense) just consisting of one number and the less-than
relation: (0, <). < is like relative fundamentality. Once we have some numbers, we can
order them with <, but the relation cannot generate new numbers. And 0 on its own
is not apt to generate its successor. Thus, (0, <) gives rise to no interesting structural
relations. Likewise, fundamental facts, on their own, are not apt to generate what they
ground. Fundamental facts, without grounding, do not give rise to structural relations.
Grounding is the structuring relation. If, instead, we had (0, 1, 2, <), we would at least
have interesting structural facts: ‘0 < 1’, ‘1 < 2’, ‘0 < 2’. But this requires that the
numbers are pre-given. And in that sense they are all ‘fundamental’. We still don’t
have the means of generating all the numbers. That, of course, requires the successor
function.56 Provided < is encoded with appropriate rules,57 we can generate all the
numbers, and the structural facts about them, with the structure (0, s, <).
What’s the point of this analogy? It’s that < can only be used to articulate rela-
tions given antecedently given numbers. In this way, it is like Sider’s non-fundamental
connecting truths. Since these truths contain non-fundamental constituents, those con-
stituents must be given ‘before’ the connecting truth can hold. The successor function,
understood in a generative sense, requires only that 0 is given. Given 0, the successor
function gives us 1. Given 1, it gives us 2. Grounding, I claim, is more akin to the
successor function. It requires only that the fundamental exist. Given the fundamental,
we get what the fundamental immediately grounds. And given the what the fundamen-
tal immediately grounds. . . You get the picture. On this understanding, grounding is
fundamental but the constituents of grounding facts needn’t be.
But, given Purity, doesn’t this entail that grounding facts are grounded? The ques-
56Think of the successor function as generative rather than as a mere mapping.
57This recursive rule will do: x < s(x) and x < s(y)→ x < ss(y).
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tion remains, then, what grounds them. The clue lies in the fact that the grounding
relation is fundamental. For that opens up the possibility of cutting off the regress.
However, the grounding relation is not a fact, and so is not a candidate for being a
ground. That’s a small obstacle. It is fundamental that the grounding relation exists
and has the the nature that it has. It is fundamental that the grounding relation behaves
the way it does.
Thus suppose that A grounds B. If we further suppose that it is part of the essence
of grounding that A grounds B, then, since we have already assumed that that essence
is fundamental, it follows that B is fundamental. Collapse. However, think again of
the successor function. It lies in the nature of the successor function (which is taken
as fundamental) that it takes 0 and returns 1. But that is not because the successor
function is encoded with infinitely many connecting rules regarding numbers and their
successors. It is encoded with one general rule: give me n and I’ll give you n + 1.
Similarly, we can take the grounding relation to be encoded with general rules—such as:
give me a type-A fact and I’ll give you a type-B fact.
The natural suggestion at this point would be to take this grounding principle to be
fundamental, and to say that it grounds the particular grounding fact (perhaps along
with the ground). But now that pesky Tortoise shows up again. After all, isn’t it
perfectly legitimate to ask: what grounds the fact that the grounding principle grounds
the grounding fact? To which we want to roll our eyes and reply that no, it isn’t perfectly
legitimate to ask this question—it’s just fundamental that grounding facts just are so-
grounded. And again, Purity forces us to reconsider our response. To avoid iterating
this whole process, we must deny that grounding facts are fundamental.
But consider the question: why does the rule ‘that (type-A facts ground type-B
facts)’ ground that (A grounds B)? To which the only sensible reply seems to be ‘what
do you mean? That’s just how grounding works’. If we are to take this response seriously
(and I propose that we do), we cannot interpret it as ‘it is of the essence of grounding that
grounding facts are so grounded’. For then we wind up saying, again, that grounding




A grounding fact is grounded in (some fact(s) about) the essence of ground.
To illustrate, suppose type-A facts (hereafter, α) ground type-B facts (hereafter, β).
What grounds this? Some collection of facts E about the essence of ground:
(102) That α grounds β is grounded in E .
To avoid collapse we must find a ground for this fact too. Here my account resembles
those of Bennett, deRosset, and Litland. I claim that this too is grounded in E :
(103) (That α grounds β is grounded in E) is grounded in E .
Like the Bennett-deRosset account, this generates an infinite series, but not a regress:
E
α < β E < (α < β) . . .
Figure 3.6: The Grounding Essentialist ‘regress’
Though we have a proliferation of grounding facts, we do not have a proliferation of
grounds, for each grounding fact is grounded in the nature of grounding itself. Note that
this does not entail that all grounding facts get the same ground. That would indeed
be a drawback. The claim is that each grounding fact is grounded in some collection
E of facts about the essence of ground. Different grounding facts may be grounded in
different Es.
Given the previous chapter’s account of philosophical explanation, this has some
interesting consequences. Recall that, for an important class of philosophical theories—
those aimed at real definition—the aim is to give an account of the essence of the target
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phenomenon, and then to show how the instances of the phenomenon are grounded in
that essence. Most grounding theorists agree that it is not possible to give an account
of the essence, or a real definition, of grounding. Thus, my account has the consequence
that, although a grounding fact has a ground in the essence of grounding itself, we may
not be able to determine all the relevant essential facts providing the ground. But that
is not to say that we will never be in possession of the relevant facts. We do know (or
at least think we know) some facts about the essence of ground. For instance, that α
grounds β and β grounds γ ground that α grounds γ. And we know why this is so. It
is because grounding is essentially transitive.
Yet sometimes we have good reason to suspect that a grounding relation holds with-
out being able to say exactly why it holds. A philosopher who doubts that determinable
properties are mere disjunctions of determinates may still reasonably believe that de-
terminables are grounded in their determinates. (Calling the relation the determinate-
determinable relation does not illuminate how it works—the label just denotes a class
of grounding relations united by their relata.) If pressed as to why the relation holds,
it would be perfectly reasonable, it seems, for this philosopher to reply that that’s just
how grounding works. And the best way to cash this out, I reiterate, is that it lies in
the nature of ground to behave in such a way. The reply is not very informative, to be
sure. But the request for such information, given our admitted imperfect knowledge of
grounding, is not always appropriate. Thus, I regard it as a virtue of Grounding Essen-
tialism that it sometimes provides an informative account of the grounds of grounding
facts, but cannot do so in all cases.
3.20.1 Modal Freedom Revisited
Grounding Essentialism, finally, puts us in a position to explain why grounding facts
are not modally free, even though grounding is fundamental. We can both preserve the
claim that grounding is fundamental and square this with grounding’s apparent lack of
modal freedom. The trick is in where we locate the source grounding’s modal properties.
Consider an electron e. Electrons seem like good candidates for being fundamental
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entities. For our purposes, we will assume that the fact that e exists is fundamental.
It would also appear to be fundamental that e is negatively charged—for that is a
fundamental property of a fundamental entity. It is clear, however, that e’s existing,
since it is an electron, necessitates its being negatively charged. Thus, the fact that e
is negatively charged is not free with respect to e’s existing. This doesn’t count against
MF, however, since e is essentially negatively charged. The fact that e can’t fail to
be negatively charged does not make its being negatively charged non-fundamental.
Compare: that a is maroon necessitates that a’s being maroon grounds its being red.
Whereas Bennett and deRosset would locate the source of this necessity in a’s being
maroon, I locate it in the essence of grounding. It is of the essence of grounding to take
maroon and deliver red. Grounding can’t fail to take maroon and give us red. This no
more violates MF than the fact the electrons can’t fail to be negatively charged does.
3.20.2 Brute Essentialism
A view which is similar to mine is dubbed ‘brute essentialism’ by Dasgupta (2015).
According to this view, A grounds B just in case it lies in the nature of B to be grounded
in A.58 That is, the essence of the grounded fact grounds grounding. Dasgupta notes that
the view enjoys many virtues but rejects it because it entails the falsity of physicalism,
as he understands it. Why? Because essentialist facts are not physical facts, and every
grounding fact must ultimately be grounded in an essentialist fact. Therefore, there are
facts not grounded in physical facts.
I have a few remarks about this. First, Dasgupta too thinks that grounding facts
are grounded in essentialist facts. He only manages to save a weakened version of
physicalism, and at the cost of positing an extra ideological primitive. The physicalism
Dasgupta sets out to save is:
(104) Strong Physicalism
All non-physical facts are grounded in physical facts.
58If this looks familiar, it’s because it is also the condition that Rosen (2015) provides for real
definition. See the previous chapter.
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The physicalism he actually saves is:
(105) Moderate Physicalism
All non-physical facts are grounded in physical facts or autonomous facts, and
all autonomous facts help underwrite grounding explanations.
Dasgupta thinks that what results is a non-ad hoc explanatory project for physicalism.
Given the autonomous facts, which must be placed there ‘by fiat’ anyway, the physical
is sufficient to ground all else. This gives explanatory pride of place to the physical
facts. Sure, given the autonomous facts, the resulting project for the physical is non-
ad hoc—that does not mean the posit of autonomy was not ad hoc to begin with.
Essentialist facts can underwrite grounding explanations whether they be autonomous
or ungrounded. Absent the Siderian problem, I don’t think there’s a convincing reason
to posit autonomous facts.
Second, why think the strong kind of physicalism Dasgupta wants to save is actually
worth saving? Dasgupta would reply that perhaps it isn’t, but that this shouldn’t be
decided by theoretical considerations about grounding. The motivation is the same kind
of ecumenicalism that motivated Wilson in Chapter 2 (which she neglects to mention in
this context). I doubted ecumenicalism back in Chapter 2 and I’ll cast doubt on it again.
Not all philosophical views are created equal. Not all philosophical theories deserve to be
taken seriously. And since a philosophical framework will rule out views just by having
content, it is unreasonable to demand that our framework be consistent with every
conceivable philosophical position—or even every plausible one. But that is no matter,
because, as Wilson (forthcoming) points out, physicalists are typically concerned with
such working hypotheses as ‘the mental is ultimately explainable in terms of physical’.
When the physicalist says that ‘all facts are physical’, what they usually mean is that
nothing is irreducibly mental or biological or whatever. To interpret the physicalist
as maintaining that absolutely every fact is grounded in the physical is unwarranted,
and the claim is implausible on the face of it—at least for the philosopher who takes
metaphysical claims seriously. Find me a physical ground for the laws of logic and maybe
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I’ll reconsider. The philosopher who claims that logical facts have physical grounds most
definitely bears the burden of proof.
So why am I not a brute essentialist, given that I reject Dasgupta’s reasons for
rejecting it? Because it locates the grounds of grounding facts in the essence of the
grounded. Since I reject the autonomy of essence, however, this requires that I take the
essence of the grounded to be fundamental, and it just doesn’t sit well to take the essence
of a non-fundamental fact to be fundamental. If it doesn’t outright violate the letter of
Purity, it at least violates its spirit. My position does not suffer this drawback. I do
not require the essences of grounded facts to be fundamental, since I take the essence
of grounding to ground the grounding facts. To illustrate, suppose that A grounds B.
This is grounded in a general connection between type-A facts and type-B facts which
is itself grounded in the essence of grounding. Now, it may be replied that this masks
a tacit commitment to the fundamentality of types of non-fundamental fact, since they
are ‘written into’ the essence of grounding. That strikes me as true in a sense, but also
unobjectionable. I think of it like this: the grounding relation contains the ‘blueprints’
for generating Bs from As (much like the successor function contains the blueprints for
generating a number’s successor). The blueprints are fundamental, sure—in the sense
that they are contained in the essence of a fundamental relation. If this entails that
types of fact are fundamental, that is a bullet I’m happy to bite. It is clear, however,
that the view requires no instances of these types to be fundamental. Furthermore, this
has desirable results regarding counterfactual grounding claims. Suppose it is a fact
that, though there are no type-A facts, if it had been the case that A it would have
been the case that A grounds B. On my view, this has a natural ground. The essence
of grounding grounds general connections whether or not they are instantiated, since
they are just blueprints written into grounding itself. On Dasgupta’s view, this work
will have to be done by the autonomous essences of unactualised (uninstantiated) fact
types. Fair enough. But the only reason for positing those autonomous essences (so far
as I can see) is to account for these kinds of counterfactual grounding claims. Thus,
again, Dasgupta’s view appears more as hoc than mine.
Metaphysical Explanation 162
3.20.3 Grounding Reconsidered
The resulting picture of grounding may be surprising. It reifies grounding in a particu-
larly strong way.59 Grounding is imbued with a rich essence, covering everything from
structure to connective rules covering all kinds of fact. The grounding relation thus ends
up doing quite a bit more work than perhaps we thought.
That is a fair criticism, but I do not think it is knockdown. My claim is that
something needs to do this work, and it is natural to have grounding do it. Similar
criticisms can be levelled at causation. Causal laws are often invoked to explain the
holding of causal facts. Similarly, instead of seeing grounding as encoded with general
grounding principles, we might invoke external, but fundamental, metaphysical laws,
in the vein of Wilsch (2015). I’m not sure how much the weight choice really carries
if, ultimately, the same work is done in either case. I prefer my formulation simply
because it avoids the posit of a further kind of fact—the fundamental metaphysical
law. That is not because I deny there are such facts, but it seems natural to me to
ground metaphysical laws in the way the grounding relation behaves. If it is a law
that necessarily, if a is maroon, then a is red, then it seems to me that that is because
necessarily, that a is maroon grounds that a is red. Allowing grounding to have a rich
essence—which is by no means a trivial posit, I concede—gives us metaphysical laws
‘for free’.
Others accept that such work needs doing but don’t posit anything which can do
it. Here I count the ‘bootstrapping’ accounts of Bennett and deRosset. It is claimed
that the fact that a is maroon is sufficient, on its own, to generate a’s being red. Our
criticism of this was that it gave rise to implausible explanations, but metaphysically,
we just don’t have the machinery to generate the grounded—unless we stipulate that
every single fact has the means to generate what it grounds ‘built in’. But then this view
morphs into a less plausible version of my own, except whereas I locate this generative
59This is a complaint of the grounding literature recently advanced by Dasgupta (2017). He thinks
current grounding theorists have a significantly more inflated sense of ‘ground’ than was initially in-
tended by Fine (2001), and that a significantly deflated notion of ground is still theoretically useful.
Unfortunately the paper was published too recently for me to fully consider in this thesis.
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power in the grounding relation, Bennett and deRosset locate it in every fact. This
view is metaphysically acceptable to me, but it is significantly more inflationary than
the view Bennett and deRosset intended.
What I do not think is acceptable is to deny that the generative work needs doing.
This entire thesis, in a sense, has argued that such work needs doing. Dasgupta’s
autonomous essences do the same work, but the posit of autonomous facts is supposed
somehow to be ontologically innocent because they are ‘placed there by fiat’ (2015, p.
583) anyway. My account accepts the ontological cost in the way I think most natural.
3.21 Explaining Grounding Facts
There’s one more loose end we need to tie up. We need to show that the Ground-
ing Essentialism (GE) account offers satisfying explanations of grounding facts. We
rejected the Bennett-deRosset account because it is just implausible that a’s being ma-
roon grounds its being red because it is maroon. Dasgupta fared better with his account.
He took the essence of the grounded fact to ground grounding. Thus, disjunctions are
grounded in their true disjunctions because it’s just in the nature of disjunctions that
they are grounded in this way. The explanation is natural and satisfying. My approach
seems to fare much worse in this regard. Since I take grounding facts to be grounded,
ultimately, in the nature of grounding, it would appear that the ultimate explanation
of every grounding fact can be summed up as ‘that’s just how grounding works!’ That
would not appear to be an acceptable explanation.
In response I am going to argue that, contra appearances, the kinds of explanations
my approach offers are just as informative as those available on Dasgupta’s account.
To start, let’s compare exactly how we would go about explaining a range of grounding
facts on each approach.
(106) a. p grounds p ∨ q
Why? Because
b. It is in the nature of disjunction that disjunctions are grounded in their true
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disjuncts. (Dasgupta)
c. It is in the nature of grounding that disjunctions are grounded in their true
disjuncts. (GE)
(107) a. That I promised to ϕ grounds that I have an obligation to ϕ.
Why? Because
b. It is in the nature of obligation that promises ground obligations. (Dasgupta)
c. It is in the nature of grounding that promises ground obligations. (GE)
(108) a. That a is maroon grounds that a is red.
Why? Because
b. It is in the nature of determinable colours that they are grounded in their
determinates. (Dasgupta)
c. It is in the nature of grounding that determinate colours ground determinable
colours. (GE)
I chose these examples because, intuitively, they favour different kinds of explanation.
Dasgupta’s view offers the best explanation of disjunction-grounding facts. The nature
of grounding appears to be irrelevant. What matters is the nature of disjunction. It
is because of how disjunction works, not of how grounding works, that true disjuncts
ground disjunctions.
On the other hand Dasgupta’s view does not offer satisfying explanations of obligation-
grounding facts. It is because of the nature of promises that promises ground obliga-
tions. The notion of obligation appears to be essential to the notion of a promise but
not conversely. Neither theory seems to capture this example well.
Lastly, it remains quite obscure as to how determinates ground their determinables.
I’m not convinced either that it is the essence of the determinate, or the essence of the
determinable, which grounds determinate-determinable relations. In such cases we can
do no better than to say: ‘that’s just how grounding works’.
With regards to disjunction, Dasgupta’s explanation is preferable not because it is
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more informative, but because it seems more likely to be true. In each case we have
located the ground in an essence, but without saying precisely which aspect of that
essence gives rise to the grounding fact. Each explanation conveys, more or less, the
same amount of information, yet each is informationally deficient. The question is,
then, could we expand the GE-style explanations in such a way as to render them more
plausible. In principle, it is my position that, for each grounding fact, a full ground
resides in the essence of grounding. Yet I concede it won’t always be possible in practice
to find one. Thus, my aim is merely to argue that it is plausible such explanations exist.
To that end, let us consider the case of disjunction more explicitly.
p grounds p ∨ q because it is essential to grounding that a true disjunct φ grounds
a disjunction φ ∨ ψ. But recall that grounding encodes, as a blueprint, the natures
of non-fundamental fact types. It needs those very blueprints in order to function in
the first place. Thus, the nature of (a kind of generalised) disjunction is encoded in
grounding. This will include facts concerning, for instance, the semantics of disjunction,
and its governing inference rules. These are the very same facts to which Dasgupta
appeals in explaining grounding facts for disjunction. So it turns out, we can, in a
roundabout way, offer the very same explanations. In the same way we can account
for promises grounding obligations—albeit by appealing to the generalised nature of the
ground, rather than the grounded. And we have a principled reason to suppose that
there is a full and satisfying explanation of determinate-determinable relations, even
though we are ignorant of it.
CHAPTER 4
Why I am not a Humean
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter I want to apply the notion of ground to a divisive and vexed metaphysical
debate—the debate over laws of nature. The debate takes a familiar course. On the one
side, the Humean says we can make sense of laws without countenancing any kind of
‘necessary connection’, ‘cosmic glue’, or otherwise ‘unhumean whatnots’. On the other,
the non-Humean says that the Humean’s laws can’t leverage the metaphysical machin-
ery to do the job they’re supposed to do: they can’t explain; they’re not confirmable;
they can’t uphold an accident/law distinction; they can’t support counterfactuals; and
they can’t support physical necessity. The Humean shouts down their opponent with
accusations of question begging. Stalemate.
This is frustrating for the non-Humean. For her, there is something deeply wrong
with Humeanism. It’s not just that she thinks it is wrong; it’s that it belies a deep
incoherence. If only she could make the Humean see it! But it seems she cannot find a
way of articulating her worries to which the Humean will not cry foul.
The recent advent of grounding has changed this. For grounding allows the non-
Humean to articulate—in a particularly precise and illuminating way—exactly what her
misgivings are. Thus, her complaints are not so easily dismissed as question-begging.
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This is a welcome step towards breaking the stalemate. However, as will become clear,
while the non-Humean’s new articulation of her criticism isn’t strictly question-begging,
it does rely on assumptions the Humean is not obliged to accept.
My criticism of Humeanism is different. It will hardly come as a surprise that the
typical Humean will reject grounding. It is exactly the kind of ‘necessary connection’
she explicitly eschews. However, while the Humean eschews heavyweight metaphysical
relations, she nevertheless attempts to carry out heavyweight metaphysical work. Such
is the inherent tension in Humean accounts of law. Their account of laws is explicitly
metaphysically ‘thin’, and yet they try to put laws to serious metaphysical (and epis-
temological) work. My target is the Humean who eschews grounding, and yet seeks to
do its work with no comparable machinery. This Humean attempts to have her cake
and eat it. My criticism of such accounts is that they exhibit explanatory or ‘ground-
ing’ gaps. There is an unbridgeable grounding gap between a Humean ontology and
lawhood—if the world is Humean, there is nothing which deserves to be called a ‘law’.
When the Humean attempts to close such gaps—usually by changing our understanding
of some operative notion—another gap crops up elsewhere. This is what I take to be
central anti-Humean complaint. Previous non-Humeans have certainly hinted at this
core complaint, but I don’t think it has hitherto been clearly articulated.
There are Humeans who deny there is any such heavy-duty metaphysical work to be
done. They are not my concern. This kind of Humean denies grounding because she
denies that there is any work for grounding to do. The view seems perfectly coherent to
me, but I am unsure why anyone would want to hold it. The view has severe and wide-
reaching implications, particularly regarding what we think we know about the world.
If you’re happy to bite those bullets, we have little common ground, and discussion
wouldn’t be very fruitful. But I suspect that most Humeans deny that heir view really
has these consequences. Again, it is my purpose to show that these Humeans have a
deeply incoherent view.
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4.2 Humeanism
According to the official story, Hume was (in)famously skeptical of what he called ‘nec-
essary connexions’. Whether that story is correct is neither here nor there. In con-
temporary usage ‘Humean’ describes a collection of views—or better, an attitude—
characterised by a general distrust of a generalised notion of ‘necessary connection’.
This notion of ‘necessary connection’ is slippery. In fact, I know no necessary condition
for it. It is not merely a relation which implies a corresponding necessary truth. For
instance, since Anscombe (1971) it has been widely doubted that a causal relation im-
plies anything like a corresponding necessary causal law. Nevertheless, causation (as a
robustly metaphysical relation) continues to be held up as exactly such a necessary con-
nection. Such necessary connections are more like determination relations. They make
the world the way it is, or ensure it is a certain way. They are the relations which ‘hold
the world together’—without doing so necessarily! The term ‘necessary connection’ is
a misleading hangover from Hume, who took the orthodox view of causation to imply
such necessary truths. Nor is it sufficient for a necessary connection that it imply a
corresponding necessary truth. Relations of logical necessity or analyticity are accept-
able to the Humean. It is necessary that p → p or that all bachelors are unmarried.
Such necessities are fine because they follow from logical laws or semantic facts, not
because they imply any worldly necessity. We can largely bypass these issues, however.
If aRb implies some truth of the form (Fa→ Gb) and Fa→ Gb is not merely a logical
or analytic truth, then R is a necessary connection in our sense. Deterministic lawful
connections, according to the non-Humean, imply such truths, so we will restrict our
attention to them.
Distrust of necessary connections may be local—a Humean may think we need to
countenance necessary connections is some instances, but not in others. Someone who
denies grounding, but admits causation, would be such a Humean. Or one may be
Humean in a global sense, eschewing all kinds of necessary connection. David Lewis was
this kind of Humean. He dubbed his view ‘Humean Supervenience’ and characterised it
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thus:
It is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of
particular fact, just one little thing and then another. (Lewis 1986b, p. ix)
[It is] the thesis that the whole truth about a world like ours supervenes on the
spatiotemporal distribution of local qualities. (Lewis 1994, p. 473)
Weatherson (2016) factors Humeanism into two theses. The first (relatively uncontro-
versial) thesis is that truth supervenes on being:
(109) Truth Supervenes
Every truth supervenes on how the world is.
The second thesis, which is our point of contention, is that there are only local matters
of particular fact or local qualities. What this means is that:
(110) Mosaic
There are only (perhaps point-sized) individuals, their intrinsic, categorical prop-
erties, and the spatiotemporal relations between them.
For Lewis, the world is the mosaic—in the sense that there is nothing more to how the
world is than how the mosaic is. Two worlds exactly alike in their mosaics are exactly
alike full stop. The non-Humean denies this. For her, there is more to the world than
the mosaic. There is the glue binding its tiles together—the necessitating unHumean
whatnots. The non-Humean thinks that though two worlds are exactly alike in their
mosaics, they may yet differ. They may make true different truths. But the non-Humean
does not deny that truth supervenes on being. She just thinks there is more to being
than the Humean has dreamt of.
Why does the non-Humean hold such a view? Because she sees truths for which she
cannot find a ground in the mosaic. Notably, she claims she is unable to find grounds for
laws of nature in the mosaic. Typically, the Humean responds that she has the wrong
conception of laws, or at any rate, the Humean is not obliged to accept her conception
of laws (cf. Beebee 2000). Perhaps, if laws were as the non-Humean conceives them,
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they would not find a suitable ground in the mosaic. But the Humean does not conceive
of laws that way, and she can certainly ‘ground’ her laws in the mosaic.
4.3 Two Theories of Law
4.3.1 The Humean View: Regularities and Deductive Systems
The simplest Humean theory of laws is the naïve regularity, or constant conjunction-
type, theory: if we look throughout the mosaic, and find that B always follows A, then it
is a law that Bs follow As. It is easy enough to see how such a law might be ‘grounded’
in the mosaic. It is just a special case of a generalisation being grounded in its instances.
What grounds that all As are B is that each A is B.1
This theory does not satisfy a key desideratum for a theory of laws, however. A
theory of laws should distinguish between laws on the one hand, and generalisations
which are merely ‘accidentally’ true on the other. It is probably the case, as the usual
example goes, that there are no gold spheres more than a mile in diameter. On the
regularity view, then, it counts as a law that all gold spheres are less than a mile in
diameter. And yet, it seems as though there is no law forbidding this. On the other
hand, it does seem to be a law that there are no uranium spheres this large (critical
mass would be achieved long before that). Why is one regularity a law and the other
not?
Enter Lewis. On Lewis’s ‘Best-System Account’ (BSA) of laws we are asked to imag-
ine we are given a vast compendium of all the facts describing the mosaic (and therefore
the world). Such a compendium is unwieldy. We can cut down its size considerably
if we organise it into a deductive system. The challenge is to find the smallest set of
propositions (axioms) the deductive closure of which most closely resembles the original
compendium. Some axiomatisations are simpler than others. They comprise a smaller
number of, or just simpler, axioms. Other axiomatisations are stronger. They imply
1We ignore any problems about whether ‘totality facts’ are needed in addition to the instances. See
Fine (2012a, 2012b).
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more truths. And finally, some axiomatisations provide a better ‘fit’. They are more
accurate than others. The ‘best system’ is the one which offers the best balance of
simplicity, strength, and fit. A proposition is a law if it is an axiom or theorem of this
system.2 The BSA accounts for the law/accident distinction easily. Only those general-
isations which are theorems of the best system count as laws. And in simple cases the
BSA reduces to the regularity view. If there are many As and they are all B, ‘all As are
B’ will probably make it into the best system.
4.3.2 A non-Humean View: Armstrong’s Necessitating Universals
Our concern is not to argue that any particular non-Humean view is right. It is merely
to highlight how a non-Humean view satisfies the non-Humean sentiment that there is
more to the world than the mosaic. We will thus use Armstrong (1983) as our exemplar.
He says:
Suppose it to be a law that F s are Gs. F -ness and G-ness are taken to be univer-
sals. A certain relation, a relation of non-logical or contingent necessitation, holds
between F -ness and G-ness. This state of affairs may be symbolized as ‘N(F,G)’
(p. 85).
The necessitation relation satisfies the non-Humean sentiment. A rough gloss of the
distinction is this: whereas the Humean thinks that it is a law that all F s are G because
all F s are G, the non-Humean thinks that all F s are G because it is a law that all F s
are G. The properties F -ness and G-ness stand in a special, or privileged relation, such
that whenever something is F , it must be G. Beebee (2000) calls these views the non-
governing (merely descriptive) conception of laws, and the governing conception of laws,
respectively. The idea is that the Humean laws do not govern, are not responsible for,
what goes on at a world. They merely describe what goes on at a world. The governing
conception is that laws are to be obeyed! They actively constrain what happens at a
world.
2Technically, this allows a proposition to count as a law even if it is not strictly true. Suppose there
is one A which is not B, but unfathomably many As which are B. Then the law ‘all As are B’ may pay
enough in simplicity and strength to offset the loss of fit.
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Beebee thinks that most (if not all) challenges to the Humean view fail because their
proponents presuppose a governing conception of laws. The counterexamples simply beg
the question. For instance, Tooley (1977) asks us to consider a world in which there
are 10 fundamental particles, and thus 55 two-particle interactions. However, only 54 of
these interactions ever occur. Nevertheless, you’d think, there is a law dictating what
happens in the remaining interaction. The committed Humean ought have no problem
accepting that there is no law describing the remaining interaction. After all, there’s
nothing to be described! Tooley’s example is question-begging.
It would appear that the fundamental difference between Humean and non-Humean
is this: the non-Humean sees work that needs doing—that is, of explaining how laws
govern—so posits something to do it. The Humean denies any such work needs doing
and so has no need for the extra posit. If that is the case, then the debate about laws has
been primarily verbal. We thought we arguing about what would account for lawhood.
Instead, we should be arguing about what kind of thing deserves the name of ‘law’.
Some Humeans didn’t get the memo. Lewis, for instance, still wants to put Humean
laws to some heavy-duty epistemic and metaphysical work. He says:
Some familiar complaints seem to me question-begging. . . . If you’re prepared to
agree that theorems of the best system are rightly called laws, presumably you’ll
also want to say that they underlie causal explanations; that they support counter-
factuals; that they are not mere coincidences; that they and their consequences are
in some good sense necessary; and that they may be confirmed by their instances.
(Lewis 1994, pp. 478–9)
It is familiar complaint. Humean laws can’t explain their instances, since it is the
instances which determine what the laws are. The order of explanation is reversed on
the Humean scheme. But this is question-begging, decrees Lewis, since explaining is
just what ‘laws’ do. The appropriate response to this is summed up in that eloquent
and witty passage, often quoted by Humeans without irony, from Lewis himself:
[Armstrong] uses ‘necessitates’ as a name for the lawmaking universal N ; and who
would be surprised to hear that if F ‘necessitates’ G and a has F , then a must
have G? But I say that N deserves the name of ‘necessitation’ only if, somehow, it
really can enter into the requisite necessary connections. It can’t enter into them
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just by bearing a name, any more than one can have mighty biceps just by being
called ‘Armstrong’.3 (Lewis 1983, p. 366)
Absolutely right. And a proposition is not confirmable just by being called a ‘law’.
The Humean needs to show us how their laws are confirmable (and what notion of
confirmation they’re working with).
We have some common ground. Humean and non-Humean alike think a theory
of laws should satisfy certain desiderata. Ideally, it should show how laws: explain;
support counterfactuals; differ from coincidences; underwrite physical necessity; and
are confirmable.4 We are further agreed that an entity cannot instantiate a property
or relation merely by bearing a name. Thus, it is not question-begging to argue that
Humean ‘laws’ do not satisfy one or other of these desiderata.
If these desiderata are characteristic of laws, and if the Humean cannot satisfy any
of them, then it would appear there is no refuge. At this point, the Humean might
argue that since the non-Humean has metaphysically heavyweight conceptions of these
desiderata, of course she requires some heavy duty machinery to support them; it’s kind
of a package deal. But the Humean has correspondingly ‘lightweight’ conceptions of
these notions, which her conception of laws is perfectly able to support. For instance, the
Humean may adopt a stance on which logical implication is perfectly able to underwrite
an explanation.
Here I detect a characteristic difference in attitude between the Humean and her
opponent. The non-Humean sees a deeper why-question here. Why do implications
underwrite explanations? In virtue of what is an inference explanatory? The Humean
simply does not see an explanatory burden. That is, where non-Humeans see grounding
gaps—gaps to be bridged, the Humean sees no gap. This seems to me the reading of
Lewis which is most plausible. When he says ‘if you’re prepared to agree that theorems
of the best system are rightly called laws, presumably you’ll also want to say that they
3There is a parallel here with Wilson (2014)’s critique of grounding. One of her key complaints is
that big-G Grounding does not get to be explanatory simply because we stipulate it to be so.
4Not all Humeans share all these desiderata. Beebee (2000), for instance, accepts that, metaphysi-
cally speaking, there is no distinction between laws and accidentally true generalisations.
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underlie causal explanations’, what this means is, you probably won’t see an ‘explanatory
gap’ between Humean laws and their ability to explain.5
This changes the structure of the dialectic once more over. The debate was about
what deserved the name of ‘law’. Though Humean and non-Humean share a set of
desiderata, they differ over the sense of the operative notions in those desiderata. The
Humean and opponent agree that laws must ‘explain’, but they disagree over what
explanation is! The challenge now is simply to show that the Humean’s conceptions
of these notions will not do. There are explanatory gaps everywhere on the Humean
view. One way of reading previous counterexamples to Humeanism is as trying to show
that such explanatory gaps are unacceptable. Of course, the Humean might continue to
reject the existence of the explanatory gaps, but the non-Humean suspects that there
are more explanatory gaps than the Humean realises or is willing to admit. Thus, the
prospect for converting at least some Humeans remains open.
We will present the Humean with a dilemma. On the one hand, the Humean may
adopt lightweight conceptions of explanation, confirmation, and the rest. When these
notions are deployed, however, they do not behave as desired. They leave explanatory,
or grounding, gaps, rendering the notions mostly useless. On the other, the Humean
may adopt heavyweight notions of explanation and confirmation, but then there is a
grounding gap between a Humean ontology and these metaphysically robust notions.
Either way, the Humean leaves grounding gaps somewhere.
4.4 Humeanism and Grounding
It will be convenient to introduce some shorthands. Call any kind of notion an ‘H-
notion’, if a Humean would approve of it. Thus, ‘H-laws’, ‘H-confirmation’, ‘H-explanation’
etc. are the Humean versions of law, confirmation, and explanation. We use ‘N-laws’
for ‘necessitating’ or non-Humean laws.
5I’m not sure whether this was Lewis’ intended reading (I’m inclined to doubt it, if anything), but
it lends the most plausibility to the passage.
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4.4.1 H-Laws can’t ground explanation
Barry Loewer (2012, p. 130) rightly notes that a central anti-Humean complaint is
that H-laws can’t explain. He therefore considers two articulations of an argument that
H-laws don’t explain. The first, due to Armstrong (1983, p. 40), is that H-laws can’t
explain their instances since the instances are part of the very thing which is supposed
to explain them. The law ‘all F s are G’ does not explain why all observed F s are G
since the law is equivalent to the conjunction ‘all observed F s are G and all unobserved
F s are G’.6 The second is due to Tim Maudlin (2007, p. 72). His point is that, since
the mosaic is, for the Humean, ontologically fundamental, it can admit of no further
explanation. Laws are just ‘generic features’ of the mosaic.
Loewer (pp. 130–2) responds that this objection rests on a conflation of metaphys-
ical and scientific explanation. Loewer accepts that, on a view like Lewis’s, the mosaic
metaphysically determines what the laws are, and so explains why certain propositions
are laws. But, he says, this kind of explanation is very different from scientific expla-
nation. His take on the distinction is that to metaphysically explain a fact is to show
what grounds it, while to scientifically explain a fact or event is to show why it oc-
curred in terms of prior events and laws.7 The Humean’s claim is that laws scientifically
explain their instances. This is perfectly compatible with those very same instances
metaphysically explaining what why that law is law.
Marc Lange (2013) argues that Loewer’s argument fails because scientific and causal
explanations chain. We first considered his example back in Chapter 2. Here it is again,
cast now in terms of explanation:
(111) That its internal pressure is greater than the external atmospheric pressure
(causally) explains the expansion of the balloon.
6Another way of putting the point makes use of a substitutional understanding of quantification:
if d1, . . . , dn make up our domain, we can write ‘∀xφ’ as: φ(d1) ∧ · · · ∧ φ(dn). Thus, an H-law cannot
explain its instances for the same reason that a conjunction cannot explain its conjuncts.
7Loewer does offer some further considerations in favour of the distinction; that metaphysical ex-
planation synchronic (which we have already shown to be false); that scientific explanation can be
probabilistic; and that although scientific explanations often cite metaphysical facts and vice versa, we
do not confuse the two kinds of explanation. I don’t find any of these reasons particularly compelling.
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(112) That the internal pressure is greater than the external pressure is (metaphys-
ically) explained by the forces exerted by the gas molecules on the balloon’s
interior.
From which it follows, it seems, that the forces on the ballon’s interior explain its
expansion. At the very least, the example lends some plausibility to the claim that
metaphysical and scientific explanations chain.
Suppose it is a law that all As are B. Reconstructing the anti-Humean argument à
la Lange, we have:
(113) That this A is B helps metaphysically explain why all As are B.
(114) That all As are B helps scientifically explain why this A is B.
(115) So, by chaining, that this A is B helps explain why this A is B.
Thus, the Armstrongian argument is revived.
I’ve made no bones that I am sympathetic to this chaining principle. However, I think
Lange’s argument hints at, but does not fully capture, the anti-Humean complaint. For
one, it’s not a chaining principle that we really need. The Humean is free to maintain
some kind of explanatory holism on which these kinds of explanatory circles are per-
fectly acceptable. Better, we could establish an asymmetry principle: that a fact can’t
scientifically explain what it is metaphysically explained by. But nor does this really
get to the heart of the matter. Both kinds of argument are reductios. In each case the
argument is: suppose H-laws are explanatory; then we get circular or self-explanations.
However, the Humean must accept both the chaining principle and asymmetry for this
argument to be dialectically successful.
What the non-Humean (this one anyway) really thinks is that H-laws just don’t have
what it takes to explain. There would certainly be unwelcome consequences if H-laws
explained, but what we want to show is that H-laws are just not of the right metaphysical
character to be able to explain. The issue is not that metaphysical explanations chain
with scientific explanations to give us explanatory circles. The issue is that ‘A explainsB’
Why I am not a Humean 177
lacks a suitable Humean ground in the first place—or so I am going to argue. This both
more accurately portrays the anti-Humean sentiment, and provides a stronger attack on
Humeanism—since it does not rely on controversial assumptions about explanation the
Humean may easily reject.
Laws and generalisations
H-laws are metaphysically ‘thin’. There is no difference—metaphysically speaking—
between an H-law and an accidentally true generalisation. There is no difference at all
on the naïve regularity view. On the BSA, if there were a metaphysical difference, it
would be, at best, an extrinsic one. It would be because, by happenstance, it earns its
keep in the best system.
Non-lawful generalisations—mere accidents—do not explain. Why is this gold sphere
less than a mile in diameter? Because all gold spheres are. That’s no explanation. The
ability to explain is thought to be a property characteristic of laws. What grounds a
law’s ability to explain? In virtue of what do laws explain? We sketched a theory of
explanation in Chapter 3. Explanations track dependence relations. It is natural to
conclude, therefore, that laws derive their ability to explain from their underwriting or
tracking causal (and other dependence) relations. We’re not going to fall back on that—
the point is, N-laws can explain, since they provide a suitable ground for explanations.
The Humean will reply that her H-laws also underwrite causal relations. Fine. But
the Humean’s causal relations are not dependence relations. That would be to invoke
unHumean whatnots. Humean causal relations are merely descriptive of regularities.
Humean causation is (something like) constant conjunction. Again, the question arises
as to why H-laws, but not accidental generalisations, underwrite causal relations.8 Either
one bites the bullet, and says that both do, whence the law/accident distinction collapses.
Or else one attempts to ground causation elsehow.
8H-laws can underwrite causation and counterfactuals, but only rather trivial versions of these
notions. Suppose it is an H-law that all As are B. What makes it true that if x had been A, it would
have been B? Lewis would say that the relevantly similar worlds are the ones in which the H-law holds.
But who would be surprised to hear that an A would be B in those worlds in which all As are B?
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Lewis would say that only those generalisations in the best system can underwrite
causation. But again, we ask what the relevant metaphysical difference is. What meta-
physical function does the best system play? The mosaic does not care about being
organised into a deductive system. The mosaic is unwieldy for us, not in itself.
Perhaps the problem is that I’m seeing a grounding gap where the Humean sees
none. I see a gap between her laws and her explanations which she does not. In which
case, I’m not sure how to proceed. That does seem like a difference in attitude. On the
other hand, perhaps it will be replied that of course there is no metaphysical difference
between laws and accidents—that is what the Humean has been trying to tell us all
along (Beebee 2000). What the Humean denies is that we need this metaphysically
weighty conception of explanation that the non-Humean seems to have. If explanation
must track metaphysically weighty dependence relations, then of course the Humean
will reject it. But there is a lighter conception of explanation, a purely epistemic sense
of explanation, on which explanations ‘organise’ our knowledge. Thus, laws explain
because they organise the mosaic for us. Call such explanation ‘H-explanation’.
4.4.2 H-explanation is not good enough
We have argued that there is a grounding gap between a Humean ontology and a weighty
conception of explanation. We will now argue that there is a grounding gap between
H-explanation and other notions to which we want to put it to work. Specifically, I will
argue that H-explanation can’t even play a rather modest epistemic role unless H-laws
are confirmable. But H-laws are not confirmable. So H-explanation can’t even do this
modest job.
Consider three mosaics. Let each tile represent a fact or event. There are three
kinds: white, black and grey. And let each column represent the world at a time. Call
the first mosaic the ‘Unkind World’.9 This mosaic has no discernible uniformity. There
are no useful generalisations to be made about this structure; the facts just hang together
9The label is an allusion to an oft-repeated remark by Lewis: that if the world is kind to us, then
we will be able to make many law-like generalisations about it.
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randomly.
Figure 4.1: The Unkind World
Call the second mosaic the the ‘HumeanWorld’. This world exhibits some uniformity.
We can make some generalisations about it. For instance, every black tile precedes a
grey tile. No laws actively govern this world, however. There are no ‘necessitation’
relations or other unHumean whatnots.
Figure 4.2: The Humean World
Finally, we have the non-Humean World. This world’s mosaic is identical to the
Humean world’s. However, the laws in the Humean world are given ‘after the fact’, as
it were; they merely describe the world. The non-Humean world is actively governed by
the law ‘black precedes grey’ (b⇒ g).
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b⇒ g︸ ︷︷ ︸
Figure 4.3: The non-Humean World
As the non-Humean sees things, the Humean World is remarkable. Though no laws
actively constrain it, it behaves as though it is indeed ‘governed’ by laws. The world
shares its beginning with the Unkind World, yet the the two take very different histories.
But neither history is more likely than the other. It is, frankly, miraculous that the
Humean world exhibits as much uniformity as it does. There is nothing miraculous
about the uniformity in the non-Humean world. Such uniformity is forced upon it.
Predictably, we are accused of question begging. H-laws are all the Humean needs
to underwrite her version of physical necessity. Only those worlds which share the
same laws are sufficiently similar to the Humean world to be considered when assessing
physical necessity. I’ve already said I find this sense of physical necessity rather trivial,
but fine, let’s grant it. The trouble now is that we have no way of telling whether we
are in a Humean world, or an unkind world. Thus, we don’t know what the physically
possible futures are.
The problem is that H-laws supervene on the entire history of a world, including its
future. But we can’t know the future. Consider the following partial history up to time
t:
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t
↓
Figure 4.4: A partial history
Based on the available evidence at t, we might conclude it is a law that black precedes
grey. But we have no way of telling if our world is kind or not. For all we know, the world
has been kind up till now, but tomorrow the laws we thought held will cease to describe
the world. To put the point somewhat provocatively, Humeanism (as the non-Humean
sees it) entails that tomorrow gravity might cease to function, we’ll spin off the Earth,





Figure 4.5: Left: a kind history. Right: an unkind history.
Since the histories of these worlds are identical up to t, whatever inferences are
warranted at t are warranted in both worlds. An internalist might say: since the available
10Lewis (1994) considers a similar situation in the case of probability. In simple cases, the BSA
account of chance reduces to Humeanism’s probabilistic cousin, simple frequentism. Suppose the fre-
quency of As which are B is 1/2 (both observed and overall). Thus, the probability that an A is B is
1/2. It is consistent with this probability that all future As are B. After all, there’s a non-zero chance
of it. But this future is impossible, since it entails that the probability would be different to what it
actually is! Lewis calls these ‘undermining’ cases.
So suppose it is a law that b⇒ g. It is possible for there to be a b which is not g, since no necessitating
whatnots prevent it. But it is impossible, since, if it came to pass, the laws would have been different
from what they actually are!
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evidence at t is the same for us, whatever inferences we can draw in the one world we
can draw in the other. But how can an inference which can go so badly wrong possibly
be warranted? No matter, you might think, Humeanism and externalist epistemologies
are natural bedfellows. What warrants the inference that b ⇒ g is what the world is
like, not what we know about it.11
Not only is Humeanism now tied to a highly non-trivial epistemology, it is tied to a
pretty implausible one at that. Indeed, what lends externalism plausibility in the first
place is that it relies on the assumption that the world is uniform. Knowledge is not
lucky. We arrive at knowledge through reliable methods. And when warrant is defeated,
it is because we have just been unlucky. Truth alone is not sufficient for warrant. (If
it were, there would be no Gettier cases.) But inductive inference is not reliable in
a Humean world. It is not reliable because there is nothing ensuring that inductive
inference is generally truth-tropic. It is not reliable because there are far more unkind
than kind worlds. Thus, all knowledge would be lucky in the Humean world.
To put the point in more familiar epistemic terms, if the world is Humean, inductive
inference never results in safe knowledge, but it appears that knowledge must be safe.
Williamson (2000, Ch. 5.3) explains safety like this. Imagine two golf balls, one resting
on a tee, the other at the bottom of a hole. Both balls are in equilibrium. But the
latter is in a more stable equilibrium. A strong gust of wind could push a ball off a
tee. Not so with the ball in hole. That ball is ‘safe’. We are safe in knowing that p if
it is not the case that p could easily have been false. Say that a method of obtaining
knowledge is reliable in a case α iff the method leads to truth in every case similar to α.
Now inductive inference may be reliable—in a world. What makes it reliable is that the
world is generally uniform. But the knowledge thereby gained is never safe—it could
have easily turned out false. It could have easily turned out false because there is a
world very similar to ours in which there is a b not followed by a g. Now, the Humean
will reply that we have not used the right measure of similarity. The relevantly similar
11This is precisely the kind of argument on which van Cleve (1984) relies in arguing that induction
justifies induction (and consequently, confirmation).
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worlds are the ones which share the very same laws. But now the Humean is begging the
question. She must assume that H-laws carry enough metaphysical weight to enter into
considerations of objective similarity between worlds. Accidental generalisations do not
enjoy this privilege, I take it. But there is no metaphysical difference between accidents
and H-laws!
It does not help, either, to advert to Bayesian methods. In order to raise the proba-
bility that b⇒ g there must be a finite number of bs. If there are 10 balls in a bag, and
we draw nine red ones, that raises the probability that all the balls in the bag are red.
But plausibly the number of bs is potentially infinite, if not actually. If the bag contained
infinitely many balls, drawing any number of reds would not raise the probability that
all are red. And even if we knew there were a finite number of bs, Bayesian inference
wouldn’t give us all we need. Unless we have an independent reason to believe that the
tenth ball is red, observing nine reds does not alter the probability that the tenth is red.
We might infer that the best explanation for our having drawn nine reds is that someone
intentionally filled the bag entirely with red balls. But that would be an ‘unHumean
bag’. What we know about the bag can only be given by the bag itself—agents with
intentions are meddling unHumean whatnots. Likewise, observing a b preceding a g
would raise the probability that all bs precede gs, but it would not alter the probability
the next b precedes a g. But the latter is surely the more modest inference!
We have uncovered another grounding gap: that L is an H-law does not ground that
L is confirmable (even in a relatively weak Bayesian sense). This spells trouble even for
the weak (purely epistemic) sense of Humean explanation. If an H-law is to be knowable,
it had better (at the very least) be confirmable. If it can’t be known, how can it play
the epistemic role of ‘organising’ our knowledge? Perhaps we take laws on faith. But
that doesn’t give us knowledge of a law. In that case the best job of ‘organising’ it could
do is a conditional one: on the assumption that L, p. It is an assumption which is never
discharged. On a non-Humean view, by contrast, not only is a law confirmable, it is
knowable. (Which is to be welcomed, since there are certainly laws we know.) What
makes inductive inference reliable is not that all bs happen to precede g—it’s that there
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is a law enforcing it. We thus don’t need to rely on a questionable inductive vindication
of induction (à la Cleve 1984). We can rely on an inference to the best explanation. It
is a no miracles argument. It would be miraculous if all bs just happened to precede
gs. There are no miracles. Therefore, the best explanation for this is that there is a law
ensuring that all bs precede gs.
Perhaps the committed Humean will stay true to her roots and deny that confirma-
tion is possible. Again, she is not my target. (I simply shake my head in disbelief that
she denies the obvious.) My target is the Humean who thinks confirmation is possible.
My argument is that there is simply no ground for confirmation on a Humean ontology.
There is no explanation why H-laws should be confirmable.
I think similar arguments can be made regarding all the familiar desiderata for laws.
A Humean ontology just has no ground, no explanation, for them. To sum up, our
argument has been:
(116) H-laws cannot ground a robust form of explanation.
(117) H-laws can ground a weak form of explanation only if they are confirmable.
(118) That H-laws are confirmable is not grounded.
(119) Therefore, H-laws can’t explain.
I have offered no original arguments against Humeanism (they can all be found in Arm-
strong 1983), only reinterpreted them as complaints of grounding gaps. The question
now, then, is how to deal with grounding gaps.
4.5 Grounding Gaps and Methodology
The non-Humean does not ask much. She asks only that if you agree laws have interest-
ing features, you have a theory which explains those interesting features—a theory which
shows what grounds them. Instead the Humean (as the non-Humean sees things) gives
us the runaround: first we are told that laws have these features just by being called
laws; then we are told that we have the wrong conception of laws, and that H-laws can
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perfectly well explain and do other things in a ‘Humean’ sense. When it is pointed out
H-laws can’t do this either, we are usually accused of question begging. Such is the
incoherence of Humeanism: it attempts to explain the interesting features of laws but
explicitly eschews any metaphysical posits which would explain them. And when this is
pointed out, they either claim not to understand the objection or cry question begging.
Compare this to another familiar debate: the debate between A- and B-theorists
about time. Both A-theorists and B-theorists agree on the desiderata for a theory of
time. (Though they may disagree about their relative importance.) For instance, both
agree that we need to account for the appearance of tense. And what’s more, both
theories do account for tense. On the A-theory, time is inherently tensed, and the B-
theory can be supplemented with an account of indexicality to account for tense. Debates
about time do not proceed with one side accusing the other of not having an explanatory
theory. Rather, the debates typically proceed first by assessing the relative plausibility of
the accounts without regards to their explanatory virtues. Are they internally coherent?
How many desiderata do they fulfil? How well do they comport with current physics?
That’s not to say that explanatory virtues aren’t discussed. We can discuss whether
the A-series or the B-series gives the better explanation of change, for instance. But
such disputes centre on explanatory virtues such as elegance and simplicity, not whether
there is any explanation at all. It is usually obvious and accepted by both sides when a
theory is unable to explain some phenomenon.
On the other hand, sometimes it is acknowledged a theory is unable to explain some
phenomenon, but in such cases we are offered an argument as to why that phenomenon
cannot exist. The free will debate proceeds in such a fashion. The libertarian does
not complain to the compatibilist that her theory does not explain what she thinks it
explains. The compatibilist knows she has no explanation of libertarian free will. Her
theory does not attempt to explain such free will. That’s not her point. Rather, on pain
of deterministic considerations, it is argued that freedom to act as willed is the best we
can do. The compatibilist then offers an explanation of this kind of free will. That is not
the shape of the debate about laws of nature—there the goalposts are forever shifting.
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Nor is the debate akin to the theism/atheism debate, with the Humean in the role of
atheist. There the theist might complain that the atheist can offer no ‘ultimate ground’
for the existence of the world. The atheist may agree. The atheist may even agree that
the theist can offer an ultimate ground for the world. But the atheist will say that the
theist has met one explanatory burden by introducing another—unless she can show why
it is that God contains in Herself the ground of Her own being (or does not need one).
And the answer had better not be ‘because She’s God!’ Moreover, the atheist can make
any number of responses to the theist: that they do not share the same explanatory
goals; that although the theist offers a ground for the world, the explanation has no
independent plausibility; that the whole project is misguided. That is not the shape of
the debate about laws. The Humean and non-Humean have a mutually agreed set of
desiderata. What they do not agree on is what explains what.
The point is, philosophers agree in most circumstances when explanation is achieved.
They have arguments about what the ‘best’ explanations are, but they do not typically
disagree about whether we have explanation at all. That is a peculiarity of the debate
about laws.12 If we can persuade the Humean that their view leaves explanatory gaps,
all well and good. But the non-Humean has been trying that for decades. Few Humeans
have been converted. That leaves us in uncertain methodological territory. How does
one go about convincing their opponent of an explanatory gap?
We want to approach the problem charitably. The uncharitable approach dismisses
the Humean’s stubbornness as insincere. It’s not that she doesn’t see the grounding
gaps, it’s just that she refuses to admit it. (I often have to resist the temptation of this
way of thinking). But that would be to accuse many fine philosophers of intellectual
dishonesty. So let us assume that the Humean really does not see any explanatory gaps.
As far as I can tell, there are three reasons for disagreement about grounding gaps.
First, pragmatically speaking, explanations are audience-relative. Whether A explains
B successfully for me depends on the state of my knowledge. Recall Salmon (1984)’s
12At least, it is the only debate with which I have some acquaintance to exhibit such a peculiarity.
But I’d be surprised if it were the only such debate.
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recounting of the friendly physicist. For the physicist, a perfectly cogent explanation
of why the balloon moved forwards is that the plane accelerated. But that explanation
leaves a big gap for the child. He does not have the requisite knowledge of fluid dynamics
to be able to bridge that gap. In principle, however, the gap is perfectly bridge-able—we
just have to teach the kid some physics. I find it incredible that the non-Humean is in a
similar state of ignorance. For that would entail that the Humean has a deeper knowledge
of the explanatory connection between H-laws and explanation. If the Humean did
possess such knowledge, surely she would have been able to communicate it to the non-
Humean in all these years.
Second, the Humean might see an obvious and immediate explanatory connection
between being an H-law and being explanatory—in the same way that the explanatory
connection between a conjunction and its conjuncts is obvious and immediate—that the
non-Humean does not. This chapter has focused on such disagreements. What we have
found, however, is that they usually amount to verbal disputes—due to differences in
the way that each party uses ‘explains’ and ‘law’. But suppose we are using the terms
consistently. It would be uncharitable to refuse the Humean the obvious and immediate
explanatory connection. But we are left scratching our heads as to how the disagreement
could arise in the first place. Why does one philosopher see an obvious explanation where
the other sees nothing at all? Is there some radical incommensurability of conceptual
schemes at play? I’m inclined to doubt this possibility, but I concede I have no convincing
argument against it. If it is accepted, however, it may turn out after all that the deadlock
is indeed unbreakable.
Third, the Humean may see no explanatory gap because the fact to be explained
is fundamental or brute. It simply can’t admit of an explanation. Perhaps it is of the
(ungrounded) essence of an H-law to be explanatory. However the story goes, we can
respect this as a dialectical possibility for the Humean. But we needn’t accept it as a
plausible possibility. With other ungrounded facts we are usually confident that they
couldn’t possibly admit of explanation. The non-Humean’s very position is that the
explanatoriness of laws can be explained. Moreover, no Humean, as far as I know, has
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ever claimed that the explanatoriness of laws is fundamental or brute. Thus, this does
not seem the correct diagnosis of the stalemate.
So much for charity. My uncharitable view is that the stalemate arises because the
Humean and her opponent have very different starting points. The Humean is guided
by the principles of Humean Supervenience: that all truth supervenes on the mosaic and
that there are no necessary connections. These are the Humean’s hinge propositions,
if you like. She will bend and twist everything else to fit around them. Her task is to
give a picture of the world as complete and coherent as possible within the confines of
Humean Supervenience. The reason I suspect this is because of something Lewis says
at the end of ‘Humean Supervenience Debugged’. He says:
A feature of Reality deserves the name of chance to the extent that it occupies the
definitive role of chance. . . Because of undermining, nothing perfectly occupies the
role, so nothing perfectly deserves the name. But near enough is good enough. If
nature is kind to us. . . [t]hey will thereby occupy the chance-role well enough to
deserve the name. To deny that they are really chances would be just silly. (1994,
p. 489)
Lewis is talking about chance but his point applies equally well to laws. Perhaps
Humeans realise that their view doesn’t fulfil all the desiderata for a theory of laws.
But they fulfil enough to deserve the name. That point is well taken. But it does not
permit the Humean to claim that their theory explains things which it clearly does not.
For the non-Humean there are explanatory burdens which are non-negotiable. A theory
of laws must explain how laws get to be explanatory and how they are confirmable.
They will thus disagree that the Humean has got ‘near enough’.
Perhaps the Humean will counter, as Lewis does, that the non-Humean’s laws do
not meet their own desiderata. Necessitation relations don’t explain just because we
call them necessitation relations. Thus, if we can’t explain explanatoriness even with
these extra unHumean posits, we might as well do without them. That point is also well
taken. Perhaps Armstrong’s view is unexplanatory. What Armstrong does do, however,
is recognise the explanatory burden. If we can’t meet the burden à la Armstrong, we
will take it upon ourselves to meet it elsehow. And this burden must be borne, for
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the Humean must deny what is painfully obvious to the rest of us: that it is perfectly
rational not to go round sticking your hand in fires.
CHAPTER 5
Conclusion
I set out to defend the posit of grounding, and to argue that building a theory of
it is a worthwhile philosophical aim. My goal was not—directly—to build my own
theory of ground. Rather, it was to address some foundational challenges, so that
grounding theorists could continue the positive work of elucidating grounding unharassed
by dubious criticisms. It is difficult, however, to say anything substantive without ruling
out certain views about grounding. And, in fact, I have said a fair few substantive things
about grounding. The space of possible grounding theories has thus narrowed as the
thesis has progressed. Ecumenicalism has been a recurring theme in this thesis. My
doubts about it are well known by now. There is something rather paradoxical about
pursuing ecumenicalism. On the one hand, we want our claims to be as interesting
and contentful as possible. On the other, the stronger our claims are, the more views
they rule out, and hence, the less ecumenical they are. Let us end on a thematic note,
then, and review the commitments I’ve made regarding grounding. As it turns out, I’ve
committed myself to a fairly detailed picture of grounding.
Chapter 2 aimed to show that the posit of grounding was at least prima facie jus-
tified. My response to the skeptic was actually fairly ecumenical. That was largely a
byproduct of my wanting to take the dialectical high ground. I wanted to show that
the skeptic’s criticisms could be met while making relatively few assumptions about
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grounding. For instance, I made no assumptions about the relata of grounding, or on
the separatism/unionism dispute. What I did argue is that (philosophical) grounding
claims derive a large part of their content from the operative background theory, and
that consequently, grounding claims are only explanatory in the context of theory. I
argued, moreover, that grounding is intimately bound up with a relational notion of
fundamentality. Such a notion of fundamentality is closest to our pretheoretic notion,
and is more useful than a notion of absolute fundamentality.
Not only did I show that grounding claims were informative, I showed that they
were necessary. We can express things with the notion of grounding which just aren’t
expressible given weaker notions of dependence. While I argued that a relational un-
derstanding of fundamentality is preferable to an absolute notion, I did not establish
that we need only the relational notion. Perhaps we need both, as Fine (2001) seems
to think. Or perhaps what Fine calls the ‘Real’ is to be understood elsehow. Nor did
I establish, definitively, that questions of relative fundamentality are inseparable from
questions of ground. Those questions require further investigation.
My aim in Chapter 3 was to show that the sense in which grounding is explanatory
could be given a plausible interpretation—one that comports with a leading theory of
explanation; and that illuminates how grounding is central to philosophical theorising.
This was important since the existence of non-causal explanations is a major motivation
for the posit of grounding. My issue with the operator view and unionism was largely
that they obscured these issues. The operator view precluded our making any commit-
ments regarding the ontology of grounding, and thus how it related to other ontologies.
And unionism offered no accompanying account of the sense in which grounding is dis-
tinctly explanatory. To put the explanatoriness of grounding on a secure footing, then, it
was necessary that I made some commitments on these issues. I argued that grounding
is a relation which itself partially grounds an epistemic notion of explanation. I argued,
moreover, that grounding and causation are unified by their being species of a general
notion of determination. Causal and metaphysical explanation are unified insofar as
the relations which ground them are unified. And regarding the nature of philosophy, I
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argued that it largely proceeds by making essence claims and deriving grounding claims
from them. Such derivations rely on generic grounding principles, the discovery of which
is the task of the metaphysician. Thus, most of philosophy turns out to be a kind of
applied metaphysics.
There are some issues that need to be addressed still. First, the unionist appeared
to have in mind a distinctly ontic sense of explanation. I was unable to reconstruct
such a notion, but I’m very curious as to what, exactly, the unionist has in mind, so I
encourage the unionist to develop a more detailed account of this kind of explanation.
Second, I argued that grounding is a relation, but I did not establish what the relata
are. More argument is needed to establish whether the relata are facts, propositions,
or entities of arbitrary category. If the relata turn out to be something fact-like, we
also need to explore cognate non-fact-relating relations, such as ontological dependence.
Third, though I claimed that grounding and causation are species of determination, I
did not address the nature of this relation itself. Is it some kind of abstraction over
its species? A determinable with grounding and causation as determinates? Are there
other species of determination? What is it about determination relations which makes
them apt to explain? There’s a lot of mileage in these questions. Lastly, I addressed a
certain kind of philosophical theory in this chapter—those aimed at real definition—and
claimed that they are simply sets of essence claims. It would be nice to have a deeper
exploration of the nature of philosophical theories. Presumably, they are not all essence
claims. Some may be grounding claims, some normative claims, or combinations thereof.
A better understanding of the philosophical theory will give us a better understanding
of how grounding claims fit into them.
The aim of Chapter 4 was to show that the notion of grounding is internally coherent—
for Sider’s dilemma apparently shows that it is not. While the problem is well known
and many solutions exist, none struck me as particularly satisfactory. Like Dasgupta, I
argued that grounding relations are grounded in essences—but unlike Dasgupta, I did
not assume that essences were groundless. I argued there was a sense in which ground-
ing is fundamental—the grounding relation exists fundamentally. And grounding has an
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essence—grounding principles, and thus, grounding facts, are grounded in essentialist
facts about grounding. This is a rather strong view on how grounding works. Ground-
ing is more like a function, encoded with principles as to what it generates, given some
input.
A key advantage of my view over its rivals was that it offered an explanation of why
there are some grounding facts we are unable to explain. To explain a grounding fact we
need to derive it via explanatory premises from some facts about the essence of ground-
ing. But the essence of grounding is not wholly known to us! Those grounding facts we
are unable to explain are grounded, or so I claim, in unknown facts about the essence of
grounding. This required that I tease apart the notions of primitivity, fundamentality,
and analysis. But we barely scratched the surface. Their interrelationships—with each
other, and with grounding and essence—are far richer, I suspect, than my brief survey
was able to capture. For instance, would a list of possible grounds (acting as a suffi-
cient condition), plus an account of essence (acting as necessary conditions) suffice for
analysis?
Lastly, my aim in Chapter 5 was to show that grounding is a useful notion. While
grounding may offer the conceptual tools for describing what it is we’re doing when
we do philosophy, can we deploy the notion consciously to help with our first-order
philosophical theorising? Well, yes—albeit indirectly. I argued that common complaints
about Humeanism are best interpreted as complaints of grounding gaps—that a Humean
ontology just can’t explain what we want it to explain. This interpretation clarifies the
structure of the dialectic in a way that favours the non-Humean. The Humean is forced
to revise her conceptions of related notions. But the Humean revision of explanation,
say, turns out to be largely useless. To recapture the useful notions we must countenance
‘necessary connections’.
It would be interesting to see if other philosophical debates can be similarly recon-
structed as debates about grounding gaps. And in general, it would be nice to see some
more applications of grounding theory. While debates about the nature of grounding
itself are all very interesting, we should bear in mind, as we learnt back in Chapter 2,
Conclusion 194
that this must ultimately be in service of some first-order philosophical goal.
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